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**REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
INTO COLLISION OF
“CAMLIN STAR” WITH
CARRICK CRAFT JETTY
AT BANAGHER, CO. OFFALY
ON 9th APRIL 2007**

REPORT No. MCIB/142



Report MCIB/142 published by The Marine Casualty Investigation Board
5th November 2009

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1. SYNOPSIS

- 1.1 On the afternoon of 9th April 2007 the pleasure craft “Camlin Star” collided heavily with the Carrick Craft jetty at Banagher, Co. Offaly.
- 1.2 As a result of this collision Ms. Ciara O'Donnell was thrown backwards and suffered back injuries.
- 1.3 The vessel was holed above the waterline on the starboard bow. No pollution was caused.

2. FACTUAL INFORMATION

Name of Vessel: “Camlin Star”

Operators: Emerald Star, The Marina, Carrick on Shannon, Co. Leitrim, Ireland.

Class of Vessel: Recreational

Built: Early 1990's by Broom Boats, Brundle, Norfolk, U.K.

Dimensions: 12.8 m x 4.1m

Sleeps: 9 (7 + 2)

Number of persons on board at time of incident: 8



“Camlin Star” at Portumna.


EVENTS PRIOR TO AND THE INCIDENT

3. EVENTS PRIOR TO AND THE INCIDENT

- 3.1 On 6th April 2007 a group of eight persons rented the “Camlin Star” from Emerald Star and set out from Portumna.
- 3.2 A number of these persons were repeat customers of Emerald Star.
- 3.3 The Captain signed a Checklist indicating acknowledgement and understanding of certain safety and hire issues. (See Appendix 7.1).
- 3.4 An Emerald Star safety video was shown to a number of the crew but not all persons travelling viewed the video.
- 3.5 The voyage proceeded without incident until the afternoon of 9th April 2007.
- 3.6 On the afternoon of 9th April 2007 the “Camlin Star” was approaching Carrick Craft jetty when, according to reports, an attempt was made to change from the cabin steering position to the upper deck conning position.

It is understood that the change-over was not successful. By the time this was realised it was too late to stop the vessel and the vessel collided heavily and at speed with a jetty post.

- 3.7 At the moment of impact Ms. Ciara O'Donnell was standing at the top of the steps, facing aft in the cabin and was thrown backwards, landing on her back having fallen into the forward cabin. (see photo indicating approximate position of Ms. O'Donnell at the time of the incident).



Ms. O'Donnell was standing about here with her back to the door immediately prior to the collision.

- 3.8 The vessel was holed on the starboard bow above the waterline (see photo) but did not take on much water and no pollution was caused.



4. FINDINGS

- 4.1 An inspection of the change-over mechanism was carried out by an Engineer and Ship Surveyor from the Marine Survey Office (see report at Appendix 7.2). The report indicates that no fault was found with the change-over control mechanism.
- 4.2 Emerald Star Portumna completed an accident report form and sent it to their Head Office in the U.K.
- 4.3 The “Camlin Star” was well maintained. Company records indicate maintenance was carried out at appropriate intervals.
- 4.4 The Emerald Star Checklist furnished to the hirer of the vessel who is described as “the Captain” does not specifically deal with the change-over levers. The video shown by Emerald Star to the Captain does not deal with change-over levers either.

5. CONCLUSIONS

- 5.1 The crew attempted a change-over from cabin control to bridge control at an inappropriate time i.e. too close to the jetty. This contributed to the collision.
- 5.2 The training in this instance appeared to have been insufficient. The use of critical equipment such as change-over levers was not specifically addressed.
- 5.3 Hire craft such as the “Camlin Star” are engaged in trade and come within the remit of the Merchant Shipping Acts 1894 - 2005.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

- 6.1 Cruise Operators should ensure that all hirers in the party are fully conversant with all aspects of the control and manoeuvring of the craft hired by them.
- 6.2 The Emerald Star Checklist should specifically highlight the procedure for changing from bridge control to cabin control and vice versa.
- 6.3 Cruise Operators should liaise closely with relevant authorities e.g., Waterways Ireland, County Councils, Irish Coast Guard, Gardai and agree appropriate reporting mechanisms to ensure a prompt response to incidents.
- 6.4 Cruise Operators should maintain a 24/7 emergency contact number. In their pre hiring instructions the clients should be advised that in the event of a serious incident/emergency they should dial 999/112 and ask for the Coast Guard.
- 6.5 All Owners, Operators, Masters, Skippers of Passenger Vessels, Cargo Vessels, Fishing Vessels and Recreational Craft are required to comply with reporting requirements for casualties as outlined in Marine Notice No. 33 of 2008 (see Appendix 7.3).

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APPENDIX 7.1

Appendix 7.1 Emerald Star Checklist.

EMERALD STAR

BOARDING TRIAL RUN CARD

Is this first cruise with Emerald Star or repeat REP ✓ DATE: 6/4 TIME: 15:45

CHECK CLIENT HAS AND UNDERSTANDS:

1.1 Holiday Guide/seen video ()
 1.2 Lifejackets and Fitting of Lifejackets. Children fitted in reception ()

DEMONSTRATE:

2.1 Handling and control of cruiser ()
 2.2 Received Trial run on cruiser ()

CHECK CLIENT CAN OPERATE

2.4 All switches on control panel & gauges (oil, water, temp) ()
 2.5 Getting underway/Getting alongside ()
 3.1 Light switches ()
 3.2 Toiler and gauges ()
 3.3 Heating system ()
 3.4 CD Player/Radio/TV if on board ()
 3.5 Fire Extinguisher/Fire Blanket ()
 Key to open Diesel/Water ()
 Fridge ()
 3.8 Binoculars ()
 3.9 Emergency Hatch ()
 3.10 Gas cooker controls and bottle switch ()
 3.11 Dinghy/Outboard Motor ()
 3.12 Ropes (trailing) ()

WARN CLIENTS ABOUT:

4.1 Navigation ()
 4.2 Wind on lakes/Groundings/when to notify base ()
 4.3 Slow in Harbours/general speed ()
 4.4 Lock times, payment method, basic operation ()
 4.5 Types of bridges, marked arches sounding horn ()
 4.6 Check water/oil gauges/water from exhaust ()
 4.7 220 volt transformer for electric razor only ()
 4.8 Man overboard (ref.Video)/Holiday guide ()
 4.9 Barbecues ()
 4.10 Mobile phone operation ()
 4.12 Cleanliness of boat on return. ()

QUESTIONS:

Is client satisfied with presentation and cleanliness of cruiser YES NO
 Has client any further question. YES NO
 Is client satisfied with instruction YES NO

LOCKS:

Going through a lock is a particular part of your cruise where we must advise you to take extra care. The information in the captain's manual related to navigation through locks and what to do if someone falls in the water in a lock in combination with the information you will receive during the trial run should enable you to make this a safe experience. Should you at the end of the trial still not feel confident to negotiate your first lock please do not leave the base without telling us. We are quite happy to come with you or meet you at the first lock however, your departure may be delayed until a member of staff becomes available to do so. We confirm that we have read and understood the instructions in relation to the going through various types of locks that we may have to cross during our cruise and as a result we feel that we can do this safely.

SIGNATURE OF CAPTAIN [Signature]

I (the hirer) acknowledge that I thoroughly understand the Terms and Conditions of Hire and that I have received instructions from the company on the use of the Cruiser and its equipment and I found everything to be in good condition. I have received instruction on the handling of the boat. I acknowledge that there is a lifebelt on board and my party has been advised on how to make use of it in the event of a person falling overboard. I acknowledge that buoyancy jackets are provided for each member of crew on board and must be worn at all times when on deck. I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT NO PORTABLE GAS EQUIPMENT, NO NAKED LIGHTS, NO PETROLEUM SPIRIT MAY BE USED OR CARRIED ABOARD THE CRUISER. ANY BARBECUES MUST BE USED WELL AWAY FROM THE CRUISER AND NOT STOWED ON BOARD UNTIL COLD.

1 OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE AND AGREE TO THE CONDITIONS OF HIRE

SIGNATURE OF CAPTAIN [Signature] **INSTRUCTOR** [Signature]

CRUISER EMUN. **DINGHY #** C79 **OUTBOARD #** -

BICYCLE # -

Appendix 7.2 Report by Marine Surveyor on Change-Over Mechanism.


Place and date of Survey: Portumna Marina, 14 May 2007.

Vessel: 7-berth cruiser.

Name of Vessel: Camlin Star

Builder: Shannon Star Boat Builder/Broom Boats, Brundle, Norfolk, U.K.

Figure 1 Change-Over Mechanism



Change-Over Mechanism from upper deck to lower deck, which is situated below lower deck level was visually tested under operation. All linkages were suitably lubricated and in good working order.

Figure 2 Morse Controls Change-Over



The Morse Controls Change-Over, which is situated under the main deck consol seat, outboard side was tested and operated satisfactorily. The selector switch was tested and operated satisfactorily.

Figure 3 Upper Deck Helm Warning



Explicit instruction situated forward of the steering helm with respect to change-over control.

Figure 4 Upper Deck Helm Controls



Upper Deck Helm position showing the size of sign in context with the surrounding instrumentation and control systems.

Figure 5 Main Deck Helm Controls



Location of change-over control at the main deck helm console.

Conclusion

Vessel was manoeuvred from both helm positions and the lock out tested under normal operating conditions. All functions operated satisfactorily.

The instructors employed by Emerald Star Cruises had no formal training.

The Emerald Star Checklist had no instruction in relation to the operation of the change-over mechanism with respect to helm position selection.

Appendix 7.3 Marine Notice No. 33 of 2008.



Department of Transport
An Roinn Iompair



Marine Notice No. 33 of 2008

Marine Casualty Reporting

For the attention of all Owners, Operators, Masters, Skippers of Passenger Vessels, Cargo Vessels, Fishing Vessels and Recreational Craft

A recent marine casualty investigation report published by the Marine Casualty Investigation Board, MCIB, recommended that the Department of Transport should remind all vessel owners, charters, masters, skippers and operators of their obligation to report marine casualties and incidents to the Marine Survey Office of the Department of Transport.

The Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act 2000 defines a Marine casualty as an event or process, which causes or poses the threat of:

- (a) death or serious injury to a person;
- (b) the loss of a person overboard;
- (c) significant loss or stranding of, or damage to, or collision with, a vessel or property; or
- (d) significant damage to the environment;

in connection with the operation of a:-

- (i) a vessel in Irish waters;
- (ii) an Irish registered vessel in waters anywhere; or
- (iii) a vessel normally located or moored in Irish waters and under the control of a resident of the state, in international waters contiguous to Irish waters.

A vessel for this purpose means any type of craft capable of being navigated on waters and includes all commercial vessels, all passenger ships and boats, all fishing vessels and all types of recreational craft.

The reporting should include relevant information including the name and description of the vessel, its position, the number of persons onboard and an accurate summary of the casualty.

Marine Notice No. 33 of 2008.

The Marine Survey Office may be contacted as follows:

MSO Dublin	MSO Cork	MSO Ballyshannon
Marine Survey Office, Department of Transport, Leeson Lane, Dublin 2.	Marine Survey Office, Department of Transport, Centre Park House, Centre Park Road, Cork.	Marine Survey Office, Department of Transport, Town Council Buildings, Abbeyview, Ballyshannon, Co. Donegal.
Tel: 01 678 3400 Fax: 01 678 3409	Tel: 021 496 8992 Fax: 021 496 8617	Tel: 071 982 2400 Fax: 071 982 2439
or by e-mail: mso@transport.ie		

Director General,
Maritime Safety Directorate,
Department of Transport,
Leeson Lane,
Dublin 2.

21 July 2008

For any technical assistance in relation to this Marine Notice please contact
The Marine Surveyors' Office, Leeson Lane, Dublin 2 +353 1 678 3400

For information in relation to technical specification/type approval of radio equipment contact the Radio Surveyors on
+353 1 678 2363 / 2364 / 2365 / 2367.

For general enquiries please contact the Maritime Safety Division at +353-1-678 3418

Any enquiries concerning Marine Notices should be addressed to:
Maritime Safety Directorate, Department of Transport, Leeson Lane, Dublin 2

Email: marinenotices@transport.ie
Or visit us at: www.transport.ie

8. LIST OF CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED

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F: + 353 (0) 9064 94147
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E: Info@waterwaysireland.org
W: www.waterwaysireland.org

Chairman,
Marine Casualty Investigation Board,
Leeson Lane,
Dublin 2

20 Jul 2009

Ref: DRAFT Report into the Collision of "Camlin Star" with Jetty on 9 Apr '07

Dear Chairman,

Please see below Waterways Ireland's response to the Draft Report into this accident.

"Waterways Ireland maintains close working relations with the Irish Coast Guard and An Garda Síochána, who have the primary responsibility as first responders in all search and rescue incidents on the inland navigations.

Waterways Ireland through its dialogue with the Irish Boat Rental Association and individual Hire Companies is satisfied that Hire Companies are aware of their statutory duties to keep Waterways Ireland informed of any incidents involving their vessels that may impact adversely on the safe use of the navigations by other users."

Yours sincerely,

Brian D'Arcy
Director of Operations



MCIB RESPONSE

The MCIB notes the contents of this letter.



Inland Waterways Association of Ireland

Crunkill, Rooskey, Co. Roscommon
Tel: +353-71 9638841, Mobile: +353-86-8217712

Att Ms Teresa Walsh

29/06/2009

Collision of "Camlin Star" on 9th April 2007

Dear Ms Walsh

We thank you for including this association in the response to the above incident. We concur with the draft findings. I would also suggest that having inspected several vessels on The Emerald Star fleet and conducted a trial, it is possible for the vessel to remain engaged in forward gear on one or other of the helm positions. In a panic situation the opposite throttle /gear may come out far enough to engage neutral (normally a method of increasing revs to charge battery's or heat water). Once out the throttle will feel as normal and by engaging full power in reverse to stop the vessel, the helmsman is actually still in forward gear on the other helm position, increasing forward power /velocity. As reported in 5.1 sufficient time to change over was not allowed. I would also comment that the staff of Emerald Star were most helpful and the standard of maintenance excellent. I also agree that changover procedure should form part of the trial run as per 6.2.

We would suggest that RNI / Coast Guard / SAR services be increased in the summer months on the Shannon and Erne Waterways.

The only part of the report that we would seek clarification on is 6.5. Many vessels are involved in minor groundings / collisions and similar incidents on the inland waterways. We as an association would seek clarification on what constitutes a reportable incident.

Yours sincerely,

Paul Garland
President
Inland Waterways Association of Ireland



MCIB RESPONSE

The MCIB notes the contents of this letter as regards the first paragraph - this matter has been dealt with in our report.

Regarding the second paragraph the Board is of the view that this is outside our remit and should be raised with the relevant authorities.

As regards the last paragraph the Board would draw attention to the contents of Marine Notice No. 33 of 2008 as set out in Appendix 7.3.

Our Ref: CMCB/AK

19 June 2009

Your Ref: MCIB/142


**MURRAY
FLYNN
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Mr John O'Donnell B.T.,
Chairman
Marine Casualty Investigations Board
Lecson Lane
Dublin 2

Attention: Eve

**Re: Ciara O'Donnell
Accident on Camlin Star – 9th April 2007**


Dear Sir,

Thank you for your letter of 11th June last enclosing draft report in this matter.


Please find enclosed a copy of email dated 15th June last received from Ciara O'Donnell setting out her observations and which she has requested be sent to you for consideration in your final report.

Should you have any queries in the meantime please do not hesitate to contact us otherwise we look forward to hearing from you with your final report.

Yours faithfully,


MURRAY FLYNN MAGUIRE

Enc.



Sent: 15 June 2009 22:04
To: Admin
Subject: Ciara O'Donnell accident.

Mr. Cian McGrath
Murray Flynn Maguire
Solicitors
12 - 16 Fairview Strand
Dublin 3.

Dear Mr. McGrath

I refer to your correspondence of June 10th 2009 and related telephone conversation.

I have studied the MCIB report and wish to make the following observations.

1. **Paragraph 3.4.** Regarding the showing of a training video, I was not shown the video. I recall one of our group saying that they (the Cruise Co.) were going to show us a video, but this didn't happen. I cannot say definitively that other members of the group were not shown the video at some stage unbeknown to me.
2. **Paragrafg 3.6.** The attempt to change the controls was from the cabin position to the upper deck position and not the other way around as stated in the report.
3. **Paragraph 3.7.** The report states that Ciara was 'thrown forward and fell backwards'. In fact I was just thrown backwards after the collision. With regard to the photograph, I was standing at the top of the small set of steps as shown and not at the bottom. When the collision occurred, I was facing toward the rear of the boat. I was thrown directly back, colliding with the door (which was closed at that moment). The door burst open and I landed in the door frame falling on a raised lip.

I am requesting that you submit my observation to the MCIB within the 28 day response period.

Yours Sincerely,

Ciara O'Donnell

MCIB RESPONSE

The MCIB has noted the contents of this communication and has made factual amendments to the report as necessary.

