

Leeson Lane, Dublin 2.
Telephone: 01-6782460.
Fax: 01-6783129.
email: info@mcib.ie
www.mcib.ie

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**REPORT OF THE
INVESTIGATION INTO THE
GROUNDING OF THE IRISH
FISHING VESSEL “FELUCCA”
IN DUBLIN PORT
ON 3RD JUNE 2006
AND THE SUBSEQUENT
VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE
CONTROL OF THE INCIDENT
INVOLVING TWO PASSENGER
VESSELS**

REPORT No. MCIB/126

Report MCIB/126 published by The Marine Casualty Investigation Board
12th May 2008



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1. SYNOPSIS

- 1.1 On the 3rd June 2006, at 16.44 hours (local time), the fishing vessel “Felucca” departed from Dublin Port bound for Killybegs. The vessel had been in Dublin for general maintenance at the dry dock. Whilst departing, the vessel suffered an engine power failure and grounded on the south side of the channel about 250 metres to the west of No. 10 buoy in Dublin Port. After one unsuccessful attempt, the vessel’s engine was restarted and the vessel successfully refloated. As the fishing vessel refloated, two passenger ferries were inbound in the channel and approaching the fishing vessel. The fishing vessel proceeded back, under its own power to its original berth. There was no pollution or hull damage suffered in the incident.

2. FACTUAL INFORMATION

2.1 Particulars of the fishing vessel “Felucca”

Length:	53.06 metres.
Breadth:	11.00 metres.
Moulded Depth:	7.90 metres.
Moulded Draught:	6.00 metres.
Gross Tonnage:	1093
Owner: Bradan	Fishing Company Limited, Moorechurch, Julianstown, Co. Meath.
Engine:	One Internal Combustion Caterpillar engine of 917 KW with one shaft and an estimated speed of 10 knots. Engine was de-rated from 2710 KW to 917 KW in July 2004.
Description of vessel:	Steel constructed fishing vessel. Built in 1995 and lengthened in 1998.

2.2 Particulars of the passenger vessel “Stena Adventurer”.

Length overall:	210.8 metres.
Beam:	29.3 metres.
Draught:	6.30 metres.
Gross Tonnage:	44,000 tons

The vessel is a Ro-Ro passenger ferry, built in 2003 and operating on the Holyhead to Dublin route. There were a total of 226 persons on board the vessel on arrival at Dublin on 3rd June 2006 at 17.45 hours.

2.3 Particulars of the high speed craft “Jonathan Swift”.

Length overall:	86.6 metres.
Beam:	24.0 metres.
Moulded depth:	7.30 metres
Gross Tonnage:	5989

The vessel is a Multihull (catamaran) High Speed Passenger Craft, built in 1998 and operating on the Holyhead to Dublin route. There were a total of 351 persons on board the vessel on arrival at Dublin on 3rd June 2006 at 17.30 hours.

3. EVENTS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT

- 3.1 On the 3rd June 2006, the fishing vessel “Felucca” was moored at the Lead in Jetty East in Alexandra Basin West, Dublin Port. The vessel had been at the nearby dry dock for general maintenance. It intended to proceed back to Killybegs, Co. Donegal. At 16.34 hours local time, the “Felucca” received clearance from Dublin Port Radio prior to departure. See Appendix 8.1 for the Met Eireann weather report on conditions pertaining to Dublin Port around the time of departure.
- 3.2 There was no Dublin Port pilot on board. The “Felucca” is not more than 70metres in length and therefore does not require a pilot. See Appendix 8.2 for Dublin Port Company Notice to Mariners No 2 of 2006, which details classes of exempted ships.
- 3.3 Recordings of the events leading up to the incident were obtained from the radar recordings at Dublin Port Company
- 3.4 The recordings show that the “Felucca” departed from the Lead in Jetty East in Alexandra Basin West at about 16.44 hours. At 16.50 hours, as it entered the river the “Felucca” called Dublin Port Radio and was advised by the Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) operator that it would meet inward bound passenger vessels “Norbank” and “Liverpool Viking” inside buoys No. 7 and 8. See Dublin Port charts in Appendix 8.3.
- 3.5 At 16.55 hours the “Felucca” was advised by Port Radio to “come ahead up to North Bank light”.
- 3.6 The recording for the time 17:00:16, given at Appendix 8.4.1, shows the track history of the fishing vessel from the time of departure up to that time. At this time the course and speed of the “Felucca” was 090 degrees and 8.7 knots. The vessel was again advised by the VTS Operator to “come ahead”.
- 3.7 At 17.04 hours the “Norbank” passes down the port side of the “Felucca” which was abeam of No. 12 buoy.
- 3.8 The recording for the time 17:05:03, given at Appendix 8.4.2, shows the “Felucca” abeam of North Bank and “Liverpool Viking” passing to port.

4. THE INCIDENT

- 4.1 The recording for the time 17:05:21, (given at Appendix 8.4.3) shows the “Felucca” veering to starboard having just passed the “Liverpool Viking”. At this time the Skipper of the “Felucca” advised Port Radio that the fishing vessel had lost engine power. Shortly afterwards the fishing vessel grounded on the south side of the channel about 250 metres to the west of No. 10 buoy.
- 4.2 The recording for the time 17:06:45, (given at Appendix 8.4.4) shows the inward bound passenger vessel “Stena Adventurer” approaching the Rosbeg South buoy followed by the inward bound Passenger High Speed Craft “Jonathan Swift”. At 17.10 hours, Port Radio advised them both to pass at reduced speed.

5. EVENTS FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT

- 5.1 At 17.11 hours, Port Radio was advised by the Skipper of the “Felucca” that the vessel was still aground and that the engine had stopped a second time. The Skipper also advised that a tug was the best option and that the “Felucca” would try using one tug initially. Appendix 8.4.5 shows the positions of the “Stena Adventurer” and “Jonathan Swift” at 17:10:45 hours.
- 5.2 At 17.14 hours, Dublin Port Radio advised the “Felucca” that there would be one tug available in about 15 minutes and a second tug in about 30 minutes. At 17.15 hours the “Jonathan Swift” confirmed that it had been copied with information regarding the trawler.
- 5.3 At 17.20 hours the fishing vessel confirmed to Dublin Port Radio that it was no longer aground and that its engine was restarted. Port Radio advised the “Felucca” to allow the passenger ferries to pass and to get in line of the channel. The recording for the time 17:20:52, given at Appendix 8.4.6, shows the “Stena Adventurer” passing No. 7 buoy followed by the “Jonathan Swift”.
- 5.4 At 17.21 hours, Port Radio advised the “Felucca” that the tug was departing its berth en route to it. The recording for the time 17:23:33, given at Appendix 8.4.7, shows the “Stena Adventurer” approaching No. 9 buoy followed by the “Jonathan Swift”.
- 5.5 At 17.27 hours, Port Radio advised the fishing vessel that the tug “Cluain Tarbh” was on the way to escort the fishing vessel back to Alexandra Basin West after the “Jonathan Swift” passed inwards. At this time the “Stena Adventurer” passed the fishing vessel.
- 5.6 At 17.29 hours, the “Jonathan Swift” passed the fishing vessel. The recording for the time 17:29:39, given at Appendix 8.4.8, shows this. After this the “Felucca” proceeded back to Alexandra Basin West.
- 5.7 The pilot boat was tasked to check around the fishing vessel for any sign of pollution. No pollution was observed.

6. CONCLUSIONS

- 6.1 The grounding of the fishing vessel was due to the main engine stopping and the vessel veering to starboard and into the shallow water on the south side of the channel. A report from the engine manufacturers of the cause of the engine stopping is enclosed at Appendix 8.5. The fault was identified as being caused by the coolant diluting the sump oil, which lowered oil pressure and caused the engine to shut down. After the incident the fault was rectified and the engine tested to the satisfaction of the manufacturers.
- 6.2 Dublin Port Company Notice to Mariners No. 9 of 2006 entitled Standard Operating Procedures for vessels entering into, shifting within and departing from the Port of Dublin is given at Appendix 8.6. This Notice to Mariners provides information that the Port Radio (PR) was upgraded from an “Advisory Service” to a “Traffic Organisation Service” that control the movement of all ships within the jurisdiction of Dublin Port Company (DPC). The instructions from PR will be result orientated only and shall not encroach upon the master’s responsibility for safe navigation or interfere with the traditional relationship that exists between the master and pilot. The criteria being that the PR control the space and shipmasters control their ships.
- 6.3 Two passenger vessels were allowed to enter the port shortly after the fishing vessel grounded and prior to the situation being fully assessed. The VTS operator has the power to instruct a vessel “not to enter the channel”. The possibility of keeping the “Stena Adventurer” and “Jonathan Swift” outside the port until the situation had been fully assessed was not considered necessary.
- 6.4 As the two passenger ferries were inward bound in the channel no instructions were given to the “Felucca”. The VTS operator was not aware that the fishing vessel was continuously trying to refloat. He firstly became aware of this when he visually saw the “Felucca” moving astern as the vessel refloated. He was concerned as the “Felucca” came astern, especially as the engine had already failed on two occasions.
- 6.5 The quality of the formal training that the Dublin Port Company VTS operators undergo is recognised. All the permanent VTS operators are trained to at least International Association of Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) recommendation V103/1 standard and some have further training to V103 / 2, 3 and 4 standards.
- 6.6 Following the grounding on 6th June 2006, an investigation was carried out on board the fishing vessel “Felucca” by a surveyor from the Marine Survey Office. The findings are given at Appendix 8.7.
- 6.7 Among the findings was one that the fishing vessel was not manned in compliance with the vessel’s Safe Manning Document at the time of the grounding.
- 6.8 There is no guidance or information issued to the Port Authorities by the Department of Transport regarding VTS operations or the training of VTS operators.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

- 7.1 Ports and Harbour authorities should implement standard operating procedures that masters of all vessels keep VTS operators fully informed of their circumstances and intentions at all times. Without this information, VTS Operators cannot assess and monitor the actions of vessels within its area of control.
- 7.2 It is recommended that a Marine Notice be issued concerning the need for Mariners to keep Port VTS Operators fully informed of their movements and intentions at all times. It is also recommended that Port Authorities who operate a VTS System should ensure that operators be trained to the IALA V103 Standard as minimum.
- 7.3 It is a requirement that all fishing vessels are manned in compliance with the regulations. Fishing vessels of 500 gross tons or more are required to have on board a Safe Manning Document issued by the Administration and are required to comply with the requirements therein. Fishing vessels of less than 500 gross tons must be manned as required by the Fishing Vessels (Certification of Deck Officers and Engineer Officers) Regulations, 1988 (S.I. No. 289 of 1988), as amended. The Department of Transport should enforce these regulations.

8. LIST OF APPENDICES

- 8.1 Met Eireann weather report.
- 8.2 Dublin Port Company Notice to Mariners No. 2 of 2006.
- 8.3 Dublin Port Chart of area.
- 8.4.1 Radar recording for 17.00.16
- 8.4.2 Radar recording for 17.05.03
- 8.4.3 Radar recording for 17.05.21
- 8.4.4 Radar recording for 17.06.45
- 8.4.5 Radar recording for 17.10.45
- 8.4.6 Radar recording for 17.20.52
- 8.4.7 Radar recording for 17.23.33
- 8.4.8 Radar recording for 17.29.39
- 8.5 Engine makers report.
- 8.6 Dublin Port Company Notice to Mariners No. 9 of 2006.
- 8.7 Marine Survey Office Report of Survey / Inspection.

Appendix 8.1 Met Éireann weather report..



Appendix 8.2 Dublin Port Company Notice to Mariners No. 2 of 2006.

DUBLIN PORT COMPANY

NOTICE TO MARINERS

No. 2 of 2006

COMPULSORY PILOTAGE

The attention of Shipowners and Masters of vessels subject to compulsory pilotage is drawn to the fact that it is obligatory for such vessels to be under pilotage within the limits of the Dublin Pilotage District. These limits are set out in the Third Schedule, part 2, of the Harbours Act 1996. They are repeated in the Schedule hereunder.

The Master of a ship subject to compulsory pilotage whose vessel is not under pilotage within the limits of the Dublin Pilotage District may render himself liable to prosecution under Section 60 of the Harbours Act 1996.

SCHEDULE

DUBLIN PILOTAGE DISTRICT.

The limits of the Dublin Pilotage District (hereinafter referred to as "the Pilotage District") shall be the waters of the River Liffey below Matt Talbot Memorial Bridge and so much of the sea westward of the sixth meridian as lies between the parallels of latitude passing through the Baily Lighthouse on the north and through Sorrento Point on the south, including all bays, creeks and harbours and all tidal docks within such area.

COMPULSARY PILOTAGE & EXEMPTED SHIPS

Under the current Bye-Laws (03rd June 2004), the following are exempted ships:-

- 2 (1) Pilotage shall be compulsory for every ship (other than an Exempted Ship) while navigating in the Pilotage District for the purpose of entering, leaving or making use of any part of the Pilotage District, and every ship (Other than an Exempted Ship) while navigating in the Pilotage District for such purpose shall be either:
 - (a) under the pilotage of a Pilot, or
 - (b) under the pilotage of a Certified Officer who holds a current Pilotage Exemption Certificate in respect of that ship.



Appendix 8.2 cont Dublin Port Company Notice to Mariners No. 2 of 2006.

- (2) The following classes of ships shall (subject to Bye-Law 2 (3)), be Exempted Ships:
- (a) ships owned by the State;
 - (b) pleasure craft and sail training ships;
 - (c) fishing vessels not more than 70 metres in length;
 - (d) ships of not more than 70 metres in length;
 - (e) ships of not more than 95 metres in length on departing to sea;
 - (f) ships the property of or engaged by the Commissioners of Irish Lights (responsible for the care and maintenance of lighthouses in the State), while engaged in carrying out their duties;
 - (g) ships the property of or engaged by the Company;
 - (h) ships which are moving from one berth within the Port to another berth within the Port but subject to the prior approval of the Harbour Master;
 - (i) tugs, dredgers, hoppers, barges and other similar ships subject to the prior approval of the Harbour Master; and
 - (j) ships navigating within the pilotage district but outside the seaward limit of the fairway or Dun Laoghaire Harbour, subject to the prior approval of the Harbour Master.
- (3) Notwithstanding Bye-Law 2(2) the following shall not be Exempted Ships:
- (a) ships over 24 metres in length with a Passenger Certificate; and
 - (b) ships carrying hazardous cargoes in bulk i.e. in tanks which are an integral part of the ship's structure or such ships which are not gas free.
- (4) The Harbour Master may, in his absolute discretion, temporarily suspend Bye-Law 2(2) in whole or in part from time to time, and furthermore may in his absolute discretion require any Exempted Ship whilst entering, leaving or making use of the Pilotage District to be under the pilotage of a Pilot or Certified Officer.
- (5) Such ships as are included in sub-paragraph 2(e) i.e. more than 70 metres but no more than 95 metres shall be liable for pilotage dues at 25% of the appropriate rate.

Captain David T. Dignam
Harbour Master.


1st January 2006

Appendix 8.3 Dublin Port Chart of area.




APPENDIX 8.4

Appendix 8.4.3 Radar recording for 17.05.21




Appendix 8.4.4 Radar recording for 17.06.45




APPENDIX 8.4

Appendix 8.4.5 Radar recording for 17.10.45




Appendix 8.4.6 Radar recording for 17.20.52




APPENDIX 8.4

Appendix 8.4.7 Radar recording for 17.23.33



Appendix 8.4.8 Radar recording for 17.29.39



Appendix 8.5. Engine makers report.






APPENDIX 8.5

McCormick Macnaughton (N.I.) Limited.

Blaris Industrial Estate
 Altona Road
 Lisburn
 BT27 5QB
 0044 2892 661221 : Tel
 0044 2892 661355 : Fax

To:	Fergal	From:	Tom Gibson
Company:	M V Feluccia	Dept:	Service
Dept:		cc:	
Fax Number:	0087132 6099822	Date:	15 June 2006
Pages (inc. cover):	1	Re:	Engine Shutdown

Re: CAT 3608, serial number 6NC00479 on M V Feluccia

On 6 June 06, I attended the above boat in the Port of Dublin to check out suspected engine shut down.

The following investigations and actions to correct fault were made.

1. Pressure tested jacket water system and found water in number one cylinder. Water was making its way into engine wet sump.
2. Removed cylinder head, piston and liner from number one cylinder and inspected. Cylinder liner appeared to be cracked. Replaced with new liner and new cylinder head.
3. Rebuilt engine and carried out pressure test.
4. Started engine and ran five hour test under load. Monitored and inspected data log.
5. Engine systems and alarms worked to requirements.
6. Inspected white metal bearings and filter contents and no debris or damage was found.

The fault was caused by the coolant diluting the sump oil which lowered oil pressure and caused the engine to shut down.

For and on behalf of
McCormick Macnaughton Ltd



Tom Gibson
 Field Service Technician

E-mail: TGibson@mccormickmacnaughton.com
 Web: www.mccormickmacnaughton.com

Page 1 of 2

Appendix 8.6. Dublin Port Company Notice to Mariners No. 9 of 2006.

DUBLIN PORT COMPANY
NOTICE TO MARINERS

No. 9 of 2006

Standard Operating Procedures For Vessels
Entering into, Shifting within & Departing from
The Port of Dublin

Port Radio:

Port Radio operates as a "Traffic Organisation Service", and its main role is to locally manage the scheduling of all sailings, arrivals and shifts. Port Radio is no longer an "Advisory Service" but now controls the movement of all ships within the jurisdiction of "Dublin Port Company" as set out in the *1996, Harbours Act*. Port Radio is authorised to issue instructions to vessels. These instructions shall be result orientated only and shall not encroach upon the master's responsibility for safe navigation, or interfere with the traditional relationship that exists between the master and pilot. The details of execution for any such instruction, such as courses to be steered and engine movements to be at the discretion of the master or pilot on board the vessel.

"Port Radio control the space – Ships masters control their ships"

Notification Requirements.

1. A minimum of two hours notice is required for all ships arriving at the Port of Dublin.
2. A minimum of two hours notice is required for ships sailing/shifting and requiring a pilot. However, should a pilot be required at shorter notice and one is available, such a service can be provided.

Criteria for Prioritizing ship movements

Priority 1 : Ro-Ro vessels when operating on their slot times shall have absolute priority

Priority 2 : Any ship arriving / departing on its allocated time.

Appendix 8.6 cont. Dublin Port Company Notice to Mariners No. 9 of 2006.

Other Considerations :

- (a) tidal window / weather / work dependent
- (b) departing vessel if vessel awaiting that berth
- (c) inbound vessels over outbound

Exception : One exception only to these priorities. Maximum draft vessel arriving and needing to work on arrival, when at least 12 hours notice has been given to the effected Ro-Ro operators

Movements

All ships with or without a Pilot or PEC holder on board and port craft must first obtain permission from Port Radio prior to :-

1. Approaching the harbour entrance and/or channel from seawards
2. Letting go and departing from a berth
3. Shifting within the Port

Conduct of ships within the Dublin Port Company Limits

Navigational Safety shall be the overriding consideration governing the movement of all vessels. In addition to those regulations, set out in the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea, the following shall also apply:

- 1) Vessels are prohibited from meeting or overtaking within the constrained section of the channel between buoys No's 5/6 and buoys No's 7/8. This does not apply to harbour tugs, pilot boats, various workboats and leisure craft unless instructed to the contrary by Port Radio.
- 2) Where two or more vessels propose to agree a particular manoeuvre, then such a manoeuvre shall not be carried out until it has been reported to and is cleared by Port Radio.
- 3) No vessel shall enter the channel/fairway, unless it has been confirmed by Port Radio that it may do so and that the intended berth is clear or expected to be clear.
- 4) All communications between ships relating to movements, manoeuvring, berthing or unberthing, shall take place on VHF Channel 12 only and shall be in the English language only. Instructions received from Port Radio, in relation to any confusion, ambiguity or the procedure of such communications, shall be followed immediately.
- 5) Traffic contra-flow is prohibited in circumstances where the visibility is reduced to less than 0.5 nautical miles, anywhere within the buoyed channel.

Appendix 8.6 cont. Dublin Port Company Notice to Mariners No. 9 of 2006.

- 6) All vessels including all port craft, must report in to Port Radio at the designated reporting points.
- 7) Gas tankers when navigating in the channel shall not to proceed against traffic moving in the opposite direction. At least a half-mile separation between vessels shall be maintained both ahead and astern of gas carriers when proceeding in the same direction.

Notwithstanding anything contained in the above, exceptions to these rules may be made by the Harbour Master.

Captain David T. Dignam
Harbour Master

1st January 2006

APPENDIX 8.7

Appendix 8.7. Marine Survey Office Report of Survey / Inspection.

MARINE SURVEY OFFICE
MARITIME SAFETY DIRECTORATE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS, MARINE
AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
LEESON LANE,
DUBLIN 2,
IRELAND.



TELEPHONE : + 353 (01) - 6783400
FAX : +353 (01) - 6783409
EMAIL : mso@dcmnr.gov.ie

REGIONAL OFFICES - SEE REVERSE

Report of Survey / Inspection

original - owner/master copy - MSO

Name of vessel..... FELUCCA O.N. / IMO 403033 / 9131951

Date of report 06/06/06 Place of inspection DUBLIN

Type of inspection FISHING VESSEL > 24m : INCIDENT RESULTING IN GROUNDING - TOW Report

Type of vessel FISHING VESSEL Port of registry SLGO

Item no.	Nature of deficiency	Legislation reference	Action taken
	<u>CERTIFICATE DETAILS AS PAGE 1</u>		
①	<u>OIL RECORD BOOK NOT CORRECT ENTRIES</u>		<u>17</u>
②	<u>MAINTENANCE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SIRE</u>		
	<u>MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE CERT (NUMBER OF OWS)</u>		<u>17</u>
③	<u>LOPP : CERTIFICATE ON BOARD NO LONGER VALID</u>		<u>17</u>
④	<u>MAINTENANCE : SHIPPER REQUIRED A SHIPPER'S FULL CERT : ON BOARD 2ND HAND FULL WITH SUMMARY</u>		<u>17</u>
⑤	<u>CHARTS : NOT CORRECTED UP TO DATE</u>		<u>17</u>
⑥	<u>WEATHER PREDICTIONS : NOT CORRECTED UP TO DATE</u>		<u>17</u>
⑦	<u>CARTRIDGE RECORD BOOK - NOT CORRECTLY FILLED IN</u>		<u>17</u>
	<u>1 - ENGINE ROOM & TECHNICAL INSPECTION</u>		
⑧	<u>ENGINE ROOM FOUND CLEAN & TIDY : W/O MAIN ENGINE BY ENGINEERS & SERVICE BY SO FOR SHOWS FRESH LUBRIC OILS. CHECKING WATER IN OIL CONTAMINATION. INSPECTION OF DIE END & FILTER DOES NOT REVEAL OILING PASTOR. REQUEST FULL SERVICE REPORT BY END OF WORK.</u>		
	<u>OWNER MEMBERS NOTED ON OWN LIST AND TO FORWARD COPIES OF OWN TO OWN OFFICE</u>		

Surveyor Name _____

Signature _____

Office _____



This report must be retained on board for a period of two years and must be available for consultation by a Department of the Marine & Natural Resources Surveyor at all times. This inspection is based on random samples and therefore deficiencies may exist which may not have been identified
Rev 2004

9. LIST OF CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED

	Page No.
Mr. Brian Byrne	30
MCIB Response	30

Appendix 9.1. Mr. Brian Byrne

22nd May 2007

Brian A. Byrne
VTS Operator
Dublin Port Company

Mr. John G. O'Donnell, B.L.
Chairman
Marine Casualty Investigation Board
Leeson Lane
Dublin 2

Comments & Observations on Draft MCIB Report
re "Grounding of Fishing Vessel Felucca on 3rd June 2006"

Section 6

Conclusions

6.1 The grounding occurred during daylight hours with light ESE winds and good visibility. The vessel was grounded in such a position that it was well out of the channel. It was visual at all times from the V.T.S. station and it got itself re-floated without assistance within 13 minutes, without any damage to itself, its crew, the environment or other vessels

6.3 The actions of V.T.S. / Dublin Port Radio, were in accordance with the wishes of the Harbour Master who followed the whole incident from start to finish. All participants in the incident were kept fully briefed by VHF Radio or by telephone at all times. It should be noted that the fishing vessel did inform V.T.S. that his engine had failed a second time and that initially he required one tug.

V.T.S. did not consider the inbound ferry traffic or the grounded fishing vessel a threat to one another, as all parties, i.e. shipping and others were kept fully aware of the ongoing situation.

Yours Sincerely,



Brian A. Byrne
V.T.S. Operator

MCIB RESPONSE

The MCIB notes the contents of this letter.



