REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
INTO THE GROUNDING OF
MV "PANTANAL"
AT
CASHLA BAY, ROSSAVEAL
ON
31st MARCH 2011

The Marine Casualty Investigation Board was established on the 25th March, 2003 under the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000.

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Report MCIB/199 published by The Marine Casualty Investigation Board. Published 24th February 2012.
1. SYNOPSIS

1.1 On 31st March 2011 at approx. 04.35 hrs. the vessel, which was anchored in Cashla Bay, began to drag anchor. At 04.55 hrs. the vessel took the ground on the North Eastern part of the Bay, in position 53° 15.7’N 009° 34.05’W. No lives were lost, however, the vessel was extensively damaged.
2. FACTUAL INFORMATION

2.1 Description of the Vessel

2.1.1 The vessel is a geared general cargo ship, designed for handling specialist heavy lift or project cargoes. The vessel has two cargo holds with Tween Decks and two hatch covers. Accommodation and machinery spaces are located aft. Weather deck protection is provided by steel hatch covers.

2.1.2 Principal Particulars:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vessel Name:</td>
<td>&quot;Pantanal&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vessel Type:</td>
<td>General Cargo Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year:</td>
<td>2004, Xingang Shipyard, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flag:</td>
<td>Antigua &amp; Barbuda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port of Registry:</td>
<td>St. John’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMSI:</td>
<td>304639000</td>
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<tr>
<td>I.M.O. Number:</td>
<td>9316579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length Overall:</td>
<td>119.80 m</td>
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<tr>
<td>Breadth Moulded:</td>
<td>20.20 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer Draft:</td>
<td>7.59 m</td>
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<tr>
<td>Summer Deadweight:</td>
<td>7,821 m.t.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gross Tonnage:</td>
<td>7,002</td>
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<td>Net Tonnage:</td>
<td>3,375</td>
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<tr>
<td>Propulsion:</td>
<td>Variable Pitch Propeller</td>
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<tr>
<td>Steering:</td>
<td>Hydraulic motors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Speed:</td>
<td>16.0 knots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classification:</td>
<td>Germanischer Lloyd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry No.:</td>
<td>110904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner/Manager:</td>
<td>Harren &amp; Partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charterer:</td>
<td>K.S. Combi Lift, Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master:</td>
<td>Capt. Reinhardt Peters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew on Board:</td>
<td>16 persons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1.3 Equipment

The vessel was a modern cargo ship and, as such, it was well equipped with navigational aids and equipment. The bridge lay out comprised of a central control console, with two seats towards the centreline at the front of the wheelhouse. The bridge had open bridge wings with doors to the wheelhouse.
3. **EVENTS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT**

3.1 The "Pantanal" was on Time Charter to K.S. Combi-Lift of Denmark and received voyage instructions on 18th March 2011. The vessel was instructed to proceed to Galway Bay where it would load two ferries for transport to Madagascar. The instructions were to load at Galway Docks or Rossaveal Harbour if there was a safe anchorage. Following communications between the Master and the Charterer it was decided to proceed to Rossaveal, where the vessel would anchor.

3.2 The vessel arrived in Galway Bay on 30th March 2011 in ballast condition. The maximum draft was 6.5 metres at the stern.

3.3 Prior to boarding the vessel the Pilot met with the Harbour Master at Rossaveal, to discuss the optimum anchorage position. As part of the preparation, they discussed the weather and examined the latest weather forecast. The intention was to load the cargo that day. However, if the loading was delayed until the next day, the Harbour Master advised that the vessel should depart the anchorage, as the bay was exposed to South Easterly winds. In addition, the Harbour Master advised that, in view of the forecast, the vessel should weigh anchor and depart the bay if loading was to be delayed until the next day.

3.4 The vessel was boarded by a Galway Docks Pilot and brought into the anchorage in Cashla Bay. The Pilot and Master were not satisfied with the initial position and the vessel weighed anchor to get a better position. This is due to the restricted swinging circle in the anchorage.

3.5 The Pilot warned the Master to depart the Bay if the weather conditions deteriorated and rose above Beaufort Force 6. He reported to the Harbour Master that he had passed on his advice with respect to departing the anchorage.

3.6 Late in the evening a decision was made to defer loading of the cargo until 31st March 2011. The vessel remained at anchor.

3.7 The Master was on the bridge until approx. 01.00 hrs. on 31st March 2011. He left the Second Officer in charge.
4. THE INCIDENT

4.1 At 04.35 hrs. on 31st March 2011 the second officer noted that the vessel had started to drag anchor. He alerted the Master. By 04.50 hrs. the vessel was aground and unable to free itself on a falling tide.
5. EVENTS FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT

5.1 The Master of the ship contacted the Harbour Master at 05.48 hrs. on 31st March 2011 by mobile telephone to advise him of the incident, and reported that the Harbour Master was the only person the Master of the ship could raise. The Harbour Master alerted the MRCC Valentia by telephone and proceeded to the scene, by boat.

5.2 On boarding the vessel, the Harbour Master attempted to discuss the incident with the Master, but he (the Master) had received instructions from his owners not to discuss the incident with anybody. The Harbour Master noted a ship’s plan showing the profile of the vessel. There was a table of fuel oils on board showing the capacities of the tanks and a table of soundings showing the actual quantities in each tank. He also noted the entries in the “Rough Log Book” or “Bell Book” (log of activities maintained whilst entering and departing from a port, the important parts of which are transferred to the Deck Log Book when there is a suitable opportunity to do so).

5.3 Later in the morning the vessel was boarded by various persons representing the Marine Survey Office, the Irish Coastguard, a surveyor representing the vessel’s P & I Club and a Supercargo (superintendent) representing the Time Charterer of the vessel.

5.4 Soundings of the tanks indicated that the vessel was not making water in any of the double-bottom tanks. A centreline void space, extending between frames 45 and 135 had filled. The bulkheads at each end were reported as being watertight. Later it was found that some water from this space had entered the engine room via ducting outlets that became dislodged. There was no immediate threat of oil pollution.

5.5 Emergency actions to secure the vessel were discussed. Two anchors, other than the ships anchors were laid out, from the starboard bow and quarter, using ship’s mooring lines. It was hoped that the vessel might be able to refloat herself on the next high tide by warping on the anchors. The alternative was that the anchors would hold the vessel in position on the next high tide and prevent her from going further inshore.

5.6 The owners entered a contract with the owners of the “Celtic Isle” for assistance and this vessel was despatched to Cashla Bay. The vessel arrived off Cashla Bay around 04.00 hrs. on 1st April 2011 and proceeded inwards. The tug was made fast to the vessel and commenced pulling as the next high tide approached. The vessel refloated at approx. 05.00 hrs. on 1st April 2011.

5.7 The vessel was anchored in Galway off Ballyvaughan and detained by the Marine Survey Office, under the Paris Memorandum of Understanding, more commonly referred to as Port State Control. It was subjected to a detailed inspection by
Germanischer Lloyd, as the Classification Society and recognised organisation representing the flag State. A team of divers and support vessels were brought in to assess the damage and to affect repairs. The tug remained on station secured to the vessel’s stern.

5.8 The vessel was subsequently brought further up Galway Bay and re-anchored outside the fairway buoy marking the approaches to Galway Docks to facilitate repairs.

5.9 Certificates of Competency

5.9.1 The Master held a valid Class 1 Certificate of Competency issued by Antigua and Barbuda, dated 25th March 2005.

5.9.2 The Mate held a Class 2 Certificate of Competency issued by the Ukraine on 17th November 2010 and a Certificate issued by Antigua and Barbuda issued on 19th November 2008.

5.9.3 The Second Officer had a Certificate of Competency as a Navigating Officer, issued by the Ukraine on 11th June 2007 and by Antigua and Barbuda on 15th March 2010.

5.9.4 The Third Officer had a Certificate of Competency issued by the Ukraine on 19th August 2008 and a Certificate issued by Antigua and Barbuda on 8th August 2008.

5.10 The British Admiralty chart was examined. The chart in use was BA 2096 with an inset for Cashla Bay. The chart was “new” in appearance and the last correction entered was No. 6499 of 2009. The last position marked on the chart was for 04.00 hrs. It was noted that the distance from the shore was 3 cables or 0.3 nautical miles. The charted depth of water was 10.5 metres.

5.11 The Sailing Directions published by the British Admiralty, NP 40, called the Irish Coast Pilot, was examined. The Second Officer pointed out the date on it which indicated that it had been received on board on 30th March 2011.

5.12 Various Statements

5.12.1 The Master had prepared a typed statement which he was relying on. It outlines the sequence of events in the hour before the incident occurred. Attached to the statement were copies of communication between the Owner’s superintendent and the Master, dated 22nd March 2011. The correspondence indicates that the vessel was too large to enter Galway Docks and suggests anchoring off Rossaveal. The problem was also discussed with a representative of Combi Lift. The Master had left orders in the Night Order Book that he was to be called if the wind
rose above 20 knots, especially if the wind direction was from the South East. He was called to the bridge by the Second Officer at 04.35 hrs. when the vessel began to drag anchor.

5.12.2 The Chief Officer had been working in the hold preparing the vessel to receive the cargo. The supercargo had left the vessel around 17.00 hrs. The Chief Officer finished working at approx. 03.00 hrs. on 31st March 2011 in preparation for the planned loading operations at 09.00 hrs. He was called by the Second Officer at approx. 04.30 hrs. to say the ship was dragging anchor.

5.12.3 The Second Officer had prepared a handwritten report on the sequence of events. He commenced watch at 00.00 hrs. on 31st March 2011. At 02.00 and 04.00 hrs. he recorded the vessel as maintaining position. He logged the first sign that the vessel was dragging anchor at 04.35 hrs. He raised the alarm and contacted the Engineers to start the main engine. The Master arrived on the bridge at 04.37 hrs. and the main engine was running at 04.40 hrs. At this time the engine was placed on full ahead, the rudder was hard to port and the boatswain was on the forecastle attempting to raise the anchor. The Master took over command but the vessel was subject to strong South South Westerly winds which blew her ashore at 04.55 hrs.

5.12.4 The Second Officer had an Able Seaman on watch with him. He was making rounds when the incident occurred.

5.12.5 The Boatswain stated he was called and ran forward in an attempt to raise the anchor.

5.12.6 The Chief Engineer reports that he was called and went to start the main engine.

5.12.7 The Third Officer stated that when he handed over the watch he passed on the Master’s instruction with respect to what should be done in the event the vessel dragged anchor. He was called at 04.40 hrs by the Second Officer. He went to the bridge to find the Master in command and the engine running.

5.12.8 The Harbour Master at Rossaveal prepared a report on the incident and provided the investigator with a copy. The report includes a photocopy of the chart of the inset showing Cashla Bay. The depth of water is shown as 10.5 metres, or 5.7 fathoms.
6. CONCLUSIONS

6.1 The vessel rode to 3 shackles in the water, the equivalent of 45 fathoms of chain or 82 metres of chain. The standard practice for fair weather is to deploy at least 3 times the depth of water, so one considers the scope of anchor chain deployed was adequate originally.

6.2 Weather data supplied by the Harbour Master, with wind speeds measured at the ferry terminal in Rossaveal, indicate that at the time of the incident the wind speed in the harbour was 40 knots. Using an exercise undertaken by consulting engineers in the past, he calculated the wind speed at the anchorage was in the region of 60 knots. The wind direction was SSW.

6.3 The documents include a graphic reading and digital records for the weather station. A summary of the records is set out below:

- **00.00 hrs.** The graph shows the wind speed rises above 20 knots. There is no digital record for this time.
- **02.00 hrs.** The graph shows wind speeds at approx. 20 to 25 knots. The digital date shows a wind speed and direction of 221° T x 23.0 knots.
- **03.00 hrs.** The graph shows a maximum gust of 35 knots. The digital records shows 259° T x 18.3 knots.
- **04.00 hrs.** The graph shows a wind speed of 40 knots. The digital records show 236° T x 30.9 knots.
- **04.30 hrs.** The graph shows gusts of approx. 47 knots. The digital records shows 223° T x 35.3 knots.

6.4 The M1 databuoy has been removed from service and the data records are no longer available. Met Éireann have provided the weather forecast in force at the time where the west coast winds were predicted as being southwest force 4 or 5, increasing to south to southeast force 7 for a time and then veering southwest force 6 to gale 8.

6.5 The description of the weather that actually occurred indicates that a frontal squall was experienced. The Harbour Master suggested that the weather might have been very localised.

6.6 The planning of the operation on the part of the Time Charterer was poor. The Master was given a choice of Galway Docks or Rossaveal to load the cargo. When he checked the information available to him on board, it was found that the
vessel could not enter Galway Docks, on two counts, beam and draft. Therefore, his options were narrowed down to one very quickly. The Master was asked to place his vessel in a narrow bay where he only had 3 cables between the ship and the shore.

6.7 The Harbour Master is adamant that he expressed his concerns with respect to the vessel remaining at anchor overnight in light of the weather forecast. He relied on the Pilot to pass on his reservations to the Master. Ideally, if the advice of the Harbour Master had been taken on board, the vessel would have left the anchorage at 17.00 hrs. on 30th March 2011 when operations were suspended until the following day. For an unexplained reason the Master opted to remain at the anchorage.

6.8 In a tight anchorage, which is new to the Master, one would expect that the engines should have been on instant standby rather than on notice. The Master wanted to be called if the wind speed rose above 20 knots. When he left the bridge at 01.00 hrs. the wind speed had already reached this speed.

6.9 Once the vessel began to drag anchor there was very little time or options available. By the time the crew were roused and the engines started the vessel was well on its way to the shore.

6.10 There was an apparent breach in protocols in that the vessel did not appear to use its VHF transceivers, or other GMDSS apparatus to alert the Authorities. At a minimum a PAN PAN message should have been transmitted immediately. Instead reports indicate the Master was relying on a mobile telephone to communicate.
7. **RECOMMENDATIONS**

On investigating the casualty the Board recommends the following actions:

7.1 All Masters, Pilots and Harbour Masters should take the dimensions of a vessel into account before entering an anchorage such as Cashla Bay. There should be a clear passage plan with all dangers and limitations clearly identified. The plan should be prepared well in advance and if necessary, there should be communication between the Pilot, the Harbour Master and the Master in advance of the arrival.

7.2 The MCIB recommends that the Minister issue a Marine Notice reiterating the requirements of the IMO STCW Code on ships at anchor.

7.3 The MCIB recommends that the Minister issue a Marine Notice reminding mariners of their obligation to report a marine casualty to the appropriate authorities.
## LIST OF APPENDICES

8. **LIST OF APPENDICES**

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<th>Section</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>8.1</td>
<td>Photographs of &quot;Pantanal&quot;. Photograph of &quot;Pantanal&quot; aground courtesy of Irish Coast Guard.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) Wheelhouse from port to starboard.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Wheelhouse from starboard to port.</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>Particulars of vessel.</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>Photograph of chart on board vessel.</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>Chart supplied by Rossaveal Harbour Master.</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>Weather reports from Met Éireann and related data.</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 8.1 Photographs of “Pantanal”.

Photograph of “Pantanal” aground courtesy of Irish Coast Guard.

(a) Wheelhouse from port to starboard.
Appendix 8.1 Photographs of “Pantanal”.

(b) Wheelhouse from starboard to port.
Appendix 8.2  Particulars of vessel.

**MV "PANAGIA" - MV "PANTANAL" - MV "PANGANI"**

**CLASS:**
100 ADG EQUIPPED FOR CARRIAGE OF CONTAINERS AND DANGEROUS CARGO IMO 1.1. MC AUT STRENGTHENED FOR HEAVY CARGO.

**BUILDERS:**
XINGANG SHIPYARD, TIANJIN YARD NO. 328337-1/2004

**REGISTER Tonnage:**
GROSS 750G
NET 3273

**DIMENSIONS:**
LENGTH OVER ALL: 115.66 M
LENGTH BETWEEN PP: 113.66 M
BREADTH MOLDED: 20.32 M
DRAFT FULLY LOADED SUMMER: 7.09 M

**DEAD WEIGHT CAPACITIES:**
DEAD WEIGHT A T: 7521 MTS
DEAD WEIGHT C.C.: 7300 MTS

**CONTAINER CAPACITIES:**
TOTAL CAPACITY 20' x 8' x 8': 599
HEROIS IN CARGO HOLD: 236
ON DECK: 361
CAPACITY WITH ANCHORAGE 14 TSB: 377
REFRIG. CONTAINERS: 36

**STACK LOAD:**
TANKTOP: 180 TSB EACH 20' 120 TSB EACH 40'
DECK: 60 TSB EACH 20' 60 TSB EACH 40'

**CARGO HOLD:**
FITTED FOR DANGEROUS CARGO SOLAS II-2, RED 94 HOLD FITTED WITH SMOKE DETECTORS, CO2 SYSTEM, SPRINKLER

**HATCHES:**
HATCH NO. 1: 12.25 X 15.15 = 6.22 X 9.94 M
HATCH NO. 2: 52.00 X 16.10 X 10.90 M

**CUBIC CAPACITIES IN HOLD:**
WITH TWEENDECK HATCH COVERS: 11069 CBM

**CRANES:**
2 ELECTRO HYDRAULIC CRANES PORT SIDE 250 T/12 M & 160 T/25M DOMINABLE UP TO 350 T/25 M

**DECK STRENGTH:**
TWEENDECK - STEEL 15.0 TSB PER M2
TWEENDECK - HOLD NO. 1 2.5 TSB PER M2
TWEENDECK - HOLD NO. 2 3.3 TSB PER M2
HATCH COVER 2.5 TSB PER M

**TANK CAPACITIES:**
Fuel oil: 7519 TSB
MDO: 693 TSB
FRESH WATER: 140 TSB
BALLAST WATER: 404 M TSB

**ALL PARTICULARS BELIEVED TO BE CORRECT BUT NOT GUARANTEED**
Appendix 8.2 Particulars of vessel.
Appendix 8.3 Photograph of chart on board vessel.
Appendix 8.4 Chart supplied by Rossaveal Harbour Master.
Appendix 8.5  Weather reports from Met Éireann and related data.

MET ÉIREANN
The Irish Meteorological Service
Gailearain Hill,
Dublin 9, Ireland.
Cnoc Ghí na Nádúr
Ballad Aghas Ghael, Éire.
www.met.ie
Tel: +353-1-866 4003
Fax: +353-1-806 6247
E-mail: met.eireann@met.ie

Our Ref: WS3018/2C_14084
Your Ref: MCIB/199

8/4/2011

Estimate of weather conditions in the Cashla Bay, County Galway, sea area, on the 31st March 2011 between 0 hours and 12 hours.

General Situation
A complex Low pressure area in mid-Atlantic gave a mainly south-westerly airflow over north-west Europe. A local Low pressure area embedded in the flow moved north-eastswards past the north-west coast of Ireland.

Details
0 to 6 hours

Winds: south to south-west Force 6 to 7, increased in the second half of the period to south-west to west Gale Force 8 to Strong Gale Force 9.

Weather: cloudy with outbreaks of rain at first, cleared to showers and clear spells later.

Visibility: Moderate to Poor

Waves of 3 metres to 5.4 metres significant wave height were observed at weather buoys off the west coast of Ireland during this period. The highest waves occurred later in the period. Similar waves would have occurred on the Atlantic side of the Aran Islands. The waves would have been considerably reduced within Cashla Bay itself.

..........................................................continued WS3018/2C_14084
Appendix 8.5 Weather reports from Met Éireann and related data.

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**Sea Area Forecast until 0600 Thursday 31 March 2011**

**Issued at 0600 Wednesday 30 March 2011**

**Gale Warning**

Strong southwest winds will reach gale force 6 to 7 on all coastal areas and on the Irish Sea.

**Sea Area Forecast for 30 March 2011**

**Wednesday, 30 March 2011**

- Gale warning: In operation

**Small Craft Warning:**

- Visibility moderate or poor

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http://www.meteo.ie/forecasts/sea-area.asp

30/03/2011
Appendix 8.5 Weather reports from Met Éireann and related data.

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<th>Time</th>
<th>Alm. Press. (mmHg)</th>
<th>Chat/Press. Temp. (°C)</th>
<th>Wind (mph)</th>
<th>Rain (mm)</th>
<th>Max Temp. (°C)</th>
<th>Min Temp. (°C)</th>
<th>Dew Point (°C)</th>
<th>Wind Speed (mph)</th>
<th>Rain Rate (mm/h)</th>
<th>Relative Hum. (%)</th>
<th>Wind Chill (°F)</th>
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Sensor Name: M3  
Latitude: 51.21660000  Longitude: -10.55000000

Please click on the Table Headers to view a Graph of the Observations.
Appendix 8.5 Weather reports from Met Éireann and related data.

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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Temp (°C)</th>
<th>Wind Speed (kn)</th>
<th>Wind Dir (°)</th>
<th>Max Gust (kn)</th>
<th>Air Temp (°C)</th>
<th>Dew Point Temp (°C)</th>
<th>Sun/Moon (°)</th>
<th>Relative Hum (%)</th>
<th>Windchill (°C)</th>
<th>Solar Insolation (W/m²)</th>
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Appendix 8.5  Weather reports from Met Éireann and related data.
Appendix 8.5 Weather reports from Met Éireann and related data.

continued WS30182C_I4084..........................

6 to 12 hours

Winds: Weserly Gale Force 8 to Strong Gale Force 9, at first, gradually backed south-westerly and decreased to Force 5.

Weather: isolated showers and some bright spells

Visibility: poor to moderate

Waves of 3.5 metres to 5.4 metres, significant wave height, were reported by weather buoys west of Ireland during the period. The highest waves occurred earlier in the period. Similar waves would have occurred on the Atlantic side of the Aran Islands. The waves would have been considerably reduced within Caha Bay itself.

Evelyn Murphy B.Sc., M.Sc., Meteorologist
Research & Applications Division
Met Éireann
## 9. CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED

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**Note:** The address and contact details of the individual respondent have been obscured for privacy reasons.
Ms Eve Reddin,
Secretary,
Marine Casualty Investigation Board,
Leeson Lane,
Dublin 2

2nd December 2011

Dear Ms. Reddin,

I received a letter from the MCIB dated 7th November 2011 and the Draft report of the investigation into the grounding of the M.V. Pantanal at Cashla Bay Rostaveel on 31st March 2011.

I wish to make the following comments:

6. CONCLUSIONS

6.7 The Harbour Master is adamant…etc.

The Galway Pilot Kevin Walsh confirmed that the Harbour Master had passed on his concerns to him prior to him boarding the vessel at the approaches and that he had agreed to pass this information onto the Master. He also confirmed that when he returned to the Harbour Masters Office immediately after anchoring the vessel that he met with the Harbour Master and reassured him that this information had in fact been passed onto the Master. In addition the Master admitted in statements given after the event that he had thus been informed. It is a Standard Operating Procedure pertaining to the entry into Cashla Bay of any large commercial vessel that the ships agent are advised that should an anchorage be available then would only be available during daylight hours and suitable weather conditions prevailing.

Below is an extract from my statement on a report of the incident given to the Marine Survey Office (MSO) and the Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) shortly after the grounding:

“The agents City of Galway Shipping Ltd. have past knowledge of large commercial vessels entering and working off anchor in Cashla Bay as they have handled various vessels in the past. As would be the routine they were advised of the port requirements for entry of the M.V. Pantanal, which included entry into the bay during daylight hours only and suitable weather conditions. The agent was also provided with the coordinates of two recommended anchorages that had been used previously by large commercial vessels. (see Annex 1 attached).

On Wednesday morning 30th March prior to the vessels arrival the owner’s representatives, cargo owners and a rep from the ships agent met in my office by way of introduction. The owner’s rep rang the master on the vessel and established that the master would be requesting a pilot even though pilotage was not compulsory. The agent consequently contacted Galway Harbour and organised a pilot to come to Ros A’ Mhíl Harbour.”
The Harbour Master concerns about the inclement weather were also expressed at the above meeting.

Practically all communication involving a large commercial ships entry into Cashla Bay would be via through the ships agent. The earliest available opportunity for the harbour to communicate directly with a vessel would be as the vessel approaches the harbours jurisdiction. Considering the possibility of language communication problems etc between vessels and shore side it was thought at the time that the most prudent method of ensuring that this important information was passed onto the master (in addition to the ships agent and cargo reps) was via the Galway Pilot.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 There was numerous contact by phone and e mail correspondence between the ships agent and the Harbour Master well in advance of the vessels entry. The dimensions of the vessel were known in ample time as this information (normal SOP’s) had been passed onto the Harbour Master by the ships agent via e mails, which showed the Nomination details, including vessels dimensions, for the Pantanal dated 18th March 2011.

Cashla Bay is a safe anchorage provided that all the well documented requirements for a vessels entry and SOP’s for the normal practice of good seamanship are followed. While not a frequent occurrence the anchorage in Cashla Bay has been and still is used successfully and safely by numerous large commercial vessels including passenger vessels such as the MV Black Prince, MV Ocean Prince, MV Adriana and the Heavy Lift General Cargo Vessel MV Paula.

The MV Paula’s use of the anchorage was similar to what was to take place with the MV Pantanal i.e. it used the anchorage successfully to offload from its deck a domestic passenger vessel for use in Rossaveel. The Paula with dimensions of 8,397 GT, LOA 151.6 Mts, Draft 7.8 Mts was a much larger vessel than the Pantanal.

Mise le meas

Captain John C. Donnelly
Harbour Master

MCIB RESPONSE

The MCIB notes the contents of this correspondence.
Reinhard Peters

Hatten, 27. Nov 2011

Your Reference: MCIB/199

Dear Mr O’Donnell,

thanks a lot for your Investigation Report.
As far as I have seen there are neither comments nor observations on the draft report from my side.

Yours sincerely

Reinhard Peters

MCIB RESPONSE
The MCIB notes the contents of this correspondence.
MCIB RESPONSE

The MCIB notes the contents of the correspondence and has included this suggestion in the recommendations.
Mr. John O'Donnell,
Chair,
MCIB
Leeson Lane,
Dublin 2.

Your Ref: MCIB/199

RE:

Dear John,

Thank you for your letter and report into the grounding of the MV Pantanal in March 2011.

I can comment as follows:

3.4 The Pilot & Master were not satisfied with the initial anchoring position after the vessel was brought up so the anchor was heaved up and the vessel was repositioned and re-anchored. This due to restricted swinging circles in the anchorage.

5.5 This paragraph refers to “two anchors being laid out”. I think to avoid confusion it should be reworded to clarify that the anchors were not the ships anchors but two other anchors that were laid by a local boat operator to assist in getting the Pantanal off the shore.

6.1 The use of the port anchor in the northern hemisphere and starboard anchor in the southern hemisphere is noted. However, modern day shipping, the anchors are rotated when the vessel requires to be anchored and this is accepted practice. The use of either anchor in this grounding had no material affect on the outcome of what followed on the early hours of the 31st March 2011.

6.3 Same comment as to point 6.1 it did not matter which anchor was used. The rule of port anchor in the N Hemisphere and starboard anchor in the S Hemisphere relates to wind shifts and to avoid anchors becoming fouled if both anchors are dropped. This was not the case of the Pantanal.
My own conclusions are that if the Master of the Pantarai had taken the professional advice of the Harbour Master in Rossaveal and that of the pilot which was to leave the anchorage if the weather deteriorated, then this incident would not have occurred.

Yours sincerely,

Captain Kevin Walsh
Pilot

MCIB RESPONSE
The MCIB notes the contents of this correspondence and has made the necessary amendments.