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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
INTO THE
LOSS OF CREWMEMBER
OVERBOARD
FROM THE MFV "ALMA AMY"
ON
17th OCTOBER 2007

REPORT No. MCIB/150 (No. 9 of 2010)



Report MCIB/150 published by The Marine Casualty Investigation Board 10th September 2010.





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SYNOPSIS

1. SYNOPSIS

- 1.1 On Wednesday 17th October 2007 Mr. Marijus Rudakov fell overboard from the MFV "Alma Amy" and drowned in an area off the South East coast of Ireland known as 'The Smalls' approximately 50 miles southeast of the Wexford coast. (As shown in Appendix 8.5).
- 1.2 The cause of death was determined by post mortem examination as being due to cardiorespiratory arrest secondary to drowning.

(Note: All times are GMT)





2. FACTUAL INFORMATION

2.1 Vessel Particulars:

Name of Vessel: "Alma Amy"
Registered length: 19.44 metres
Beam: 6.80 metres
Moulded Depth: 3.80 metres

Gross tonnage: 140
Year of build: 1992
Main Engine: Cummins
Power Output: 405 kW



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2.2 Crew Particulars:

The joint owners of the "Alma Amy" are Mr. Joseph D. Foley and Mr. Alan Foley.

On the day of the incident the crew comprised of Mr. Joseph D. Foley (skipper) and a crew of three: Mr. Alan Foley, Mr. Diarmuid Murphy and the deceased Mr. Marijus Rudakov.

EVENTS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT

3. EVENTS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT

- 3.1 The "Alma Amy" sailed from Duncannon, Co. Wexford on the evening of Sunday 14th October 2007 at around 22.00 hrs. The vessel first called at Dunmore East, Co. Waterford for ice. She departed Dunmore East shortly after midnight on Monday 15th October 2007 and sailed towards her planned fishing grounds in 'The Smalls'.
- 3.2 The "Alma Amy" had a crew of four persons on board as detailed in Section 2.2. Mr. Alan Foley took watch the first night for the voyage to the fishing grounds. The vessel was engaged in prawn fishing and normally only shot her gear by day. At night the vessel drifted, the engine being used if required to maintain position.
- 3.3 The first trawl was around 07.00 hrs. on Monday 15th October 2007, the gear being hauled again around 13.30 hrs. and shot again about an hour later. The final haul that day was made around 21.00 hrs. Mr. Murphy kept watch on the second night out. (The evening of Monday 15th October 2007 into the morning of Tuesday 16th October 2007.)
- 3.4 On the morning of Tuesday 16th October 2007 the gear was shot again around 07.00 hrs. Problems were encountered with the fishing gear during the day and after the second shoot of the day, a large stone was removed from the cod end of the net. After the last haul around 21.30 hrs. repairs had to be made to the net damage. It is unclear as to what time these repairs were completed but it was probably close to 23.00 hrs.
- 3.5 Mr. Rudakov kept watch on Tuesday night (16th October 2007) into Wednesday morning (17th October 2007). It has been stated by other crew that he would have had an opportunity to rest for 'a few hours' between hauling and repairing the gear and before going on watch.
- 3.6 Mr. Alan Foley was on the bridge around 04.00 hrs. on the morning of Wednesday 17th October 2007. The gear was shot at 07.10 hrs. During the shooting operation Mr. Rudakov was at the port aft quarter of the main deck and Mr. Murphy was in a similar position on the starboard side. Mr. Alan Foley was at the control station at the rear of the deckhouse. (See photographs in Appendices 8.2 8.4).



4. THE INCIDENT

- 4.1 During the shooting of the gear one of the tasks assigned to Mr. Murphy and Mr. Rudakov was to clip on the bridle wire to the trawl door. Mr. Alan Foley estimated that, along with the nets, about 30 fathoms of bridle wire passed out through the pulley. The photographs in Appendices 8.1 8.4 show the arrangement of the vessel and the area in which Mr. Rudakov was standing. Appendix 8.5 contains a chartlet indicating the location of the incident and Appendix 8.6 contains details of the weather at the time of the incident but which is not considered to have been a factor.
- 4.2 Mr. Murphy was connecting up the bridle on the starboard side when he glanced across towards Mr. Rudakov and he stated he looked 'distracted'. Mr. Murphy continued connecting his own side when he heard Mr. Alan Foley shout out. He looked up to see Mr. Rudakov's legs in the air as he fell backwards over the bulwark.
- 4.3 Mr. Alan Foley stated that from the control position he had a clear view of the two men working at the aft port and starboard. Mr. Rudakov appeared to shake, then started to fall backwards over the bulwark. He ran towards him from the control station but could not reach Mr. Rudakov in time and saw him fall head first into the sea.
- 4.4 When Mr. Murphy looked over the stern he saw Mr. Rudakov floating face down in the water. He was not wearing a lifejacket. Mr. Alan Foley called out 'man overboard' and threw a lifebuoy to Mr. Rudakov. However, Mr. Rudakov appeared motionless and made no attempt to grab the lifebuoy.

EVENTS FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT

5. EVENTS FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT

- 5.1 Mr. Alan Foley ran forward to get a rope to throw to Mr. Rudakov as he could find no suitable length of rope near the stern of the vessel. When he returned aft, Mr. Murphy had jumped overboard and had swam to Mr. Rudakov. Mr. Murphy managed to get hold of Mr. Rudakov by the braces of his oilskins but was unable to turn him around.
- 5.2 Mr. Joseph Foley, who was in the wheelhouse, made a distress call on the VHF indicating 'man overboard'. The time of this call is recorded as 07.22 hrs. He then released the Man Overboard (MOB) lifebuoy with self-igniting light and smoke attached. Using the rope he had thrown to the two men in the water, Mr. Alan Foley pulled the men back towards the stern of the vessel. Mr. Joseph Foley called on Mr. Alan Foley to get the boarding ladder and bring it down to the stern of the vessel.
- 5.3 Due to the boarding ladder being tied in place it took a minute or two to cut the ladder from its normal stowage position. After a few minutes Mr. Murphy found he was also in difficulty, the strap on Mr. Rudakov oilskins broke and the two men drifted apart. Mr. Murphy called out for the other crew to help him out of the water. Eventually he managed to get back onboard the vessel by climbing up along the port bridle wire assisted by Mr. Alan Foley.
- 5.4 At this time the casualty started to drift away from the vessel. An initial attempt was made to turn the vessel but due to the fact that the fishing gear was out, the vessel was very slow to turn around. The skipper also felt there was a substantial risk of the fishing gear becoming entangled in the propeller so it was decided to haul in the gear. It is estimated that it took between 10 and 12 minutes to haul the gear.
- 5.5 The vessel then steamed back to the estimated position where the incident occurred and they spotted the MOB light and smoke signal. The casualty was located still face down in the water. In order to recover the casualty it was decided to launch the port liferaft.
- 5.6 When the liferaft was launched Mr. Alan Foley boarded it but was unable to recover the casualty from the water. Mr. Murphy then climbed down to the liferaft to assist him and they managed to get the casualty into the liferaft. This was reported to Coastguard radio at 08.12 hrs.
- 5.7 Another fishing vessel, the "Ocean Pearl", was now close to the "Alma Amy" and radioed her to advise that the liferaft seemed to be being pulled into the propeller of the "Alma Amy". It appears that the sea anchor (drogue) of the liferaft which is automatically deployed upon inflation may have become entangled in the propeller of the "Alma Amy". The propeller controls were stated to be at the neutral position but the propeller may have been turning

EVENTS FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT



- slowly ahead. Both Mr. Murphy and Mr. Alan Foley jumped from the liferaft into the water.
- 5.8 Mr. Murphy was wearing a gas inflatable lifejacket that failed to inflate. However, both Mr. Murphy and Mr. Alan Foley managed to swim to the boarding ladder and climb back onboard the "Alma Amy". The propeller was confirmed as being stopped and the liferaft was not pulled any closer to the propeller. Shortly after this at 08.30 hrs. the rescue helicopter R117 reported having visual contact with the vessel.
- Once on scene, R117 was unable to lower the winch man directly into the liferaft, instead he was lowered onto the deck of the "Alma Amy" and climbed down the boarding ladder into the liferaft. Mr. Rudakov was lifted from the liferaft to the helicopter at 08.43 hrs.
- 5.10 Once onboard R117, immediate efforts were made to resuscitate Mr. Rudakov, these efforts continued throughout the flight to Waterford Regional Hospital (WRH). R117 landed at Ardkeen Rugby pitch adjacent to WRH at 08.19 hrs. and Mr. Rudakov was transferred to Hospital by ambulance.
- 5.11 Mr. Rudakov was pronounced dead shortly after arrival at WRH. A post mortem examination was carried out the following day, which gave the cause of death as being due to cardiorespiratory arrest secondary to drowning.

CONCLUSIONS

6. CONCLUSIONS

- 6.1 It is not known nor can it be determined why Mr. Rudakov went overboard. There is no evidence to suggest that Mr. Rudakov sustained trauma or became entangled in ropes or any other cause for him going overboard.
- 6.2 The fishermen on board the MFV "Alma Amy" were not wearing lifejackets. It is a statutory obligation for fishermen whilst on the deck of a fishing vessel to wear suitable lifejackets.



7. RECOMMENDATIONS

- 7.1 The Minister for Transport should enforce the wearing of lifejackets/PFDs by all persons engaged in fishing activities.
- 7.2 Consideration should be given by the Minister for Transport to the development of a Safety Management System for fishing vessels.


LIST OF APPENDICES

8. LIST OF APPENDICES


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Appendix 8.1 General arrangement of "Alma Amy" and position of casualty.



Appendix 8.2 Approximate path of the bridle wire.





Appendix 8.3 View from the control station of port aft area.




APPENDIX 8.4

Appendix 8.4 Person of the same approximate height as Mr. Rudakov standing at the stern bulwark.





Appendix 8.5 Chartlet showing location of the incident.





MET ÉIREANN

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Weather Report for sea area on 17-10-2007 between 0000 hours and 1200 hours Local Time.

General Meteorological Situation: At the beginning of the period, the area was in the immediate wake of a shallow depression and its associated frontal system, which continued to move steadily eastwards across southern England and the English Channel through the rest of the period; a northerly airflow over the area soon stabilised as pressure rose from the west.

From 0000 to 0600 hours (Local Time):

Wind(Beaufort): North to northwest 5 or 6, decreasing northwest 4 later.

Weather: Showers then fair.

Visibility: Good. Sea state: Slight.

From 0600 to 1200 hours (Local Time):

Wind(Beaufort): Northwest 3 or 4.

Weather: Fair. Visibility: Good. Sea state: Slight.







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Nearby observations from offshore weather buoy M5 (station number 62094) position 512.5N 6.7W

tation number	Date Time GMT	Wind Direction	Wind Speed (knots)	Highest Gust (knots)	Wave Height (meters)
62094	0100/17-10-07	340	16	22	1.0
62094	0200/17-10-07	330	14	22	1.0
62094	0300/17-10-07	330	15	19	0.9
62094	0400/17-10-07	340	11	16	0.8
62094	0500/17-10-07	330	12	16	0.7
62094	0600/17-10-07	320	10	16	0.7
62094 (0700/17-10-07	320	11	15	0.7
62094	0800/17-10-07	320	10	16	0.8
62094	0900/17-10-07	340	12	17	0.8
62094	1000/17-10-07	330	8	13	0.7
62094	1100/17-10-07	330	8	15	0.7
62094	1200/17-10-07	320	7	12	0.8

UTC Universal Time Coordinate = Greenwich Meantime XXXX Local Time = British Summer Time = UTC + 1 hour Wind direction in degrees from North Wind speed and gusts in knots Temperatures in degrees Celsius Significant wave height in meters




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Top Level HOME

DATE: 2007/10/17 Up one level




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07/12/2007


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Appendix 8.6 Met Éireann Weather Report.





Appendix 8.6 Met Éireann Weather Report.



Cont.

Appendix 8.6 Met Éireann Weather Report.







Appendix to Marine Weather Report

Please note that the information in this Marine Weather Report is derived by extrapolation from reports of the offshore weather buoys, from Met Éireann's nearby synoptic land stations, archived weather charts, satellite and radar images and wave model data. The sea conditions as stated in this report are for open sea and may be considerably different near the shore due to coastal effects and tidal currents.

UTC Universal Time Coordinate = Greenwich Meantime Summer Time = UTC + 1 hour (April - October) Wind strength in Beaufort force (see table below) Sea state descriptive terms (see table below)

MET ÉIREANN SEA AREA FORECAST TERMINOLOGY




Fig 1. Headlands, coastal stations & buoy location as used in Mct Éireann Sea Area Forecast

Wave Heights / State of Sea

The wave height is the vertical distance between the crest and the preceding or following trough. The table below gives a description of the wave system associated with a range of significant wave heights. Individual waves in the wave train will have heights in excess of the significant height. The highest wave of all will have a height about twice the significant height.

Descriptive terms	Height in meters
Calm	0 - 0.1
Wavelets	0.1 - 0.5
Slight	0.5 - 1.25
Moderate	1.25 - 2.5
Rough	2.5 - 4
Very rough	4-6
High	6-9
Very high	9 - 14
Phenomenal	Over 14

Be	aufort Scale	of Wir	nd	
No	. Description	Speed*	Specification – AT SEA Wave	e height**
		(knots)	5.21 SV 18	(metres)
0	Calm	<1	Sea like mirror	
1	Light air	1-3	Ripples	0.1(0.1)
2	Light breeze	4-6	Small wavelets	0.2(0.3)
3	Gentle breeze	7-10	Large wavelets, crests begin to break	0.6(1)
4	Moderate	11-16	Small waves becoming longer, frequent white horses	1 (1.5)
5	Fresh breeze	17-21	Moderate waves, many white horses, chance of spray	2 (2.5)
6	Strong breeze	22-27	Large waves, white foam crests, probably some spray	3 (4)
7	Near gale	28-33	Sea heaves up, streaks of white foam	4 (5.5)
8	Gale	34-40	Moderately high waves of greater length	5.5 (7.5)
9	Strong gale	41-47	High waves, dense streaks of foam, spray may reduce visibili	ty 7 (10)
10	Storm		Very high waves, long overhanging crests, visibility affected	9 (12.5)
11	Violent storm	56-63	Exceptionally high waves, long white foam patches cover sea	11.5 (16)
12	Hurricane		Air filled with foam and spray, sea completely white	14 (-)

^{*}Speed = mean speed at a standard height of 10 metres. 1 knot = 1 nautical mile (1.85km) per hour.

**Wave height is only intended as a guide to what may be expected in the open sea. Bracketed figures indicate the probable maximum wave height.

On land, there are different specifications for the Beaufort Scale.

No)	Speed	Specification – ON LAND
	(km/h)	
0	Calm <	< 1	Calm; smoke rises vertically
1.	Light air	1-5	Wind direction shown by smoke but not wind vanes
2	Light breeze	6-11	Leaves rustle, vanes move
3	Gentle	12-19	Leaves & twigs in motion; flags fly
4	Moderate	20-28	Raises dust & paper; branches move
5	Fresh	29-38	Small trees sway; crested waves on inland waters
6	Strong	39-49	Large branches move; whistling in wires; umbrellas difficult to use
7	Near gale	50-61	Trees in motion; walking against wind inconvenient
8	Gale	62-74	Breaks off twigs; generally impedes progress
9	Strong gale	75-88	Slight structural damage
10	Storm	89-102	Trees uprooted, considerable structural damage; rarely occurs inland
11	Violent storm	103-117	Very rare; widespread damage
12	Hurricane	118+	. 17 등 등 전 18 등 전 17 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1

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Appendix 8.6 Met Éireann Weather Report.

The Sea Area Forecast issued by Met Éireann contains the following standard elements:

Meteorological or General Situation: A description of the meteorological situation over Ireland at the stated time and of adjacent weather systems, e.g. depressions, anticyclones or frontal troughs, which are expected to have an influence on the forecast areas during the following 24 hours. Explanation of some terms used here are:

- Imminent: within 6 hours, Soon: between 6 and 12 hours Later: between 12 and 24 hours.
- The speed of movement of pressure and frontal systems is described as follows: Slowly: up to 15 knots. Steadily: 15 to 25 knots. Rather quickly: 25 to 35 knots. Rapidly: 35 to 45 knots. Very Rapidly: greater than 45knots.

The general forecast follows for coastal waters and the Irish Sea, it describes the expected conditions for:

- Wind: The wind strength is given in Beaufort Force and wind direction using the 16-point compass.
- · Weather: The following are some terms used in the Forecast and coastal reports:-
 - Fine: Dry, mainly sunny day. Clear after dark.
 - Fair: Dry, good sunny or clear spells(cloud no more than 3 5 okta of medium or low cloud or 6 - 8 okta of high cloud).
 - Cloudy: 6 8 okta of low or medium cloud.
 - o Mist: Visibility restricted by water droplets.
 - Haze: Visibility restricted by dust or smoke.
 - Other terms such as rain or hail shower are self explanatory.
 - Visibility: descriptions of visibility mean the following:-
 - Good: more than 5 nautical miles (9km)
 - Moderate: 2 5 nm (4 9 km)
 - Poor: 0.5 to 2 nm (4km)
 - o Fog: less than 0.5 nm (1,000m)
- Swell Warnings: when significant swell height of greater than 4 metres is expected.
- Outlook: A brief outlook is given for the 24 hours following the period covered by the forecast.

Gale Warnings

- Gale warnings are issued by Met Éireann for Irish coastal waters, which are extending 30 miles out from the coastline, and the Irish Sea or part thereof.
- Gale Warnings are issued if winds of Beaufort Force 8 are expected.
- Strong Gale Warnings are issued if winds of Beaufort Force 9 or frequent gusts of at least 52 knots are expected.
- Storm Force Warnings are issued if Beaufort Force 10 or frequent gusts of at least 61 knots are expected.
- Violent Storm Force Warnings are issued if Beaufort Force 11 or frequent gusts of at least 69 knots are expected.
- Hurricane Force Warnings are issued if winds of greater than 64 knots are expected.

Small Craft Warnings

Small Craft Warnings are issued if winds of Beaufort Force 6 (min. mean of 22 knots) are expected up to 10 Nautical miles offshore.

Coastal Reports from the following stations:

Malin Head, Dublin Airport, Rosslare (ceased after 1 July 2007), Roches Point Automatic, Valentia, Belmullet and the following buoys:

BUOY	Degree Decimal Minutes (GPS)	Degree Minutes Seconds (DMS)	Decimal Degrees GIS application s	General Location
M1 62090	53 07.6 N 11 12 W	53° 7' 36" N 11° 12' 0" W	53.127 -11.200	Off the Galway coast Approximately 40 nautical miles (60 km) westsouthwest of Slyne Head
M2 62091	53 28.8 N 5 25.5 W	53° 28' 48" N 5° 25' 30" W	53.480 -5.425	Irish Sea approximately 20 nautical miles (37Km) east of Howth Head
M3 62092	51 13 N 10 33 W	51° 13' 0" N 10° 33' 0" W	51.217 -10.550	Off the Kerry coast Approximately 30 nautical miles (56km) southwest of Mizen Head
M4 62093	55 0 N 10 0 W	55° 0′ 0″ N 10° 0′ 0″ W	55.000 -10.000	Off the Donegal coast Approximately 45 nautical miles (83 km) West northwest of Rossan Point
M5 62094	51 41.4 N 6 42.24 W	51° 41' 24" N 6° 42' 14" W	51.690 -6.704	Off the south Wexford coast Approximately 30 nautical miles (56 km) south of Hook Head
M6 62095	53 03.6 N 15 55.8 W	53° 3' 36" N 15° 55' 48 " W	53.060 -15.930	Deep Atlantic Approximately 210 nautical miles (389 km) west southwest of Slyne Head

Caution: Those are the designated locations of the buoys for which statutory sanction was approved, hence buoy locations are approximate and are not for navigational purposes. All vessels are requested to give the buoys a wide berth of at least 1 nautical mile.

The coastal reports include:

- (a) wind direction on the 16 point compass and speed in knots
- (b) weather
- (c) visibility in nautical miles and tenths of,
- (d) pressure in hectopascals (millibars)
- (e) pressure tendency, which describes the change in pressure over the past 3 hours, according to this scale:
 - 0.0 0.4hPa = steady
 - 0.5 1.9hPa = rising/falling slowly
 - 2.0 3.4 hPa = rising/falling
 - 3.5 5.9 hPa = rising or falling rapidly
 - 6.0hPa or greater = rising or falling very rapidly



Following circulation of the draft report into this incident under Section 36 of the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000 no correspondence or comments were received by the Board.

NOTES







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