

**REPORT INTO THE LOSS OF  
THE MFV "POD SANT YANN"  
ON THE 26TH APRIL 2005**

**The Marine Casualty Investigation Board was established on the 25<sup>th</sup> March, 2003 under The Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act 2000**

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## 1. SYNOPSIS

- 1.1 The Motor Fishing Vessel "Pod Sant Yann" departed from Union Hall, Co. Cork on the morning of the 25th April 2005 at approximately 03.00 UST to undertake a fishing trip which began at fishing grounds 12 miles South of Baltimore.
- 1.2 Fishing continued throughout that day until late in the night. The vessel moved to different areas as it trawled.
- 1.3 On the morning of the 26th April 2005 a fire occurred in the main engine room, which rapidly went out of control. The vessel was abandoned and the crew were rescued by another fishing vessel. The vessel burned until eventually sinking on the evening of the 26th April 2005.
- 1.4 There were no injuries, loss of life or pollution caused by this incident.

**2. FACTUAL INFORMATION**

**2.1 VESSEL DETAILS**

Year of build: 1984  
 Construction: Wood Carvel  
 Registered Length: 57.6 feet  
 Registered Breadth: 19.7 feet  
 Registered Depth: 7.8 feet  
 Gross Tonnage: 45.29 tons  
 Registered Tonnage: 20.38 tons  
 Engine: 8 cylinder Bauduin 316Kw  
 Fuel remaining on board: Approximately 12000 Litres Gas Oil.  
 Hydraulic Oil on board: Approximately 250 Litres.  
 Engine Lubricating Oil: Approximately 120 Litres.  
 RFD SOLAS 6 person inflatable liferaft with 'A' pack.

**2.2 CREW**

Skipper: Mr. William Newman.  
 Union Hall, Co. Cork.  
 Mr. Newman holds a:  
 2nd Hand Limited Certificate of Service No. 064  
 Radiotelephony Restricted No.5955  
 Radio Operators Long Range Certificate No. 468

Crewman: Antonio Augusto Pinho Da Silva (Portuguese),  
 Skibbereen, Co. Cork.

Crewman: Armando Antonio Marnut Viera (Portuguese),  
 Union Hall, Co. Cork.

Crewman: Vladimirs Matovs (Latvian),  
 Union Hall, Co. Cork.

### 3. EVENTS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT

All times UTC

- 3.1 On the 25th April 2005 at 03.00hours the vessel sailed from Union Hall, Co. Cork to carry out a fishing trip South of Baltimore.
- 3.2 Fishing continued in that area until mid-day. The fishing net was then hauled and when emptied of fish was shot again and trawling continued towards the "Lusitania" wreck.
- 3.3 The net was hauled again sometime between 15.00-16.00hours and once emptied was again shot straight away.
- 3.4 Trawling continued to approximately 13 miles South of Seven Heads and the net was hauled at approximately 22.00hours. The net was not shot again and the crew rested.
- 3.5 The vessel was then steamed slowly Southwards to an area known as "Galley Fishing Grounds" and the net was shot again at approximately 05.00hours on the 26th April 2005.
- 3.6 The weather just prior to the incident was wind South Westerly Force 5 with good visibility.
- 3.7 The Skipper was in the wheelhouse.
- 3.8 The three crewmen were resting in the sleeping accommodation.

#### 4. THE INCIDENT

- 4.1 At approximately 06.50hrs the Skipper who was in the wheelhouse detected the smell of smoke and went to investigate the source.
- 4.2 He checked at the fire escape hatch from the engine room and was met with a lot of smoke and was unable to enter the engine room.
- 4.3 The Skipper instructed the crew to don their lifejackets and to commence preparing the inflatable liferaft for launching.
- 4.4 The Skipper then got a portable fire extinguisher at the engine room main entrance hatch and released it into the space but was unable to go down through the hatch due to the amount of smoke coming from the fire.
- 4.5 The Skipper went to the wheelhouse and stopped the ventilation fans and closed all the air vents to the engine room and disconnected the LPG cooking gas cylinder. He also instructed the crew to go with him.
- 4.6 The CO<sub>2</sub> Fixed Fire Fighting Installation was not released to extinguish the fire.
- 4.7 The Skipper returned to the wheelhouse to make a Mayday call on the radio but was unable to get to the radio due to thick smoke emanating from the wheelhouse. He was able to get hold of a portable VHF radio.
- 4.8 The Skipper instructed the crew to board the liferaft, which was launched on the Port side of the vessel. He remained on board the burning vessel himself for a few minutes in sight of the crew. He then boarded the liferaft and made a Mayday call on the portable VHF radio, which Valentia Radio received at 07.23hours.
- 4.9 The crew paddled the liferaft away from the burning vessel and when approximately 20 metres away from it an explosion occurred. The crew are not sure if the explosion was caused by the LPG cooking gas cylinder exploding or by some other cause.

## EVENTS AFTER THE INCIDENT

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### 5. EVENTS AFTER THE INCIDENT

- 5.1 At 07.27 hours a cargo vessel "Orohope" which was 4.5 miles from the scene, responded to the call and proceeded to the casualty.
- 5.2 At 07.31 hours a Fishing Vessel "Mary Ann" responded from 6 miles.
- 5.3 At 07.37 hours the Rescue Helicopter R117 was tasked to the casualty location.
- 5.4 At 07.43 hours a Fishing Vessel "Horizon" gave an estimated time of arrival of 30 minutes.
- 5.5 At 07.47 hours the LE "Ciara" reported it was proceeding to the scene.
- 5.6 At approximately 08.20hours the "Horizon" arrived at the scene and commenced boarding the survivors. This was completed and reported at 08.28 hours.
- 5.7 The "Horizon" returned to Union Hall with the survivors on board.
- 5.8 LE "Ciara" arrived on scene at 09.15 hours and stood by as on scene co-coordinator. LE "Ciara's" crew attempted to extinguish the fire using fire hoses deployed from "Ciara's" bow.
- 5.9 The vessel remained afloat still burning and eventually sank at 17.45 hours in position 51 11.4N 008 40.5W in water depth 102 Metres.
- 5.10 There were no injuries reported in connection with this incident.
- 5.11 There appeared to be no pollution at the time.
- 5.12 The safety equipment used was a portable fire extinguisher, the 6 person RFD (SOLAS 'A' Pack) inflatable liferaft, the lifejackets and the portable VHF radio.

## 6. CONCLUSIONS

- 6.1 The vessel burned out and sank and therefore the cause of fire cannot be determined.
- 6.2 Attempts by the Skipper to use the fire fighting appliances did not include the use of the CO2 Fixed Fire Fighting Installation. If this system was working and had been used the fire might have been extinguished.
- 6.3 The fire went out of control rapidly necessitating the evacuation of the Skipper and Crew. This took place without difficulty, aided by the reasonable weather conditions.
- 6.4 There have been no reports to date of any oil pollution and therefore it can be assumed that the oils on board the vessel remain contained in the vessels storage tanks and drums. It can also be assumed that at some time in the future the oil will eventually leak into the sea.

## 7. RECOMMENDATIONS

- 7.1 It is recommended that the Skipper or the person responsible for using the Fixed Fire Fighting Installation should be fully familiar with its correct operation in the event of an engine room fire.
- 7.2 It is recommended that Fire Fighting Appliances including the Fixed Fire Fighting Installation be maintained by a competent servicing agent at a period not exceeding two years.

**8. LIST OF APPENDICES**

- 8.1 Photographs of "Pod Sant Yann" on fire and being extinguished by LE "Ciara"  
(Photographs courtesy of Naval Operations Command)

# APPENDIX 8.1

## Appendix 8.1





## 9. LIST OF CORESPONDENCE RECEIVED

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9. CORESPONDENCE RECEIVED



MCIB RESPONSE

The MCIB notes the contents of this letter and have amended the report accordingly.

