

8.3: Status of Aids to Navigation from the Commissioners of Irish Lights.



COMMISSIONERS OF IRISH LIGHTS

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MARINE ACCIDENT 2ND FEBRUARY 2000 AT CODLING BANK

The status of the Aids to Navigation in the vicinity of the Codling Bank on the evening of 2nd February 2000 was as follows:

BUOYAGE

West Codling	In position	Light functioning correctly.
North India	In position	Light functioning correctly.
Moulditch	In position	Light functioning correctly.
Breaches	In position	Light functioning correctly.
South Codling	In position	Light not functioning
East Codling	In position	Light functioning correctly.

LIGHTHOUSES

Muglins Lighthouse	Functioning correctly.
Kish Lighthouse	Functioning correctly.
Wicklow Head Lighthouse	Functioning correctly.
Codling Lanby	Functioning correctly.

RACONS

Kish Lighthouse	Functioning correctly.
Codling Lanby	Functioning correctly.

DGPS

The broadcasting of differential corrections to the GPS system by the General Lighthouse Authorities was operating normally. In particular, the signals from Point Lynas were operating normally. The time frame analysed was from 1800 hours to 2400 hours on the 2nd February 2000.

WEST CODLING BUOY

A clean refurbished buoy was placed in the Assigned Charted Position by the THV Patricia on 30th January 2000. On the 3rd February the Patricia was requested by CIL to return from her duties on the West coast of the United Kingdom and check the charted positions and characters of the buoyage in the vicinity of the Codling Bank.

On 4th February at 1150 hours the Patricia confirmed that the West Codling buoy was in the Assigned Charted Position and that the light was functioning correctly.

SOUTH CODLING BUOY

On 4th February at 1400 hours the Patricia reported that the South Codling buoy was extinguished. There had been no other ship report up to this point stating that the South Codling buoy was extinguished.

Yours sincerely,

for INSPECTOR OF LIGHTS & MARINE SUPERINTENDENT.

KOH/JSH



**REPORT OF THE
INVESTIGATION INTO
THE GROUNDING OF THE
PANAMANIAN REGISTERED
MOTOR VESSEL, MV "ASIAN
PARADE" OFF THE
CODLING BANK, DUBLIN BAY
ON 2ND FEBRUARY, 2000.**

The Marine Casualty Investigation Board was established on the 5th, June 2002 under The Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act 2000

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1. SYNOPSIS.

- 1.1 The Panamanian registered car carrier, MV "Asian Parade", sailed from the port of Dublin for Rotterdam on the evening of the 2nd February 2000 with a part cargo of 1802 cars and 22 items of machinery. The vessel went aground on the northwest part of the Codling Bank.
- 1.2 There were no injuries sustained in this incident.

2. FACTUAL INFORMATION

2.1 The MV "Asian Parade" was built in 1996 in Korea.

Flag:	Panama
Operators:	Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. Ltd.
Classification Society:	Korean Register of Shipping
Deadweight Tonnage of	16,293
Gross Tonnage of	55,680
Car Capacity of	6000
Call Sign:	3FVA6
IMO Number:	9122954
 Crew (at time of grounding):	 20 (15 Korean + 5 Myanmarian)

2.2 Navigation Equipment:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Maker</u>	<u>Model</u>
No. 1 GPS	Trimble	NT 200D GPS
No. 2 GPS	Shipmate	RS 5900
No. 1 Gyro	TokiMec	TG-6000
No. 2 Gyro	Tokimec	TG-6000
No. 1 Radar (ARPA, S-Band)	Kelvin Hughes	Nucleus 6000A
No. 2 Radar (ARPA, X-Band)	Kelvin Hughes	Nucleus 6000A
Course Recorder	Tokimec	DCR-40-A
Echo Sounder	Furuno	FE-680 T
Magnetic Compass	C. Plath	Navipol
Steering Stand	Tokimec	PR-8489-EV33
Doppler Speed Log	Consilium Marine	SAL-SD1-2.

3. EVENTS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT

- 3.1 The vessel MV “Asian Parade” is a large car carrier engaged on a liner, scheduled service to Dublin and European ports from the Far East. (See Appendix 1)
- 3.2 The vessel sailed from Dublin at approximately 1930 on the evening of the 2nd February 2000.
- 3.3 On departure the vessel’s cargo consisted of 1802 cars and 22 items of machinery. In addition the vessel had fuel oil bunkers as follows, 590.7 tonnes of heavy fuel oil, 66.9 tonnes of Diesel Oil. The maximum draft was 8.0 Metres.
- 3.4 The Master, Third Mate ‘A’, Third Mate ‘B’, the quartermaster (helmsman) and the pilot were present on the bridge at the time of departure. The pilot was disembarked at approximately 2005. The vessel set course to leave Dublin Bay in the southeast bound traffic lane.
- 3.5 All bridge navigational equipment, steering gear and engines were reported to be in good working order.
- 3.6 The Master joined the vessel on October 9th 1999. He has approximately two years experience as Master. The Master carries a Korean Certificate of competency as Master without limitations. It was his first call to Dublin as Master of a vessel but he had called to Dublin on many occasions as Chief Mate. He has nineteen years sea-going experience.
- 3.7 On the voyage plan submitted by the second officer the waypoints indicated that the vessel would track to the south of the Burford bank and then alter course to pass north of the Kish bank. On sailing the Master modified the voyage plan to proceed in a south southeasterly direction.
- 3.8 The Master of the MV “Asian Parade” rang up his engines to “full away” at 2048. The gyro course at this time was approximately 152°.
- 3.9 The Master stated that he changed to autopilot at approximately 2038. The quartermaster who had been manually steering the vessel up to this point was sent down shortly after “full away” to collect documentation from the car decks.
- 3.10 According to the Master, Third Mate ‘A’ was sent to compile the departure report e-mail from the ship’s office. Third Mate ‘B’ was not taking any active part in the navigation and was working at the Satcom C station.
- 3.11 According to the engine data logger the engine revolutions were increased to 96 RPM at 2035 and were further increased to full sea speed engine revolutions of 101 RPM at 2047.

- 3.12 The echo sounder was turned off at approximately 2048.
- 3.13 After clearing the Burford bank two positions were charted, one at 2034 and another at 2048. The 2034 position indicated that the vessel was approximately 0.4 of a mile to the west of the course line and the 2048 position indicated that the vessel was approximately 0.4 of a mile to the east of the course line.
- 3.14 The Master stated that between 2034 and 2048 there was one north bound vessel and that he adjusted course a little to port to increase the passing distance off this north bound vessel. The course recorder was functioning on departure from Dublin but the time and course setting were incorrect. Allowing for corrections to the settings it would appear that the Master altered course to port from 159° gyro to 151° gyro.
- 3.15 The weather conditions were good at the time with good visibility and moderate winds. (see Appendix 2).
- 3.16 The vessel went aground just before 2100 doing full sea speed of approximately 19 knots.

4. THE INCIDENT

- 4.1 The vessel went aground on the Codling Bank in position 53° 07.9'N, 005° 54.4'W approximately six miles east of Greystones off the County Wicklow coast at approximately 2100 on the 2nd February 2000. The time of High Water Dublin Bar was 2216 hours.
- 4.2 The Codling Bank has varying depths of water from 2.7 metres to 9.1 metres. The MV "Asian Parade" went aground in approximately 4 metres of water.
- 4.3 The 'bottom' on the Codling Bank is a mixture of gravel, shale and boulders.

5. EVENTS FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT

- 5.1 The Master tried until 2322, with the aid of the engines to refloat the vessel.
- 5.2 When this did not succeed he informed the Coast Guard.
- 5.3 Over the next four days a number of attempts were made to refloat the vessel with the aid of salvage tugs. A large quantity of fuel oil was pumped from the vessel to alleviate the risk of pollution.
- 5.4 On the evening of the 6th February the vessel was successfully refloated and towed into Dublin the next day.
- 5.5 An assessment of bottom damage was carried out and the vessel departed to Rotterdam.
- 5.6 During a ten day stay in drydock in Rotterdam permanent repairs to damage caused by the grounding were effected.



6. CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS

- 6.1 At the time of grounding the Master was effectively alone in navigating the vessel. Third Mate 'B' was on the bridge but was not taking any part in the navigation of the vessel. Third Mate 'B' though signed on as a third mate was acting as a radio officer and did not take part in the day-to-day navigation of the vessel. Third Mate 'A' was sending emails from the ships office. The quartermaster was engaged in collecting cargo logbooks from the car decks.
- 6.2 Proper bridge procedures were not adhered to. The Master took too much responsibility on himself by navigating the vessel alone in confined waters.
- 6.3 Passage planning was haphazard. The original plan to go south of Burford bank and then north of Kish Bank involved a large (87°) alteration to port and was modified shortly before or on sailing. The safer option for a large vessel would be to leave Dublin Bay by the east bound traffic lane to the North of the Burford Bank and proceed southwards to east of the various banks along our east coast.
- 6.4 There was a strong emphasis on communications to the detriment of the safe navigation of the vessel. Both Third Mate 'A' and Third Mate 'B' were involved in operational communications at the time the vessel went aground.
- 6.5 The Master was apparently unaware of the danger the vessel was in prior the grounding. No evasive action was taken by helm or engine. The fact that the vessel was in autopilot at the time of grounding and at full sea speed indicates the extent to which the Master was unaware of the danger his vessel was in.
- 6.6 Despite this being his first call to the port of Dublin as Master the Master chose to take the inner route inside the Burford, Kish, Bray and Codling Banks instead of the safer route to the east of these banks.
- 6.7 The grounding was not due to any fault of equipment or onboard machinery. The vessel is excellently equipped with modern navigation equipment.
- 6.8 The Master was of the opinion that the weather may have been a factor in the grounding. Whilst the direction and speed of the wind may have had some influence on the course made good by the vessel it appears that the Master did not allow for this windage prior to going aground and was not aware that it posed any danger to the vessel.
- 6.9 Under the MARPOL Convention the Master of any vessel is required to inform the nearest coastal state as soon as practical if there is a danger or a possibility of pollution from his vessel. The Master of the MV "Asian Parade" did not inform the Coast Guard until several hours after the grounding.

- 6.10 The Master indicated that northbound vessels obliged him to alert course a little to port. Under the International Regulation for Preventing Collisions at Sea vessels meeting on reciprocal or near reciprocal courses shall alter their courses so that each shall pass on the port side of the other. An alteration of course to starboard for these northbound vessels would have resulted in a safe passing distance of the Codling Bank. In any event there is plenty of sea room between Codling Bank and the Breaches Shoal to the west.
- 6.11 There was no loss of life, injury or pollution of the marine environment during the grounding of the MV "Asian Parade".
- 6.12 All of the officers on board the vessel were Korean. All possessed Korean Certificates of competency. All conventions and required trading certificates were in order.
- 6.13 All the aids to navigation in the area were functioning properly with the exception of the south Codling buoy which was unlit. This unlit buoy was not a factor in the vessel going aground (see Appendix 3).

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

- 7.1 All vessels using our ports should adhere to proper passage planning. Evidence of proper voyage planning should be inspected during port state control inspections.
- 7.2 Vessels of more than, say 6 metres in draft and vessels with high windage area should avoid navigating inshore of the off lying banks along the east coast of Ireland. The British Admiralty Hydrographer should be advised to amend charts and publications accordingly.

8. Appendices

8.1: Photographs of vessel.

8.2: Met Eireann Weather Report.

8.3: Status of Aids to Navigation from the Commissioners of Irish Lights.

APPENDICES

8.1: Photographs of vessel.



8.2: Met Eireann Weather Report.



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APPENDIX 2.

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**Weather report for the Codling Bank east of Greystones, Co. Wicklow
on the 2nd February 2000
between 19 and 23 hours**

The winds in the Irish Sea were westerly Force 3 to 5. However due to the mountain effects near this sea area the winds would have been backed to the south therefore an expected wind for the area would be south to south-west Force 3 to 5.

The weather was dry with some cloud at times.

The visibility was good.

The waves were Slight.

Note: We hold no observations in the area and this report is based on the routine charts drawn up by this office.

