

The Marine Casualty Investigation Board was established on the 25<sup>th</sup> March, 2003 under The Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act 2000

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CO. DONEGAL

**ON 13TH JUNE 2003** 

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2

# PAGE

3

1.	SYNOPSIS	4
2.	FACTUAL INFORMATION	5
3.	CIRCUMSTANCES PRIOR TO INCIDENT	9
4.	THE INCIDENT	12
5.	EVENTS FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT	13
6.	CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS	14
7.	RECOMMENDATIONS	17
8.	GLOSSARY OF TERMS	18
9.	LIST OF APPENDICES	20
10.	PHOTOGRAPHS	49
11.	LIST OF CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED	53

# 1. SYNOPSIS

1.1 The "Carrie of Camaret" (hereinafter referred to as "Cabin Fever I"), an auxiliary gaff rigged fore and aft schooner went aground on the southwest end of Tory Island off the Donegal coast on Friday afternoon 13th June 2003. All eleven people aboard, two crew and nine contestants were taking part in an RTE Reality Game. There were no fatalaties. The vessel was a total loss.

Note: All times are given in Summer Time (Local Time) i.e. GMT + 1 hour and following the casualty, times are taken from MRSC Malinhead log or Admiralty Tide Tables. Otherwise the times are estimated.

# 2. FACTUAL INFORMATION

## 2.1 Details, Description, Inspections and Certification of the Vessel.

## 2.1.1 Details of the Vessel

Name:	"Carrie of Camaret"
Flag:	United Kingdom
Port of Registry:	Plymouth
Official Number:	900273
Call Sign:	MPGZ7
IMO No.:	Not Applicable
Year of Build:	1947 as a motor fishing vessel.
Builders:	M. Cornel, Camaret, France.
Converted to a two masted auxiliary ketch: Converted to two masted auxiliary schooner: Converted by: Length Overall (LOA) including sprits: LOA Length Between Perpendiculars (LBP): Beam excluding channels: Depth amidships: Displacement fully laden: Draft fully laden: Hull material: Type of rig: Masts: Sails: Iron Ballast: Watertight Bulkheads: Auxiliary Engine:	Not known 1987/1988 Square Sail Shipyard, Bristol. 27.5 meters 20.5 meters 17.04 meters 5.88 meters 3.57 meters 3.57 meters 99.86 tonnes 2.402 meters Wood carvel Fore and aft gaff schooner 2 wooden 7 sails 17 tonnes None as built John Deere 6068 tfm 50

## 2.1.2 Description of the Vessel

The vessel was of conventional wooden construction, carvel planked on double sawn frames. It was a full-bodied hull cut away back to the sternpost. Built in 1947 trading as a crayfish carrier between Mauritania in North West Africa and France, it was one of the last wooden vessels built for that trade. After extensive refitting in 1987/88 and in 2002 it had a new engine and systems upgrade for chartering in North West Europe area (See Appendices 8.3 and 8.4).

5

## 2.1.3 Relevant Regulations and Codes.

The UK MCA apply a Code of Practice for the Construction, Machinery, Equipment, Operation and Examination of Sailing Vessels up to 24 meters Load Line Length, in Commercial Use and which do not carry Cargo or more than twelve passengers. This Code was published in 1993 and is referred to as the "Code of Practice". It is an acceptable Code of Practice for application in accordance with Regulation 16 of the UK SI No. 1072 of 1993 (Vessels in Commercial Use for Sports and Pleasure)

The Marine Surveyor's Office (MSO) in Dublin, in general, will accept a UK "Code of Practice" boat if it has had a bottom hull inspection (slipped) within the last two years and then following a satisfactory Report of Inspection of a Passenger Boat and a Declaration by the MSO surveyor a Passenger Boat Licence is issued, usually for a short term, unless the boat is slipped and inspected by the surveyor. The inspection is carried out in compliance with Irish Merchant Shipping Act 1992 and Statutory Instrument Nos. 273, 274, 555, 556 of 2002 and 648 of 2003.

A requirement for issuing a Passenger Boat licence is that the hull is inspected out of the water at least every two years.

A number of inspections were carried out between Spring 2002 and the incident. The ship complied with all applicable statutory requirements of these inspections and surveys. (See Appendix 8.6).

- **2.1.4** The ship *"Cabin Fever I"* was presented to the Irish Marine Surveyor's Office of Maritime Safety Directorate (MSD) for licensing to operate in Irish waters. This licence was granted on 3rd June 2003.
- 2.1.5 A newspaper made a claim on Sunday 22nd June 2003, which was brought to the Inspectors' attention, concerning a salvage expert stating that the lower part of the hull timbers below the ship's waterline were weakened by worm holes that were 60mm wide and that it (the hull and associated timber) was in very poor condition, soft and rotten. The photographed sections that appeared in the newspaper of the hull (i.e. two oak frames) were retrieved from the salvage expert and a consultant timber technologist, Gordon Knaggs and Associates, engaged to provide expert opinion on this. (See Appendix 8.7)

The reference in the newspaper report to "60mm" holes is probably a misprint for 6mm. Holes made by teredo are commonly 6 - 12mm wide.

## 2.2 Equipment on board.

- **2.2.1** The vessel was equipped with all required statutory items including:
  - (a) Communications equipment
  - (b) Lights and Shapes required under the Collision Regulations
  - (c) Navigational equipment:
    - (i) compass
    - (ii) deviation card
    - (iii) hand bearing compass
    - (iv) autopilot
    - (v) radar
    - (vi) GPS
    - (vii) auto depth and speed/distance log
  - (d) Navtex, Nautical Publications:
    - (i) Corrected folio of Admiralty charts for coast of Ireland together with Tide Tables,
    - (ii) Tidal stream atlas,
    - (iii) Sailing directions
    - (iv) List of Radio Signals.

### 2.3 Manning, certification and qualification of personnel.

**2.3.1** The P6 Passenger Boat Certificate requires that at least two crew are on board and that one other crewmember is on the RIB when deployed.

The following personnel on board the vessel at the time of grounding were: -

- (i) Mr. Rodger Barton, Skipper/Owner, holds a Yacht Master Offshore with a Commercial Endorsement up to 200 tonnes as issued by the UK MCA.
- (ii) Mr. Peter Culleton was appointed as the TV Skipper by Coco Television. He stated that he is a qualified shipwright but holds no formal qualifications in sailing or sea survival training. He has experience in sailing over 50,000 miles and has been a Skipper of yachts over 10 meters in length. He has skippered two 60-foot motor sailing boats and had been a Skipper on two transatlantic voyages.

Mr. Culleton's understanding of his responsibility was:

- (a) where the boat was concerned he was a member of the crew; and
- (b) where the TV/Press were concerned he was the Skipper. He set up the watch system and laid down the rules for the contestants.

- (iii) The nine contestants on board at the time of the collision are deemed crew. They were:
  - Ms. Marie Walsh Ms. Elaine Power Mr. John Carroll Mr. Andrew Fowler, Mr. Neville Fitzpatrick Ms. Fiona McGonnell Mr. Dean Ward Mr. Lee Gooch, Ms. Cath Sheridan

The above nine contestants completed courses on Personal Survival Techniques (PST), Personal Safety and Social Responsibilities (PSSR) and Ship Board Familiarisation (SBF).

## 2.4 Owners and charterers of the Vessel.

- Owner: Mr. Rodger Barton, Brighton, England.
- Charterers: Coco Television Ltd., 19 Creighton Street, Dublin 2, Ireland. MD Mr. Stuart Switzer

# 3. CIRCUMSTANCES PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT

## 3.1 Introduction.

"Cabin Fever I" was advertised as a new reality game show television programme where contestants would set off around the coast of Ireland, north about from Dublin. They would compete for the final prize of  $\leq 100,000$  and the voting television audience would eliminate one contestant each week. Refer to Appendix 8.2 for detailed explanation of the programme.

3.2 Events at Dublin prior to arrival in Tory Island on 13th June 2003.

The vessel departed Dublin on 3rd June sailing north about. It had on board ten contestants, three experienced crew and three camera personnel as passengers, a total of 16 persons.

The film crew were filming from Tuesday morning until Friday noon and generally did not stay on board overnight. From the Friday until Monday the contestants were free of the camera crew and sailed on "Cabin Fever I" to the next destination port where a live television show would take place.

Sail training was given to the contestants by Mr. Rodger Barton on Friday afternoon, Saturday and Sunday (6th, 7th and 8th June).

Watches for the contestants were arranged by Mr. Peter Culleton on the basis of three hours on and six hours off. However the contestants were also required to take part in physical challenges and were said to be issued with fairly basic food rations.

On Tuesday 10th June at Ballycastle, Co. Antrim, Mr. Warren Gunn who was the mate starting out on the voyage, departed the ship. His replacement was not due until Sunday 15th in Sligo and the ship sailed from Ballycastle (off Rathlin Island) at 23.00 hours on Wednesday 11th for Tory Island with the Skipper/Owner (Mr. Barton), TV appointed Skipper (Mr. Culleton) and nine contestants. The Met Eireann forecast was giving a small craft warning and winds as South to Southwest force 5 or 6, increasing force 6 or 7 overnight. (See Appendix 8.8 for Met Office Report) The vessel experienced strong winds and heavy seas on the voyage to Tory Island. They arrived at Tory Island Thursday evening 12th June. A "special feast" was laid on that evening for the contestants in the Island Hotel. The two crew were back on board at around 23.00 hours and the contestants returned circa 24.00/00.30 hours. After returning onboard, the appointed duty contestants maintained deck watches throughout the Friday morning while the vessel was alongside in Tory.

3.3 The operation on the day leading up to the casualty.

At 07.30 hours on Friday 13th June the schooner motored from Camusmore Bay Harbour, West Town, Tory Island to the Magheraroarty area in Inishboffin Bay (See area A at Appendix 9.1).

From there, sails were set and the vessel was set a course to go north about Inishbeg Island, to an area east of Keelasmore Sound and close to the Peninsula and tacked when the echo sounder reached 8 meters. (See area B at Appendix 8.1). The purpose of this was to complete the individual contestants address to the television cameras and to facilitate onboard and helicopter filming that had to be carried out close to land.

Just before 12.00 hours when north east of Inishbeg the wind was an average of 15 to 17 knots (force 4 on the Beaufort scale). At 12.20 hours Peter Culleton took the RIB away and clear of the schooner to allow for helicopter filming. Mr. Barton was for that period the only crew on board with the nine contestants. Mr. Culleton rejoined the vessel at 13.30/13.45 hours and secured the RIB to trail astern on a line. Mr. Culleton changed out of his thermal clothing, oilskins and lifejacket and left the deck.

After the last helicopter shots were taken the course was set  $310^{\circ}$  (M) on automatic pilot and hard on the port tack with the engine clutched in. This course was set to keep Tory Island on the starboard side and was set at about 14.00 hours. (See Appendix 8.1 between lines "FF" and "GG"). The wind was south west by west and had dropped to about 13/15 knots gusting to 17 knots giving the vessel a probable speed of 6.8 or 6.9 knots. A contestant stated that he thought the speed of the vessel was not more than 4.5 knots.

Mr. Barton stated that it was perfect sailing conditions and had all the sails (six) except for the "fisherman sail" set. He stated that when he left the deck they were on course to clear Tory Island on a course over the ground of 310° (M) held by the autopilot. On Friday 13th June he said the tides were half way between springs and neaps and at 14.00 hours the tide had just started to flood. He also stated that there could have been an unaccounted tidal current one-mile south of Tory Island. Due care did not appear to be given in calculation of tidal effects in this area. (Refer to Section 4.4)

3.4 Location of Personnel at the time of the Grounding.

Also at 14.00 hours the contestants duty rotas had changed and shortly after that Ms. Walsh, Mr. Carroll and Ms. Power had gone on deck to keep a lookout. The position is indicated in Appendix 8.1 between lines "FF" and "GG". Also on deck, though off duty and resting, were Ms. Sheridan, Mr. Gooch, Mr. Fowler and Mr. Ward. Mr. Fitzpatrick was the duty cook finishing off in the galley and Ms. McGonnell was the assistant duty cook washing up.

CONTD.

Sometime before the grounding one of the off duty contestants remembered looking up and saying to Mr. Barton that they were on a collision course (for the lighthouse) and that Mr. Barton altered course further up into the wind (to port). This was confirmed by another contestant.

Mr. Barton stated that at the time of grounding both Mr. Culleton and himself were on duty. He was in the chartroom and had been below decks for at least 20 minutes and Mr. Culleton said that he was in the galley. The three lookouts, Ms. Walsh, Mr. Carroll and Ms. Power stated that Mr. Culleton had come on deck to instruct them to keep a look out for lobster pots. This is estimated at about 15 minutes or less by the contestants and by Mr. Barton at about 5 minutes before the schooner grounded. It is probable at that stage that Mr. Culleton said that when he went down the amidships companionway he glanced to starboard and saw they were clearing the breakers. This was probably in the vicinity of line "CC" (See Appendix 9.1).

# 4. THE INCIDENT

4.1 At approximately 14.25 hours the "Cabin Fever I" struck rocks at Camusmore Bay. When the vessel grounded two contestants stated that Mr. Barton was in the galley and came up the forward companionway. Mr. Barton stated that he was in the chartroom and exited onto the deck from the aft companionway.

Mr. Culleton said that he was below in the galley when the grounding occurred.

- 4.2 The engines were put into maximum stern power and sails were struck immediately. They tried to get the RIB in order to attempt towing off but the trailing painter had snapped and the RIB drifted away. There was a lot of heavy movement on the vessel and screeching of the timbers. The anchor was considered but it was on the catshead and flukes up on the bulwark. It would require a block and tackle to rig it up for letting go. The breaking waves were pounding the vessel further in on the shore.
- 4.3 At 14.30 hours Malin MRSC received a Pan Pan (Urgency signal) announcing that a yacht Carrie had run aground on the western edge of Tory Island. The GPS position (corrected to the chart with 0°00.04' E Longitude) was reported as Latitude 55°15.6' North, Longitude 008°14.5' West that is a position as indicated on Admiralty Chart 2752 inside Bullighonawaush on the south and western end of Tory Island. (See Appendix 9.1).
- 4.4 The weather conditions were good with about 14 to 16 knots of wind from south west by west. The visibility was good. High Water at Tory was given as 17.47 hours and High Water at Galway was 17.07 hours. The tides were making with full Spring Tide on Sunday 15th June. The North East flood was estimated to have started about 11.20 hours or shortly after that and had probably achieved a rate of 1<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> to 1<sup>3</sup>/<sub>4</sub> knots between 14.00 and 14.30 hours. A local fisherman on the scene said that it was between 1 and 2 knots. There was a slight to moderate sea with a low swell left over from the strong winds of the previous days. The wind and tide were acting in the same general direction. (See Appendix 9.9. for the Direction of Main Flood Stream).

# 5. EVENTS FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT

5.1 Following the grounding, Mr. Barton said that they needed to get off the boat. The initiative and leadership was taken by one of the contestants, Mr. Andrew Fowler, who is a strong swimmer and had good sailing experience before joining the boat. Mr. Fowler secured around himself a long line that was extended by Mr. Dean Ward (another contestant).

MRSC tasked Helicopter R110, which arrived on the scene at 14.57 hours.

5.2 The fishing vessel "Cara Maith" also responded, as did the Aranmore Lifeboat. Four persons, Mr. Barton, Mr. Culleton, Mr. Gooch and Mr. Ward remained on board, the remainder having made the shore at 15.40 hours. Helicopter R110 transferred a pump from the Lifeboat to "Cabin Fever I". At 16.31 hours whilst attempting to place a second pump on "Cabin Fever I" the helicopter was informed that the remaining crew were abandoning ship. The helicopter lifted the remaining crew and transported them ashore. (See Appendix 9.10).

## 6.1 Conclusions

- (i) The immediate causes of this grounding were:
- (a) No effective watch keeping on the deck by the experienced crew and no clear requirement for at least one of the experienced crew to be on deck at all times while at sea.
- (b) When the adjustment upwind to the course being steered was made by Mr. Barton, he should have monitored the effectiveness of the action taken, particularly as the wind and tide were acting in the same direction and pushing onto a lee shore very close by. The steering area remained unattended with the vessel on automatic pilot.
- (c) Fatigue had more than likely developed among the crew and contestants. This was exacerbated by:
  - (i) Being short one experienced crewmember. Additional workload was imposed on the two experienced crew to deal with the filming. For a period of time Mr. Barton was the only experienced member of crew on board from about 12.20 hours to 13.45 hours while Mr. Culleton was in the RIB lying clear of the schooner for filming purposes.
  - (ii) A late Thursday night out by the contestants and crew after a heavy weather passage from Rathlin Island followed by an early Friday morning start.
- 6.2 Findings
  - (i) During the course of the voyage the conditions of the Passenger Boat Licence were breached as follows:
  - (a) The vessel sailed from Ballycastle (Rathlin Island) in adverse weather conditions, which is clearly in breach of Condition 2 (the boat must only be used in favourable weather conditions) of the Passenger Boat Licence.
  - (b) The vessel sailed from Tory Island on Friday 13th with only two experienced crew on board in the knowledge that one of them would be off the schooner for a period using the RIB. This is a clear breach of the minimum crew requirements as stated on the Passenger Boat Licence. There were two periods when the vessel was left without the minimum crew on board (a) when Mr. Barton took the film crew ashore in Magheraroarty earlier in the morning, and (b) when Mr. Culleton took the RIB clear of the schooner for helicopter filming purposes.
  - (ii) The command structure on board was not clear to the contestants. Most of the contestants were confused as to who was in charge.

- (iii) The three contestants who were on lookout duty stated that they were instructed by Mr. Peter Culleton to keep a look out for lobster pots. They were all extremely tired and suffering from varying degrees of fatigue.
- (iv) As part of the conditions for the Passenger Boat Licence the contestants were required to wear Personnel Floatation Devices (PFD's) as supplied by Coco Television when on and above decks. Some of the contestants made comments regarding the PFD's where it either nearly came over the head or was excessively tight around the neck following inflation. (See Appendix 9.11 for the observations by Sea & Shore Safety Services who were requested by the MCIB to perform some functional observations).
- (v) No fault was found with using the automatic pilot steering arrangement however there should be an experienced crewmember in immediate attendance. Refer to Section 6.1 (i) above.
- (vi) Mr. Fowler was given genuine praise and recognition by his co-contestants as to his bravery and unshakable leadership.
- (vii) The life raft was inflated and made ready though not utilised. The actual procedure carried out for abandonment was considered a safer option due to the action of the waves where "*Cabin Fever I*" grounded.
- (viii) The contestants were satisfied with the training they had received ashore and the induction training prior to departure. The 2-day Basic Training they received before sailing kept everyone calm and reassured and served its purpose. This training, while not specifically a regulatory requirement for this type of operation, was a condition imposed by the Marine Surveyor's Office.
- (ix) The Global Positioning System (GPS) on board was taken from the vessel at the time of the incident by Mr. Barton. Mr. Barton maintains that he lost the GPS ashore prior to the arrival of the MCIB Investigator. This navigational item could have been interrogated in order to establish with a greater degree of accuracy the history of the vessel's positions and track leading up the grounding.
- (x) Shortly after grounding, the vessel was being pounded onto the rocks by the swell left over from the day before and the people were being thrown around quite vigorously. A fisherman working in the area said that at 15.05 hours the schooner was lying on its side and that it was too dangerous to approach it.

# CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS

CONTD.

(xi) One contestant remained on board instead of going ashore with the other contestants. Prior to leaving the boat he went down three times into the accommodation to retrieve personal belongings. When he abandoned the boat he attempted to swim ashore with the personal belongings dragging him under water. The lifejacket that he was wearing was coming up over his head and he said that he did not have time to fiddle with the small plastic buckle attachment to the lifejacket and that it was very hard to put the tapes through.

The Skipper/Owner should have ensured that the last contestant to leave did so by helicopter and should not have permitted him to re-enter the accommodation in order to retrieve personal belongings.

(xii) The persons that had to abandon "Cabin Fever I" expressed deep feelings for the people of Tory Island who had assisted them during the abandonment, some of them wading out in the dangerous surf including the Coast Guard Area Officer - Mr. Patsy Dan Rodgers. The islanders also helped with comfort, food and sleeping arrangements. The work of the Irish Air Corp Dauphin Helicopter R 110 under the command of Commandant Clancy acting as the on-scene commander and twice landing their winch man on to "Cabin Fever I" should be recognised as equal to any air rescue service under the circumstances. Also in attendance though standing off ready to give assistance as required, were the RNLI Arranmore lifeboat and crew, the fishing vessel with Skipper Mr. James Sweeney and his crew and the customs personnel in their RIB. Consideration should also be given to the MRSC operators who co-ordinated the rescue services.

# 7. RECOMMENDATIONS

- 7.1 Re-issue Marine Notice No. 9 of 2003 being applicable to Passenger Boats and re-iterate to persons in charge of Passenger Boats, Charterers, Owners and others, the requirement for passage planning, visual watch keeping and understanding the effects and the movement of the tides. This Marine Notice should include guidance on parallel indexing. It is understood that the Department of Marine will issue new regulations in this area which will deal with this issue.
- 7.2 The Maritime Safety Directorate should put in place a Safe Manning Document for all Passenger Boats to state:
  - (a) the crew required,
  - (b) their qualifications and experience,
  - (c) their responsibilities,
  - (d) the person in charge, and
  - (e) requirements for suitable rest periods.
- 7.3 The Maritime Safety Directorate should put in place a Passenger Boat Certificate of Qualification, Proficiency or Competency by examination and/or assessment for persons in charge of or acting as crew of Passenger Boats.
- 7.4 Such undertakings as this should have adequate risk assessment by a Marine Consultant carried out prior to departure by the owner/ charterers.
- 7.5 The MCIB recommends that the Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources issue a safety pamphlet covering the correct use and wearing of lifejackets.

# 8. GLOSSARY

- PST Personal Survival Techniques involves classroom and practical training in a swimming pool using lifejackets and liferafts. Where the lifejackets used are the inherent type, instruction will also be given on the correct use of inflatable lifejackets. The course is approved under STCW Regulation VI by the MSD (Maritime Safety Directorate). Duration is normally one day.
- PSSR Personal Safety and Social Responsibility is designed to heighten awareness of the dangers on board the vessel, how to identify hazards and reduce or eliminate them. Duration  $\frac{1}{2}$  day. Also MSD approved.
- Schooner A fore-and aft rigged vessel with 2 to 6 masts, common on the coasting and fishing trades and usually has a rounded bottom without a keel thus permitting trading in shallow waters. It is also referred to as a fore-and-aft gaff rigged schooner. If compared with its cousin the "Asgard II", which is a brigantine, or the "Malcolm Miller", a square topsail schooner, the fore-and-aft schooner is said to have the advantage of being a better craft when sailing close-hauled. It generally requires a smaller crew than a square rigged vessel of the same size. The two masted schooner rig is generally considered more suitable for hulls with overall length ranging from 36 to 130 feet.
- RIB Rigid Inflatable Boat.
- P6 LICENCE Passenger Boats with no more than twelve passengers on board used for domestic voyages in smooth waters, partially smooth waters or to sea, in the course of which the passengers are engaged actively and solely in waterborne activities in which the passenger boats form an integral and necessary part of those activities.
- EPIRB Emergency Positioning Indicating Radio Beacon operating on a frequency that will alert MRCC when the beacon is activated.
- VHF DSC Digital Selective Calling on vhf radio that when activated will set off an alarm to coast radio stations and ships that are operating on the DSC system. The VHF DSC normally has an operating range of 30 to 40 miles

## FAVOURABLE WEATHER CONDITIONS

The ship should operate only when weather conditions and official weather forecasts for the period of the voyage are favourable. This is a compensatory measure to offset the failure to reach full compliance with the Load Line Regulations. Although there is no legal definition of these conditions it is intended that they should be interpreted by the master or person-in-charge as being where the visibility is good and when the combined effects of wind, sea or swell upon the ship under consideration are never greater than those which would cause moderate rolling or pitching or result in shipping seas on to the weather deck or in the case of open boat over the gunwale.

Of course the above interpretation could vary according to size, type and sea handling capabilities of the ship under consideration including the force, direction, fetch and duration of the wind and intended area of operation.

A good working knowledge of the ship and its behaviour under varying weather conditions with regular attention to weather forecasts for the area of operation is required.

- TIDES The general motion of the tides consists of an alternate vertical Rise and Fall, and horizontal Flow and Ebb, occupying an average period of half a Lunar day, or about 12 hours 25 minutes. The times and heights of High and Low water are available from the Admiralty Tide Tables Volume 1.
- KNOT A measurement of nautical miles per hour.

NAUTICAL MILE 6,080 Feet.


# LIST OF APPENDICES

# 9. LIST OF APPENDICES

- 9.1 Abstract from the Admiralty Chart No. 2747;
- 9.2 RTE Media Release 28/03/2003; 4 pages;
- 9.3 Profile and tank arrangement of "Cabin Fever I";
- 9.4 Sail Plan;
- 9.5 Rough sketch of bulkhead arrangement prior to issue of P6 Passenger Boat Licence;
- 9.6 History of Recent Inspection and Certification of the vessel;
- 9.7 Reports from Timber Technologist. Four pages and two pages photographs and newspaper article on Sunday 22nd June 2003;
- 9.8 Met Eireann Weather Forecasts and Weather Report;
- 9.9 Abstract from the Admiralty Tide Tables giving the Direction of Main Flood Stream;
- 9.10 Times of Tasking at the time of the Incident;
- 9.11 Report on Lifejackets from Sea and Shore Safety.
- 9.12 Photographs.
  - 9.12.1 Appears to show end of frames where they are butted against the keel. No fracture of frames.
  - 9.12.2 End of frames rounded and abraded, fastenings pulled out.
  - 9.12.3 Most ribs intact joints parted
  - 9.12.4 Fastenings pulled through and out of planking
  - 9.12.5 Wood soft at some fastenings. Possible decay in one frame. Butt joint in plank.
  - 9.12.6 Apparent decay at base of mast.
  - 9.12.7 Fastenings pulled through. Considerable abrasion evident, not suggestive of decay.
  - 9.12.8 Splintery fractures typical of sound wood.

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## Appendix 9.1




Abstract from the Admiralty Chart No. 2747


# **APPENDIX 9.2**

## Appendix 9.2

RTE Media Release 28/03/2003



### RTE Media Release 28/03/2003



### RTE Media Release 28/03/2003





who are this week's heroes and zeroes. With ten very different people stuck in close proximity in difficult conditions will it be a case of The Love Boat or will it be more like Mutiny on the Bounty?

At the end of each show the phone lines will open and the fate of all the contestants will be in the hands of the viewers. Viewers will vote to keep their favourite contestants on board and in the running. Contrl./.

#### Contd/.3

Every Monday night Cabin Fever Live will be broadcast live from a different port. Over the course of the series the show will be coming to Belfast, Sligo, Galway, Limerick, Dingle, Cork and Waterford ending with the grand finale in Dublin. Cabin Fever Live will reveal the results of the public vote and the contestant with the least amount of votes will have to walk the plank live on national television.

On the final weekend there will be just three contestants left. As they sail into Dublin Port for the final public vote, they will be counting on the viewers' votes to decide the eventual winner of the <100,000 big prize.

Julien Vignoles, Executive Producer, RTÉ said today " This is going to be a genuinely Irish reality series. Viewers get to see the country and the coastline at its best and the ten lucky people at their worst ! They also get backbling, sea sickness and intrigue from the comfort of their living rooms! And of course the chance to decide it all by voting with their phones."

COCO Managing Director Stuart Switzer added, "We are sending out an open call to everyone in the country to apply to take part in Cabin Fever and we want to hear from as many people as possible. This is going to be an incredible advonture for the final ten who are chosen. Added to that we have a €100,000 prize and the chance to become a TV star up for grabs, so we are expecting a fantastic response. It's not necessary for contestants to have had previous sailing experience but they should be able to swim. The only restrictions that apply are that contestants must be over 18, reasonably fit, up for an adventure and be available to take part full time for eight weeks in June and July this year."

Anyone who wishes to take part in Cabin Fever should call 1570 71 81 91 (from the Republic, calls will cost €1.27 per minute inci VAT) or 0905 0710020 (from Northern Ireland, calls will cost 75p per minute

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# Appendix 9.2

## RTE Media Release 28/03/2003


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	CABIN
	THE MARINE C
	RTÉ
	Incl. WAT) to receive an application form in the post. Service provider Phonovation Ltd: Helpline 1890 927 117.
	TIZ. All completed application forms must be received by 5PM on Monday, 14" April 2003.
	ALL COMPLETED APPLICATION FORMS MUST BE RECEIVED BY JPM ON MUNURY, 14" APRIL 2003.
	ENDS
	END3
	For more information please contact:
	Karen Fitzpatrick at <i>ignite pr s. marketing</i> on 01 670 4500 or 086 814 9290 for COCO Television
	Ann Coughlan, Press Officer Entertainment & Music, BTE on 01 208 3161
	Ann oluginan, Fress enicer Entertainnent & Music, and en el 200 3101

# **APPENDIX 9.3**

## Appendix 9.3

26


Profile and tank arrangement of "Cabin Fever I"



E

## Appendix 9.4


## Sail Plan



# **APPENDIX 9.5**

# Appendix 9.5

Rough sketch of bulkhead arrangement prior to issue of P6 Passenger Boat Licence.



History of Recent Inspection and Certification of the vessel.

- (i) The UK MCA approved the Stability Information Booklet on 13/08/1996 provided by Woolfson Unit for Marine Technology and Industrial Aerodynamics (University of Southampton) for the vessel as a UK Category 2 area of operation.
- (ii) Mr. Rodger Barton Skipper/Owner purchased the vessel in 2002. It was taken to a wooden ship repairer in Gloucester where structural repairs were carried out during Spring 2002. These included some re-planking, frame repair, ongoing caulking maintenance and seam paying identified as necessary during a survey by a qualified yacht surveyor. The original Baudouin engine was replaced by a new 225hp John Deere engine. On completion of this work the vessel transferred from MECAL (Marine Engineering Certifying Authority Ltd.) to YDSA (Yacht Brokers, Designers and Surveyors Association) and was issued a Compliance Document (SCV2) in accordance with the UK Marine and Coastguard Agency (MCA) Code of Practice as a Category 2 vessel (60 miles from a safe haven) for up to 16 persons. Since May 2002 the Skipper/Owner was reported to have made considerable minor improvements to the vessel.
- (iii) MCA Southampton Marine Office issued a Report of Inspection and Survey on a Passenger-Sailing vessel on 1/08/2002 and no deficiencies were recorded. The relevant certificates at the time of inspection were: - Code of Practice YDSA Category 2 issued 6/07/02 and expired 30/05/07. A UK Class VI (restricted to Solent between Needles and Bembridge with 36 passengers and five crew in daylight and fair-weather) certificate was issued that day by UK MCA and expired 31/10/02.
- (iv) Between the period of the initial inspection for compliance (SCV2) in May 2002 and the first annual on 15th May 2003 the YDSA surveyor stated he had visited the vessel while on the slipway at Ramsgate probably in November 2002. The purpose for the slipping was to clarify a problem with propeller vibration. Minor seam re-paying was carried out during the slipping. The surveyor stated that there was no evidence of any damage or deterioration below the waterline during that visit.
- (v) An initial inspection was carried out at Gloucester on 14th April 2003 by the Marine Surveyor's Office of the Maritime Safety Directorate, Ireland. A short term Passenger Boat Licence would be issued subject to 1) Forward bulkhead door to be reinstated and bulkhead to make as watertight as reasonably practicable with a bilge pump to provide for the space; 2) Liferafts to change for SOLAS approved liferafts for all persons on board; 3) Fit VHF DSC and EPIRB and 4) Muster list to produce for all persons on board.

Following dry-docking and propeller change in Gloucester Docks the first annual inspection by an YDSA surveyor was carried out while the vessel was afloat on 15th May 2003.


- (vii) On 31st May 2003 in addition to items covered in (iv) above the MSO surveyor made a Report of Inspection of a Passenger Boat and required the owner/skipper to complete a list of 11 safety items before issuing a P6 Passenger Boat Licence. Five items were required to complete before a P6 Passenger Boat Licence for the on board RIB tender was issued. The Passenger Boat Licences were issued on 3rd June for a limited period to expire 31st August 2003.
- (viii) An MCIB Ship Surveyor inspected the remains of the wreck on Sunday 15th June 2003. The following points were noted:
  - the shift of butts were carefully examined. Areas were noted not to be in accordance with conventional wooden boat building practice;
  - there appeared to be no hanging knees. It would be normal practice to fit hanging knees at least in the way of the chain plates on sailing vessels;
  - the bilge stringer appeared to have been recently replaced and only run for approximately half the length of the vessel.

The plying limit conditions for issuing the P6 for the schooner were that the schooner would not be more that 30 miles from land and 12 hours from a safe haven with a maximum of 16 persons (maximum 4 passengers where 10 contestants were deemed crew) on board and a minimum of 2 crew and 1 other crew for the RIB with restrictions for the RIB as to the distance from schooner and land when in use for transferring passengers. The RIB was limited to three passengers (film crew).

Note: Gloucester Docks Boat Yard has experience in dealing with wooden sailing boats. Ongoing replacement of timber is normal in wooden boats.

# Reports from Timber Technologist. Four pages and two pages photographs and newspaper article on Sunday 22nd June 2003

Gordon Knaggs & Associates Consultant Timber Technologists Captain D. Linehan, 21-10-2003. Dept. of the Marine. Dear Captain Linehan, Attached please find my report on the frames from "Carrie of Camaret". I would also like to make a few extra comments, also some comments on the photographs which you gave to me last week. 1. The newspaper article talked of 60mm "wormholes". The only definite insect attack, probably by weevil, left 1.5-2mm holes in a small area of sapwood. The wider grooves in the same area may not be due to insects. There was no sign of marine borers (Teredo or Gribble). 2. Photographs ex. Mowatt. Labels Nos. 1-8 on the back. 2.1 Photo appears to show ends of frames where they butted against the keel. No fracture of frames. 2.2 Ends of frames rounded and abraded, fastenings pulled out. 2.3 Most ribs intact - joints parted. 2.4 Fastenings pulled through and out of planking. 2.5 Wood soft at some fastenings. Possible decay in one frame. Butt joint in plank. 2.6 Apparent decay at base of mast. 2.7 Fastening appear to have pulled through matching sections. 2.8 Do. 3. Photographs ex. Linehan. Labels 1A-6A on back. 3.1 (1A) Fastenings pulled through. Considerable abrasion evident, not suggestive of decay. 3.2 Splintery fractures, typical of sound wood. 3.3 ? Newer frames alongside older, possibly decayed frames. 3.4 Not oak, probably softwood. Possible decay. 3.5 Surface decay in frames. Planking apparently soft at fastenings. 3.6 ? Previous repair. I hope these comments will assist. If you have any queries regarding my report, please do not hesitate to contact me. Yours sincerely, Gordon Knaggs. Gordon R. Knaggs A.I.W.Sc. The Gables Baldoyle Road Sutton Dublin 13 Ireland Tel/Fax:- 01-8396783 Mob. 087-6886871 E-mail:- gordonknaggs@eircom.net



# **APPENDIX 9.7**

### Appendix 9.7

#### Report No. 00379

21-10-2003

#### Examination of Oak Frames.

#### Summary.

Two oak frames, taken from the wreckage of the vessel "Carrie of Camaret" were Examined. Areas of fungal decay and insect attack in these frames were limited in extent. Erosion and softening of the timber around fastenings, probably due to electrolytic action, was also present. The bulk of the timber was sound.

#### Examination.

Two frame sections, said to have come from near the turn of the bilge, were received. Section 1. was approx. 800mm long and 150x100mm in section, tapering. Grey paint was present on two faces. Erosion, some 2-3mm deep was present on one unpainted face. A microscopical examination indicated that this was most probably due to the action of "soft rot" fungi. Below the eroded surface the wood was hard and sound. An area of sapwood (220x15x10mm) was present at one end. This had been attacked by terrestrial insects in the past and was soft. There was considerable rust staining on the wood at the position of some fastenings, with some localised softening of the wood at these points. Other than at the areas noted above, the wood was sound and hard. Section 2. was approx. 950x150x100mm, with a slight curve at mid-length. White and blue-grey paint was present on two sides. See Fig. 2. The grain was generally parallel to the two arms, indicating that it was cut from a grown section. The section was split along its length, with stains indicating that some of this splitting was present for a considerable time. Very localised erosion was present at one point on one unpainted face, indicative of soft rot. This did not penetrate more than 2-3mm. Localised softening of the wood was present at the position of some fastenings.

Gordon Knaggs & Associates Page 1 of 4-

Report No. 00379

21-10-2003

#### Discussion and Conclusions.

Both sections were of oak heartwood, with the exception of a very small portion of Frame 1 where sapwood, the outer less durable portion of the tree, was included. The insect attack noted in this area probably occurred before construction and is of no significance. Oak heartwood is of high durability and was the traditional species for use as frames.

"Soft rot" caused by the action of micro-fungi, is normally found in wood which stays at a very high moisture content – a typical environment being cooling towers. In this case, it seems to occur on the surface between the frames and the planking. The surface erosion is typical of soft rot and the effect on strength in this case is negligible.

Chemical attack of wood can occur due to electrolytic action between dissimilar metals – this is sometimes referred to as "nail sickness". Such action appears to have occurred around some of the fastenings and this may have affected the rigidity of the joints at these fastenings.

Blackening of the oak was widespread in both pieces. This is due to a reaction between the tannins in the oak and iron compounds. It is not an indicator of decay and does not weaken the wood.


Photographs of these frames showing some of the features mentioned above, are attached.

Gordon Knaggs & Associates Page 2 of 4

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# **APPENDIX 9.7**

# Appendix 9.7






37

### Appendix 9.8

### Met Eireann Weather Forecasts and Weather Report.




38



CONTD.

### Appendix 9.8



	Text of Gale warning
	NIL
	Text of Small Craft Warning
Southwest winds will	reach force 6 at times tonight or tomorrow on all coasts of Ireland
Coastal Reports	at 6 PM
Malin Head	East-Northeast, 01 Knot, Rain shower, 4 Miles, 1013, Rising slowly
Rosslare	South-Southwest, 12 Knots, Cloudy, 26 Miles, 1016, Steady
Roches Pt (Automatic)	South-Southwest, 13 Knots, More than 10 Miles , 1015, Steady
Valentia	South-Southwest, 13 Knots, Gust 24 Knots, Fair, 26 Miles, 1014, Steady
Belmullet	South-Southwest, 19 Knots, Gust 29 Knots, Fair, 21 Miles, 1012, Falling slowly
Dublin Airport	Southwest, 13 Knots, Rain shower, 21 Miles, 1014, Steady
Buoy M1 53.1N, 11.2W	South-Southwest, 16 Knots, WAVE HT 02.5 m, 1012, Falling slowly
Buoy M2 53.5N, 5.4W	South-Southwest, 17 Knots, WAVE HT 01.5 m, 1015, Falling slowly
Buoy M3 51.2N, 10.50W	South-Southwest, 12 Knots, WAVE HT 02.3 m, 1015, Steady
Buoy M4 54.7N 9.1W	West-Southwest, 04 Knots, WAVE HT 01.3 m, 1012, Steady

oca Crossings	State of sea for the next 46 hours
Dublin - Holyhead	Moderate, decreasing slight
Rosslare - South Wales	Moderate, decreasing slight
Cork - South Wales	Moderate or rough, decreasing slight or moderate.
Rosslare - France	Moderate or rough, decreasing moderate
Cork - France	Moderate or rough, decreasing moderate

#### Next update before 0100 hours

40

A detailed forecast may be obtained by dialling *Weatherdial* on 1550 123 855. Calls cost € 0.73 per minute (Incl. VAT).

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## Appendix 9.8

6	WeatherDial Fax Product Code 0021	
$(\mathfrak{S})$	General Forecast Division	v
1	Fax: 1570 131 838	WEATHERDIAL
NALET	Sea Area Forecast	
éireann	Sea Area Forecast	
Se	a Area Forecast until : 2400 hours Thursda Issued at 2400 hours Wednesday, 11-Ju	
1. Gale warnin;	g: NIL	
Small craft w	varning : in operation	
	cal Situation at 2100: An unstable South to South depression of 996 hPa about 300 miles northwest of d.	
3. Forecast for	coasts from : Viglentia to Slyne Hd in Fair Ha	
	o Southwest force 5 or 6, increasing force 6 or 7 over Thursday. Stronger gusts throughout in showers.	might . Decreasing Southwest
Weather : Sho	wers or longer spells of rain, with a risk of scattered th	understorms.
Visibility : Mod	lerate at times in rain or showers, otherwise good.	
Forecast for co	asts from : Fair Hd to Carnsore Pt to Valentia and the	Irish Sea
	o Southwest force 4 or 5, increasing Southwest force r Thursday. Stronger gusts throughout in showers.	5 or 6 overnight . Decreasing
Weather : Scat	tered showers, with a risk of isolated thunderstorms.	
Visibility : Mod	ferate at times in showers, otherwise good.	
3a. Warning of	Heavy Swell : Nil.	
	a further 24-hours until 2400 hours, Friday, 1. s, decreasing light to moderate Southwest or variable.	

#### Warning of heavy Atlantic swell : NIL

Text of Gale warning

NIL

Text of Small Craft Warning					
Southwest winds will reach force 6 or 7 at times tonight or during Thursday on all coasts of					
Ireland.					

Coastal Reports	at 11 PM
Malin Head	South, 11 Knots, Recent rain shower, 6 Miles, 1012, Steady
Rosslare	South-Southwest, 08 Knots, Cloudy, 16 Miles, 1017, Steady
Roches Pt (Automatic)	South-Southwest, 10 Knots, Greater than 10 Miles , 1016, Rising slowly
Valentia	South, 09 Knots, Recent rain shower, 16 Miles, 1015, Rising slowly
Belmullet	South-Southwest, 12 Knots, Gust 24 Knots, Fair, 18 Miles, 1012, Steady
Dublin Airport	South-Southwest, 09 Knots, Cloudy, 18 Miles, 1015, Rising slowly
Buoy M1 53.1N, 11.2W	South-Southwest, 17 Knots, WAVE HT 02.6 m, 1012, Steady
Buoy M2 53.5N, 5.4W	South-Southwest, 15 Knots, WAVE HT 01.2 m, 1015, Steady
Buoy M3 51.2N, 10.50W	South-Southwest, 12 Knots, WAVE HT 02.2 m, 1015, Steady
Buoy M4 54.7N 9.1W	South-Southwest, 11 Knots, WAVE HT 01.5 m, 1012, Steady


Sea Crossings	State of sea for the next 48 hours	
Dublin - Holyhead	Moderate later slight	
Rosslare - South Wales	Moderate later slight	
Cork - South Wales	Moderate later slight	
Rosslare - France	Moderate	
Cork - France	Moderate	

#### Next update before 0700 hours

A detailed forecast may be obtained by dialling *Weatherdlal* on 1550 123 855. Calls cost € 0.73 per minute (Incl. VAT).

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Abstract from the Admiralty Tide Tables giving the Direction of Main Flood Stream.



-43

							LAT 53*	16'N	LONG 9'0	3'W							
TIME 20	NEUT	(амт)				TIM	IS AND HEIGH	ITS O	F HIGH AND U	OW W	ATERS				YE	NR 200	1
Time 10512 1053 TH 1720 2015	H 47 0.8 4.8 0.8	16	Time 0458 1051 1714 2312	m 5.3 0.3 5.4 0.2	1127	m 45 12 48 1.1	16 0016 1201 M 1828	m 5.0 0.8 5.1			16 0017 16 0017 0040 1202 1901	m 0.5 4.8 0.9 5.0	1 0048 0718 F 1253 1922	A 0.5 4.7 0.8 4.8	16 84	0111 0747 1324 2000	2.6 4.6 1.0 4.7
2 0547 1123 F 1000 2947	4.7 0.9 4.8 0.9	17	0543 1133 1758 2357	5.3 0.3 5.4 0.2	<b>2</b> 0634 1200 M 1840	4.5 1.2 4.6	17 0081 0708 TU 1247 1915	0.5 4.8 0.9 5.0	2 0024 0655 W 1228 1901	0.9 4.5 1.1 4.6	17 0100 0733 TH 1313 1945	0.5 4.8 1.0 4.8	2 0124 0755 54 1333 2002	0.5 4.7 0.8 4.7	50	0147 0825 1400 2038	0.8 4.4 1.2 4.4
3 1152 SA 1032	4.7 1.0 4.7		0629 1216 1843	5.2 0.5 5.2		1.1 4.4 1.3 4.5	18 0118 0750 W 1333 2004	0.8 4.8 1.2 4.7	3 0103 0736 TH 1308 1941	0.9 4.5 1.2 4.6	18 0142 F 1054 2000	0.7 4.5 1.2 4.6	3 0004 0635 50 1416 2046	0.7 4.6 1.0 4.6			1.1 4.2 1.6 4.1
4 0018 50 1223 1903	1.0 4.6 1.1 4.6	1 <u>9</u> ⊮	0043 0715 1300 1925	0.4 5.0 0.8 5.0		12 43 15 44	19 0206 TH 1421 2067	0.9 4,4 1,4 4,4	4 0540 F 1351 2025	0.9 4.4 1.3 4.5	19 0224 54 1430 2110	0.9 4.3 1.4 4.3	4 0249 0922 M 1505 2141	0.9 4.4 1.3 4.4		0304 0941 1523 2205	1.5 4.0 1.8 3.8
5 0050 0730 1256 1936	1.2 4.4 1.3 4.4	ZU TU	0131 0803 1347 2018	0.7 4.6 1.2 4.6	5 0835 TH 1402 2043	1.3 4.2 1.6 4.2	20 0057 F 1517 2157	1.1 4.1 1.7 4.2	5A 1438 2115	1.0 4.3 1.4 4.6	20 0308 50 1527 2208	1.2 4.0 1.7 4.1	5 0840 1017 TU 1603 2246	1.2 4.2 1.5 4.2		0349 1026 1627 2258	1.8 3.8 2.1 3.6
6 0126 0807 TU 1388 2018	1.4 4.2 1.5 4.2	2 <u>1</u>	0223 0857 1441 2118	1.0 4.3 1.6 4.3		1.4 4.1 1.8 4.1	21 10354 54 1624 2300	1.4 0.9 1.9 4.0	6 0316 0955 50 1533 2213	1.2 4.2 1.6 4.3	21 1037 M 1628 2301	1.5 3.9 1.9 3.8	6 0440 1119 W 1715 2356	1.5 4.1 1.7 4.0	<b>21</b> ™	0450 1118 1813	2.1 3.6 2.2
7 0206 W 1415 2100	1.8 4.0 1.8 4.0	22 TH	0323 1004 1551 2233	1.3 4.0 1.9 4.1		1.5 4.0 1.9 4.1	22 0455 50 1138 50 1735	1.6 3.8 1.9	7 0413 1052 M 1637 2316	1.3 4.2 1.6 4.2	22 0452 1130 TU 1741 2367	1.7 3.7 2.0 3.7	7 (5555 1230 TH 1843	1.7 4,1 1.7	<b>22</b>	0002 0622 1227 1905	3.5 2.2 3.6 2.0
8 0255 0944 TH 1507 2201	1.8 3.8 2.1 3.9	23	0435 1119 1716 2349	1.6 3.8 2.0 4.0	8 0451 50 1124 50 1718 2344	1.6 4.1 1.9 4.2	23 0001 0555 1239 1840	8.9 1.7 3.8 1.9	8 0517 1153 TU 1751	1.4 4.2 1.6	23 asss 1230 1855	1.9 3.7 2.0	8 0114 0725 7 1343 2000	4.0 1.7 4.2 1.5	23	0140 0742 1422 2033	3.5 2.1 3.7 1.8
9 1046 F 1617 2306	1.9 0.8 2.2 0.8	24	0547 1234 1830	1.6 3.8 2.0	9 0810 1227 M 1840	1.8 42 1.7	24 0102 TU 1340 1809	3.9 1.7 3.9 1.8	9 0020 W 1258 1907	4.2 1.4 4.3 1.5	24 0104 0702 TH 1341 1959	3.6 1.9 3.7 1.8	9 0230 54 1454 2102	4.2 1.5 4.4 1.2	24		37 1.8 4.0 1.4
10 0557 54 1525	1.9 3.8 2.1	25 su	0058 0853 1340 1932	4.0 1.8 4.0 1.8	10 0051 0716 TU 1333 1942	43 13 44 14	25 0000 W 1432 2029	3.9 1.7 4.0 1.6	10 0130 0742 TH 1400 2012	4.0 1.4 4.5 1.3	25 0214 0505 F 1443 2051	3.7 1.9 3.9 1.6	10 0529 60 0524 80 1546 2151	4,4 1,3 4,7 0,9	25	0343 0824 1555 2156	4.0 1.5 4.3 1.0
1 0015 0705 80 1310 1927	3.9 1.8 4.0 1.7	<b>26</b>	0155 0751 1431 2020	4.1 1.5 4.2 1.8	11 0158 0812 W 1430 2034	45 1.1 47 1.1	26 0851 0639 TH 1515 2112	4.0 1.6 4.2 1.4	11 0238 0841 F 1501 2108	4,4 1,2 4,7 1,0	26 0311 0357 84 1529 2135	3.8 1.7 4.1 1.4	11 0420 1009 M 1634 2236	4,8 1,1 4,9 0,8	26 TU		4.8 1.2 4.6 0.7
2 0132 0750 M 1416 2018	4.2 1.3 4.4 1.3		0244 0837 1812 2101	4.2 1.4 4.3 1.4	12 0255 0901 TH 1520 2122	4.7 0.9 4.9 0.8	27 0035 0000 7 1552 2152	4.1 1.5 4.3 1.3	12 0333 0931 54 1552 2157	4.6 1.1 4.9 0.8	27 0367 80 1609 2216	4.0 1.8 4.3 1.1	12 0608 1052 TU 1718 0 2318	4,7 0.9 5.0 0.5	w		4.6 4.8 0.4
13 0235 TU 1505 2103			0326 0915 1549 2139	4.3 1.3 4.5 1.2	13 0347 P 1907 2209	5.1	28 0415 64 1625 2231	4.2 1.4 4.4 1.2	13 0428 1010 80 1641 0 2245	4.7 0.9 5.0 0.6	28 0439 1021 M 1647 2256	42 1.3 4.5 0.9	13 0550 1132 W 1801 2357	4.8 0.8 5.1 0.4	28 TH	0538 1119 1745 2346	4.8 0.6 5.0 0.2
4 0325 W 1548 2146	4.8 0.8 5.1 0.6		0405 0950 1823 2215	4.6 1.2 4.6 1.1	14 0407 54 1021 54 1053 0 2255	5.2	29 0455 50 1005 50 1704 • 2300	4.3 1.3 4.5 1.0	14 0516 1105 M 1729 2332	5.1	29 0520 1100 TU 1726 • 2333	4.4 1.0 4.6 0.7	14 0631 1210 TH 1842	4.8 0.7 5.0	<b>29</b>	0615 1155 1822	
15 0411 1010 TH 1681 2229	5.1 0.4 5.3 0.3		0443 1023 1655 2250	4.5 1.1 4.6 1.1	1116	5.2	30 0535 1112 M 1742 2547	4,4 1,2 4,6 1,0	15 0804 1149 TU 1816	4.8 0.8 5.0	30 0550 W 1805	4.8 0.9 4.8	15 0035 0710 F 1248 1921			0022 0651 1233 1859	0.2 5.0 0.4 5.1
		SA.	0519 1054 1729 2324	4.5 1.1 4.6 1.1							31 0000 TH 1216 1843	0.0				1311	0.3 5.0 0.8 5.0

Times of Tasking at the time of the Incident.


- 14.32 hours helicopter R110 contacted MRSC and advised E.T.A (estimated time of arrival) in 20 minutes with two hours endurance.
- 14.34 hours fishing vessel "Cara Maith" (Skipper James Sweeney) responded and offered assistance. The fishing vessel reported that the tide was flooding and that the grounded yacht had taken a list and that there were breakers there. Tory Island Coast Guard in attendance ashore under the supervision of Mr. Patsy Dan Rogers.
- 14.42 hours in response to a request from MRSC to advise which side would be suitable for winching off "*Cabin Fever I*", the "Cara Maith" said that one person was ashore with a line and that the rest of the crew (contestants) were starting to disembark.
- 14.43 hours Aranmore lifeboat launched with an e.t.a of one hour.
- 14.57 hours R110 is over yacht and reports to MRSC that a number of people are ashore and estimating four persons (Mr. Barton, Mr. Culleton, Mr. Gooch and Mr. Ward) remain on board "Cabin Fever I" and that they are in no immediate danger.
- 14.58 hours "Cabin Fever I" confirms four on board and seven ashore. Taking in some water and are manning pumps and request more pumps. They agreed with MRSC to call in R110 if there is a danger to remaining crew on board "Cabin Fever I".
- 15.05 hours fv "Cara Maith" and another small vessel (probably Customs) decide that it is too dangerous and are unable to get in close to "Cabin Fever I" in order to offer tow assistance and will wait for the lifeboat.
- 15.09/14.15 hrs weak signal from "*Cabin Fever I*" and hoax call interfering with communications.
- 15.15 hours Aranmore lifeboat is seven miles off and will use their small "Y" boat to transfer the pump across.
- 15.41 hours Pump transferred to "Cabin Fever I" by R110 from lifeboat and helicopter crewman landed on board the schooner to prime the pump. R110 can see water in the bilges and say the vessel is well aground and the crew remaining on board are not in danger. No visible pollution. There is on board 1,000 litres of red diesel and 3 gallons of petrol. It was stated by one of the crew that when the helicopter landed the pump on deck it was too late particularly as the deck was flexing at the foremast.

Between 15.57 and 16.15 hours -

The "Y" lifeboat fired three speed lines. The persons on board "Cabin Fever I" had positioned themselves forward, amidships and aft to attempt to get hold of the rocket line. However the lines did not reach the boat.

- 16.31 hours the R110 while attempting to place a second pump on the vessel the vessel called to say they were now in a position to abandon ship. The crew suggested that they may attempt to swim ashore but the pilot of R110 felt there would be certain casualties if this was attempted and as the on-scene commander instructed the crew that they were to be winched off. One member of the three remaining contestant made his own decision to swim. The last two crew were airlifted to shore and the swimmer was later recovered by the R110 winch man halfway between the shoreline and the vessel as he was in some difficulty.
- 17.45 hours SAR stood down.

### Report on Lifejackets from Sea and Shore Safety.



48

- It has been observed that many users of inflatable lifejackets don them incorrectly, some of the more common mistakes are:
  - o Having the securing straps too loose.
  - Keeping the manual operating cord inside the cover of the jacket.
  - Leaving loose strap ends dangling.
  - Not securing crotch straps.
- It is normal for inflatable lifejackets to feel tight when fully inflated in order to
  provide maximum buoyancy and to allow for the possibility of the loss of some of
  the gas during inflation.

Signed Captain Michael Langran

The MCIB acknowledges that this Report, as submitted by Sea & Shore Safety Services Ltd., was submitted at the request of the MCIB Investigator.

49

## 10. PHOTOGRAPHS

10.1 Appears to show end of frames where they are butted against the keel. No fracture of frames.



10.2 End of frames rounded and abraded, fastenings pulled out.



# PHOTOGRAPHS CONTD.

## Photographs

10.3 Most ribs intact - joints parted.



10.4 Fastenings pulled through and out of planking.



## PHOTOGRAPHS

## Photographs



10.5 Wood soft at some fastenings. Possible decay in one frame. Butt joint in plank.

10.6 Apparent decay at base of mast.



## Photographs

10.7 Fastenings pulled through. Considerable abrasion evident, not suggestive of decay.



10.8 Splintery fractures typical of sound wood.



- BB


## **11. LIST OF CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED**

Correspondent	Page No.
Coco TV	54
MCIB Response	61
Sea & Shore Safety Services Ltd.	62
MCIB Response	62

## CORRESPONDENCE CONTD.

cocoty June 24th, 2004 Mr. Dick Heron Secretary Marine Casualty Investigation Board Leeson Lane Dublin 2 Draft Report of he investigation into the grounding of "Carrie of Re: Camaret" (alias Cabin Fever) at Tory Island on 13th June 2003 Dear Mr. Heron. Please find attached our comments and observations on the above draft report. Our comments and observations are in relation to the : Background (1)Conclusions (paragraph 6.1) (2)(3) Findings (paragraph 6.2) Recommendation (paragraph 7) (4) Yours sincerely Stuart Switzer Encl. Copy Yacht Charter Agreement MCIB RESPONSE The MCIB notes the contents of this letter. Coco Television Ltd 19 Creighton Street Dublin 2 Ireland 1+353 1 6170480 1+353 1 6170481 e info@cocotelevision.ie VAT No: IE 48590548 Registered in Dublin Directors: Stuart Switzer, Linda Cullen, Paul Higgins **MCIB RESPONSE** 

The MCIB notes the contents of this letter.



-1-

## CORRESPONDENCE CONTD.

#### Page 2 of 4

#### COCO Television Productions Limited

#### Comment and Observation by COCO Television Productions on :

#### Conculsions 6.1

(1A) - COCO Television understood that effective watch keeping had been put in place, and observed same when on board, which included a requirement that one experienced crew member would be on deck at all times. This is supported and confirmed in the Draft Report. (Point 3.2). It was the Master of the vessel's responsibility to monitor and maintain the watch system.

(1B) – COCO Television was not present at the time of the grounding and we do not understand when the prevailing conditions were pushing the vessel onto a lee shore why :

- 1. The steering area remained unattended, on automatic pilot.
- The course was not monitored and corrected, by the Master, who had total and absolute responsibility for navigation.

(1C) - Crew Member Short. Following complaints by some of the contestants on Monday evening (June 9<sup>th</sup>) in Bangor about Warren Gunn the RIB driver, the matter was discussed with Mr Barton. During the discussion on the Monday evening Mr. Barton said he would talk with Warren Gunn and take the appropriate action.

During our discussion on Monday evening (June 9<sup>th</sup>) COCO TV offered to have a replacement crew member in place for Tuesday morning but Mr. Barton insisted that this was not necessary, and would not allow same.

A number of phone calls had been made on Monday evening (June 9<sup>th</sup>) by COCO Television and an appropriate qualified sailor, with Yacht Master Certification was identified and available, but Mr. Barton insisted it was not necessary and would arrange a replacement himself, who would be in Sligo for Sunday 15<sup>th</sup>. The Charter Agreement states that all matters relating to sailing are the sole responsibility of the Owner/Master. On Tuesday morning Mr. Barton decided following a discussion with Mr. Gunn to dispense with his services.

(1C) - All contestants were in bed on Thursday evening by 12pm. The contestants had a meal ashore which was hosted by (the King of Tory) the meal was full and substantial and included a nominal 2 glasses of wine per

-2-

Page 3 of 4

#### COCO Television Productions Limited

Comment and Observation by COCO Television Productions on :

#### Conclusions (continued)

contestant/crew. The vessel sailed at approximately 8am on Friday morning. The watch system operated as per usual.

All contestants had eight hours sleep and had not show any sign of fatigue while ashore, for dinner the previous evening, Thursday June 12th.

#### Comment and Observation by COCO Television Productions on :

#### Findings 6.2

A- All decisions regarding whether or not the vessel sailed, were made by the Master. COCO Television ensured the Master had daily weather reports.

C - We believe the command structure was clear, Rodger Barton as the Owner/Master and Peter Culleton as the TV Skipper/Mate. This was made totally clear to all contestants /crew and understood by Rodger Barton and Peter Culleton. This matter was not only explained by COCO Television but also by Rodger Barton and Peter Culleton.

D – While none of COCO Television personnel were on board at the time of the incident, the question of motivation of the contestants/crew while at sea was a matter for the Master.

We note that the three contestants on watch, state they were instructed by Peter Culleton to keep a look out for lobster pots.

All the contestants/crew had completed many watches by the time the incident occurred. It appears that one of the off duty contestants/crew said to Rodger Barton, that they were on a collision course for the lighthouse which seems to confirm that Rodger Barton was on duty.

E – We note the findings about the PFD's and the observations from Sea & Shore Safety Services.

All contestants/crew were aware that if they did not wear their PFD's they would

-3-

#### Page 4 of 4

#### COCO Television Productions Limited

#### Comment and Observation by COCO Television Productions on :

#### Findings 6.2 (continued)

be immediately, eliminated from the programme. All contestants/crew were shown a number of times how to adjust and wear their PFD's safely. All PFD's were 150 Newton Lifejackets, to fit chest size 34" to 54".

We understand they are Department of Marine approved and have all necessary cartification.

J - COCO Television were made aware of Mr. Barton's contention that he lost the GPS unit ashore and expressed their concerns about same to him.

#### Comment and Observation by COCO Television Productions on :

#### Recommendations

7.1 We as part of our Charter Agreement retained Rodger Barton as Master/Owner. He holds a Yacht Master Offshore, with a commercial endorsement.

We understood that navigation, including passing, planning, watch keeping and understanding the effects and movement of tides, are skills you must have to obtain a Yacht Master, let alone achieve a commercial endorsement. We relied on Mr. Barton's experience and qualifications.

-4-

# CORRESPONDENCE

-59

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	BEAUTIFULLY BLUE
	Luxury Yacht Charter
	YACHT CHARTER AGREEMENT
	Name of Yacht CARRIE OF CAMARET
	Address 420 SUSSEX SO. BALGHTON PALZ IGE UK_ Date
	Between RODGER JANTON (owner)and (charterer)
	From (noom) 26 MAY 2003 to (noon) 27 JULY 2003
	100 4(7 /4+.VA7)
	Charter Total(Euro) 100 462 (MI. VAT) Deposit(Euro) 20231-25 (MC. VAT)
	Balance due 45 days prior to start of charter
	It is understood that advance monies will be disbursed by the bank to the owner/master immediately. It is understood
	that the deposit is considered an earned fee by the Owner/Master and will be refunded only if the boat is rebooked for
	the same period.
	Maximum Charter Guests 10 No of days
	Cruising area_NISH WATERS Port of boarding Dicky N Port of Release Dicky N
	fully furnished, including galley and dining utensils and linens and blankets: staunch clean and in good condition throughout and ready for service, and agrees to allow demurrage pro-rata to the charterer for any delay in delivery. But should it be impossible for the owner to make delivery as stipulated through causes beyond his control and should such delivery not be made within 24 hours thereafter, then this agreement may be cancelled by the charterer and any charter money paid in advance will be returned to him.
	Insurance: The owner represents that the yacht is insured against fire, marine and collision risks, and with protection
	and indemnity coverage for the term of this charter, and the charterer shall thereby he relieved of any and all liability for such loss or damage and in case of any accident or disaster the charterer shall give the owner of Captain prompt
	notice of same. Said policies of insurance are to be held by owner. But should the owner fail to or eket not to, carry
	such insurance he shall then assume the same responsibility as if the yacht were so insured.
	The owner and his insurance underwriters accept no responsibility for accidents, injuries or deathdue to swimming or the use of speeches, masks as a lifed an important such as SCURA species and whether such is in accepted by the
	the use of snorkels, masks or allied equipment such as SCUBA equipment whether or not it is supplied by the owner or charterer. Neither the vessel, its owner or charter company are liable for any hodily injury or death related to
	water-skiing, spinnaker flying, halyard flying or the vessel's dingy or outboard motor.
	Accident: The owner agrees that should the yacht after delivery sustain breakdown of machinery or be disabled or
	damaged by fire, grounding collision or other cause so as to prevent the use of the yacht by the charterer for a period
	Beautifully Blue Telephone: 01292 511097
	Suite 2000 Facsimile: 01292 511098
-	Suite 2000 Facsimile: 01292 511098 Aviation House Email: into 8 beautifullyblue.com Prestwick International Airport Web: www.beautifullyblue.com
	Suite 2000 Facsimila: 01292 511098 Aviation House Email: into 0 beautifullyblue.com
	Suite 2000 Facsimile: 01292 511098 Aviation House Email: Info@beaufullyblue.com Preshulck International Airport Web: www.beaufullyblue.com Scotland KAB 2PL Beautifully Blue Marine Charter Ltd. Registered Office: 148 West Regent Street, Glasgow, G2 2RZ.
	Suite 2000 Facsimile: 01292 511098 Aviation House Email: into 0 beautifullyblue.com Prestvick International Airport Web: www.beautifullyblue.com Scotland KAB 2PL
	Suite 2000 Facsimile: 01292 511098 Aviation House Email: Info@beaufullyblue.com Preshulck International Airport Web: www.beaufullyblue.com Scotland KAB 2PL Beautifully Blue Marine Charter Ltd. Registered Office: 148 West Regent Street, Glasgow, G2 2RZ.
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	Suite 2000 Facsimile: 01292 511098 Aviation House Email: Info@beaufullyblue.com Preshulck International Airport Web: www.beaufullyblue.com Scotland KAB 2PL Beautifully Blue Marine Charter Ltd. Registered Office: 148 West Regent Street, Glasgow, G2 2RZ.

## CORRESPONDENCE CONTD.



of not less than 24 consecutive ours at any time, the same not being brought about by any act or default of  $4.5 \times 10^{-10}$  charterer, the owner shall make a pro-rata return of hire to the charterer of such period in excess of t to  $10^{-10}$  with excess of t to  $10^{-10}$  enter the yacht shall be disabled or unfit for use. Provided however that in case the yacht be lost or said damage be so extensive that the yacht cannot be or is not repaired within 24 hours, the same not being brought about by any act or default of the charterer, then the charter price shall be abated pro-rata and charter money paid in advance shall be releated pro-rata from the time of such damage, and the charterer shall have the right to terminate this charter.

Redelivery: The charterer agrees to redeliver the yacht her equipment and furnishings free and clear of any indebtedness incurred for charterers account, at the expiration of this charter. Chatterer agrees to be responsible for and to replace or make good any injury, alteration or decorations to the yacht, her furnishings and equipment, caused by himself or by any of his party, less ordinary wear and tear. Should the charterer not make redelivery of the yacht at the time and place stipulated he shall pay demurrage pro rata to the owner for the time that such delivery is delayed plus any losses that may sustain due to the delayed delivery resulting in the owner not being able to make agreements with other charterers.

Restricted Use: The charterer agrees that the yacht shall be employed exclusively as a pleasure vessel and not for subcharter and shall not transport merchandise or carry passengers for pay, or engage in any trade nor in any way violate the revenue laws of the United Kingdom or of any other Government within the jurisdiction of which the yacht may be at any time, and shall comply with the law in all other respects.

Additional Restricted Use: The charter party agrees to prohibit the use or possession of any illegal drugs on board the charter vessel and will be totally responsible for any lass or damage to the boat due to any violation of Customs or applicable drugs acts. Penalty for discovery of illegal drugs and controlled substances other than by prescription on board a vessel in these islands is confiscation and forfeiture of the vessel even if the presence of such substances is not known to the crew. Therefore, if such substances are used by or found to be in the possession of guests, they will be put ashore at the next port of call without refund of the charter fee.

Authority: The Captain is competent, not only coastwise, but in deep sea navigation. The Captain shall handle clearance and the normal running of the yacht. The Captain shall receive orders from the charterer as to ports to be called at and the general course of the voyage but the Captain shall be responsible for the safe navigation of the yacht, and the charterer shall abide by his judgement as to sailing, weather, anchorages, and pertinent matters

Accomodation will be provided for 10 contestants with separate crew quarters. Bed linen pillows and towels will also be provided.

Coco Television has permission to make minor decorative changes to the vessel with the agreement of, and supervision by, Rødger Barian (Owner). All changes will be made good as to the original decoration of the vessel. Coco Television has permission to use the image of the vessel in all media and in promotion of or in conjunction with the series (Cabin Fever). Reference to be made as to Carries availability for charter through Beautifully Blue Marine Charters Ltd. Coco Television has permission to change the name of the vessel for television purposes only. Camera mounts will be fitted to the vessel and Coco Television agrees that any alterations will be made good back to the original condition of the vessel.

The Owner (Rodger Barton) recognises that the vessel is being used for filming a television series (Cabin Fever) and understands that the nature of television production can be repetitive. The owner agrees to work alongside Coco Television's nominated Skipper, but Coco Television acknowledge Rodger Barton is master of the vessel.

The charter of Carrie of Cameret includes the owner (Rodger Barton) who's terms of engagement are full time on board. A contingency will be made in the event of any unforescen circumstances, i.e. III health, death of a family member etc. A substitute Skipper will be provided, at no extra cost to Coco Television, who is qualified and capable of continuation.

All elements concerning the the television series (Cabin Fever) are confidential and the owner (Rodger Barton) will be obliged to sign a confidentiality agreement. Coco Television will draw up strict lines of communication and protocol between the owner (Rodger Barton) and the contestants

Beautifully Blue: Email: info@beautifullyblue.com, Web: www.beautifullyblue.com, Tel. 01292 511097, Fax. 01292 511098 COPYRIGHT OF BEAUTIFULLY BLUE MARINE CHARTERS LTD 2002

61

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	Additional Conditions:		
	with this agreement and owner ag charter. It is further understood t	rterer recognise Beautifully Blue Marine of prees to pay said agent customary and usu that the function of booking agent or brol ponsible for actions of charterer or Capta	al brokerage fees prevailing at the place o ker is solely that of arranging the charter,
	In the event of this agreement being to sue nor be liable to be sued upo		n agent, the agent shall neither be entitled
	To the true and faithful performa executors, administrators and assi		parties hereto bind themselves, their heirs,
	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the pa	arties hereto have set their hands	
	Signed	Owner/Master	
	Signed	Charterer	Date
-			
	Dan alt it. Direct Free line		
	COPYRI	Utifullyblue.com, Web: www.beautifullyblue.c GHT OF BEAUTIFULLY BLUE MARINE CH	com, Tel. 01292 511097, Fax. 01292 511098 ARTERS LTD 2002

**MCIB RESPONSE** The MCIB notes the content of this letter and enclosure.

## CORRESPONDENCE CONTD.

SEA & SHO



"Happy Valley" Glenamuck Road, Dublin 18, Ireland.

Tel: 01 - 295 5991 Fax: 01 - 295 7705 Mobile: 087 230 9077

Secretary, M.A.I.B. Leeson Lane Dublin 2

14/06/2004

62

Dear Mr.Heron,

#### "CABIN FEVER" Draft report

Many thanks for sending us a copy of your draft report into the loss of "Cabin Fever 1" which we consider to be a very thorough and excellent piece of work.

With regard to our report on the Mullion lifejackets which you include in the appendices, it could be thought to be an unsolicited report. We would be grateful if you could indicate in some way that our report was submitted at the request of Captain D.Linehan of the Marine Surveyors' Office.

Yours sincerely Millionary Captain Michael Langran	-
Member of the International Association for Sea Survival Training Directors: (Managing) Michael Langran, Master Mariner, Susan Langran, Philip Murphy, Master Mariner, Clare Langran. Regd. No. 119472. VAT No. 1E 4812843P.	

**MCIB RESPONSE** The MCIB notes the content of this letter and has amended the report accordingly.

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# NOTES

1	
C.	