

MCIB

Marine Casualty Investigation Board
Bord Imscrúdú Taisní Muirí



**REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
INTO A FATAL INCIDENT ON THE
RIVER SHANNON AT
CASTLECONNELL,
CO. LIMERICK
ON
4th FEBRUARY 2016**

**REPORT NO. MCIB/253
(No.6 OF 2016)**

The Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) examines and investigates all types of marine casualties to, or on board, Irish registered vessels worldwide and other vessels in Irish territorial waters and inland waterways.

The MCIB objective in investigating a marine casualty is to determine its circumstances and its causes with a view to making recommendations for the avoidance of similar marine casualties in the future, thereby improving the safety of life at sea.

The MCIB is a non-prosecutorial body. We do not enforce laws or carry out prosecutions. It is not the purpose of an investigation carried out by the MCIB to apportion blame or fault.

The legislative framework for the operation of the MCIB, the reporting and investigating of marine casualties and the powers of MCIB investigators is set out in The Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000.

In carrying out its functions the MCIB complies with the provisions of the International Maritime Organisation's Casualty Investigation Code and EU Directive 2009/18/EC governing the investigation of accidents in the maritime transport sector.



Leeson Lane, Dublin 2.
Telephone: 01-678 3485/86.
Fax: 01-678 3493.
email: info@mcib.ie
www.mcib.ie

The Marine Casualty Investigation Board was established on the 25th March, 2003 under the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000.

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1. SUMMARY

In the early hours of Thursday the 4th February 2016, four young men took a boat from Castleconnell Boat Club and launched it into the River Shannon. The men had been taking drugs and/or drinking alcohol since the previous afternoon. The river was very high and was flowing very fast due to the weather conditions of the previous months.

After a short period, they realised that the boat was taking on water and they could no longer control it properly. The men managed to guide the boat into the trees on to a spit of land with the river flowing over it like a rapid. The boat was tipped over as it grounded on submerged rocks and was pushed into the trees and the men were thrown into the shallow water. The strong current forced the upturned boat against the trees and the leg of one of the men became trapped under the capsized boat and another man's feet became trapped in undergrowth.

In very challenging circumstances and after an extended rescue operation by several emergency services the men were rescued. One of the men was unresponsive and was later pronounced dead at Limerick University Hospital. Post mortem results state that the cause of death was due to drowning.

All times quoted are local times (GMT).

2. FACTUAL INFORMATION

2.1 Vessel Description

Type of Boat:	Sylvan Sea Breeze 14.
Construction:	Aluminium.
Builder:	Sylvan Boats, New Paris, Indiana, USA.
LOA:	14' (4.2 metres).

2.2 Conditions at time of Incident

Weather:	Wind Westerly, Force 2. No precipitation. Visibility moderate to poor in darkness.
Air Temperature:	9°C to 10°C (see Appendix 7.1 Met Éireann Weather Report).
River:	High river with very strong flow.

2.3 Persons Involved

4 men aged from 25 to 32. None with any experience of boats.

All were wearing ordinary outdoor clothes, shirts, trousers and jackets or coats.

There were no personal flotation devices (PFDs) or safety equipment of any type available.

2.4 Marine Casualty Information

Date & Time:	4th February 2016, approximately 04.00 hrs.
Type of Casualty:	Serious Marine Casualty.
Location of Incident:	River Shannon at Castleconnell, Co. Limerick.
Fatalities:	One, 27 year old male.
Environmental Impact:	None.

3. NARRATIVE

- 3.1 Four young men, aged between 25 and 32 years met up together at a mutual friend's house in Castleconnell, Co. Limerick at approximately 23.00 hrs on the night of Wednesday the 3rd February and remained there until 03.00 hrs on the morning of Thursday the 4th February 2016. The four men had been drinking and/or taking drugs to varying degrees during the day.
- 3.2 At approximately 03.30 hrs the four men, excluding the friend whose house they had visited, decided to walk along the river bank to a location known as 'World's End', a remote area which was well known to the men.
- 3.3 The Castleconnell Boat Club is also located in this area, and on arrival they spotted a small aluminium boat ashore, loosely tied to the railings outside the Club. Although none of the men knew anything about boating or had any experience of boat handling, they decided to take the boat out onto the river.
- 3.4 At approximately 03.50 hrs, they dragged the boat across the grass and pushed it into the water. Due to the recent weather conditions, the level of the river was very high and the slipway was completely underwater making it easy to launch the boat. They also took three oars from another boat nearby.
- 3.5 The four men were wearing ordinary outdoor clothing and did not have or take PFDs or any life saving equipment. The night was very dark and there was no street or house lights in the area. Some moonlight was present.
- 3.6 It is normal practice to remove the drain plug from any boat stored ashore. This is to prevent the boat from filling with water due to rainfall (see Appendix 7.2 Photograph No. 1).
- 3.7 The river initially appeared to the men to be quite calm, however, the level was so high that as the river narrowed and flowed over a spit of land lined with trees further downstream, it became a torrent. This area is known as the 'Gap of the Dam' and is always covered with water as it is the main thoroughfare for the river. It is situated between two spits of land which are normally above the level of the water in the gap and therefore dry with growing vegetation. Whilst the weather was reasonably calm at the time of the incident, the river was in full spate due to the large amount of rainfall in the previous ten to fourteen days (see Appendix 7.2 Photograph No. 2).
- 3.8 After approximately 15 minutes on the water, the men noticed that the boat was taking on water through the drain hole in the transom and they decided to head back to the bank near the launch site. However, the boat was now very heavy and unresponsive to their attempts to paddle it back to the shore. The boat was then caught in the fast flowing current which was tending to drag it into the middle of the river and through the Gap of the Dam.

- 3.9 The men managed to guide the boat into the trees on the spit of land with the river roaring over it like a rapid. The boat was tipped over as it grounded on submerged rocks and the spit, and was pushed into the trees. The four men were thrown into the shallow water (see Appendix 7.2 Photograph No. 3).
- 3.10 The strong current forced the upturned boat against the trees and the leg of one of the men became trapped under the capsized boat. The other three tried to lift the boat off, but to no avail. One of them was washed away from the boat and managed to grab a branch to stop himself being washed through the gap and away downstream. Of the remaining two, one found himself sinking into the bottom and his feet became trapped in the branches and undergrowth under the water.
- 3.11 The fourth man, standing adjacent to the upturned boat managed to get his mobile phone out and at 04.17 hrs called 999. After several attempts he was connected to Marine Rescue Sub Centre (MRSC) Valentia. The Limerick Community Rescue Boats Ireland (CRBI), Killaloe Coast Guard Unit (CGU) and the Shannon based Coast Guard helicopter R115 were all tasked to respond to the incident. MRSC Valentia also advised Limerick Fire Service, the Gardaí and the National Aeromedical Co-ordination Centre (NACC).
- 3.12 At approximately 04.35 hrs two Gardaí arrived on the scene, however due to the prevailing water conditions it was deemed too dangerous to attempt a rescue. They were followed shortly afterward by the Limerick Fire Service and at 04.45 hrs the Killaloe CGU D Class Rigid Inflatable Boat (RIB) arrived on the scene. Also at 04.45 hrs, the Limerick CRBI RIB arrived on the scene.
- 3.13 At approximately 04.57 hrs, two firemen entered the water to try to get to the men and help them ashore but the fast flowing water prevented them from effecting a rescue. The firemen remained in the water for approximately two and a half hours helping to keep the head of the trapped man above the surface.
- 3.14 The rapid flow of water made any attempt by the RIBs to approach the men in the water very dangerous and had the effect of washing water over the head and face of the man whose legs were trapped in the undergrowth. One casualty was pulled from the water by the Killaloe CGU at 05.52 hrs and transferred to the Limerick CRBI RIB from where he was brought ashore and transferred to an ambulance. After a few attempts to reach the remaining men, the Killaloe CGU RIB approached from down river. At all times during the operation the Limerick CRBI RIB remained upstream of the incident.
- 3.15 At 06.20 hrs, a second man who had been trapped under the capsized boat was recovered from the water.

- 3.16 At 06.20 hrs, the Shannon based helicopter R115 arrived at the scene. When they arrived in the overhead position, they realised that they could not provide any assistance as the overhanging trees prevented the winchman from accessing the men in the water. At 06.30 hrs, the helicopter was released and returned to base.
- 3.17 By 06.54 hrs, the man who called the emergency services and the man whose feet were trapped in the tree roots were recovered from the water and all of the men were transferred to ambulances. It was noted that one of the casualties, the man who had difficulty keeping his head above water due to entanglement in undergrowth was not responsive.
- 3.18 At 06.59 hrs, the two firemen were also recovered from the water and brought ashore.
- 3.19 The boat was recovered from the water the following day.

4. ANALYSIS

- 4.1 The men had been using drugs and/or drinking alcohol during the preceding 24 hours. The use of drugs and alcohol is known to have an adverse impact on a person's judgement and can impair a person's ability to operate vessels safely.
- 4.2 The boat was initially out of the water, tied to the fencing of the Castleconnell Boat Club. The drain plug in the transom had been removed as is normal practice to drain the vessel when it is out of the water and should be replaced prior to the vessel being put back in the water.
- 4.3 None of the men had any experience of boat handling nor were there any PFDs or other lifesaving equipment available or used by them. The men didn't know about the need to replace the drain plug prior to launching the vessel.
- 4.4 The night was very dark with only moonlight to provide visibility. Limited light conditions can make it very difficult to assess the speed and level of a river. Although the river appeared calm where the men intended to go, the level was very high and the river was running very fast where it narrowed through the Gap of the Dam.
- 4.5 In addition, the low level of light together with the consumption of alcohol and drugs would restrict the men's ability to assess whether the boat was suitable for use in the river and whether they were fit to use it.
- 4.6 Once the boat had run aground, the fast flowing water pinned it against the trees on the spit of land, trapping the leg of one of the men.
- 4.7 Another one of the men lost his footing on the bottom and his foot became entangled in undergrowth.
- 4.8 The men had no safety equipment or any PFDs. Fortunately, the mobile phone of one of the men was working and they were able to contact the emergency services.
- 4.9 The casualties were in the water for approximately two and a half hours struggling with the assistance of the rescue services to keep their heads above the surface of the water in a very fast flowing river.
- 4.10 In taking an unknown vessel whilst they were in an impaired state, these men put themselves at considerable risk of harm which resulted in the loss of one life. In addition their actions and the requirement for a rescue in very difficult conditions endangered the responding rescue services.

5. CONCLUSIONS

- 5.1 The consumption of drugs and/or alcohol over a protracted period of time affected the judgement of the four men leading them to take risks that, otherwise, they would not have considered. It is possible that they may not have been aware of their limitations in ability to handle a boat and the assessment of the dangerous water conditions.
- 5.2 As the men lacked any experience of boats and boat handling and given the poor visibility and the amount of drugs and alcohol consumed they did not notice that the drain plug was missing in the transom which resulted in the ingress of water.
- 5.3 Once the boat capsized, the men had no safety equipment, for example PFDs, to assist them for the two and half hours that they were in the water. In addition they were only wearing ordinary outdoor clothing.
- 5.4 Once the boat had capsized two of the group were trapped, one by the boat and one by branches underwater after his footing slipped. The man trapped by the branches needed assistance to keep his head above the water level. One of the men was washed away and the remaining man focussed on assisting his friends. Although his mobile phone was not protected in any way from the water, this man managed to raise the alarm by phoning 999.
- 5.5 Due to the nature of the location, the level and speed of the river, the fact that one of the casualties was trapped with his head at water level and with very low light conditions, the rescue of the men from the river took considerable time.
- 5.6 Given the conditions and the cold, the actions of the rescue services and the two firemen who remained in the water for over two and a half hours, was highly courageous.
- 5.7 Despite the best efforts of all concerned, the man whose foot had become entangled in the undergrowth was later pronounced dead. Death was due to drowning.

6. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

- 6.1 It is recommended that the Minister for Transport, Tourism and Sport issues a Marine Notice reminding the public of the need to comply with the Recreational Craft Code of Practice for the Safe Operation of Recreational Craft - Section 1.2.6 on Controls on Alcohol and Drugs in particular and Marine Notice No. 56 of 2012.

7. APPENDICES

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Appendix 7.1 Met Éireann weather report.



MET ÉIREANN
The Irish Meteorological Service

Glasnevin Hill, Cnoc Ghlas Naion Tel: +353-1-806 4200
Dublin 9, Ireland. Baile Átha Cliath 9, Éire. Fax: +353-1-806 4247
www.met.ie E-mail: met.eireann@met.ie

9/2/2016

Our Ref. WS3018/2_16181
Your Ref. MCIB/12/253

Estimate of weather conditions on the river Shannon, at Castleconnell, Co Limerick, on the 4th February 2016, between midnight and noon.

General Situation over Ireland
A mild muggy airflow over Ireland was generated by a deep depression in mid-Atlantic. However a large High Pressure area to the south was keeping the rain-belts mainly to the north of the country.

Details
00-06 hours
Winds: from a west-south-west direction, were mainly Moderate, Force 4 (11 to 16 knots were reported at Shannon Airport during this time)
Weather: cloudy with spells of light rain or drizzle
Visibility: Moderate to Poor
Air Temperatures: mild 9°C or 10°C

06-12 hours
Winds: from a south-west or west direction, Light to Moderate in strength, Force 3 to 4 (7 to 15 knots)
Weather: cloudy, some drizzle at times at first but becoming mostly dry later
Visibility: Poor at first, increased Moderate to Good later in the period.
Air Temperatures: approx 10°C



Met Éireann

Appendix 7.1 Met Éireann weather report.



MET ÉIREANN
The Irish Meteorological Service

Glasnevin Hill, Cnoc Ghlas Naíon Tel: +353-1-806 4200
Dublin 9, Ireland. Baile Átha Cliath 9, Éire. Fax: +353-1-806 4247
www.met.ie E-mail: met.eireann@met.ie

Beaufort Scale of Wind

Force	Description	Speed*		Specification -sea	Wave height** (metres)
		knots	km/hr		
0	Calm	<1	<1	Sea like mirror	
1	Light air	1-3	1-5	Ripples	0.1 (0.1)
2	Light breeze	4-6	6-11	Small wavelets	0.2 (0.3)
3	Gentle breeze	7-10	12-19	Large wavelets, crests begin to break	0.6 (1)
4	Moderate breeze	11-16	20-28	Small waves becoming longer, frequent white horses	1 (1.5)
5	Fresh breeze	17-21	29-38	Moderate waves, many white horses, chance of spray	2 (2.5)
6	Strong breeze	22-27	39-49	Large waves, white foam crests, probably some spray	3 (4)
7	Near gale	28-33	50-61	Sea heaps up, streaks of white foam	4 (5.5)
8	Gale	34-40	62-74	Moderately high waves of greater length	5.5 (7.5)
9	Strong gale	41-47	75-88	High waves, dense streaks of foam, spray may reduce visibility	7 (10)
10	Storm	48-55	89-102	Very high waves, long overhanging crests, visibility affected	9 (12.5)
11	Violent storm	56-63	103-117	Exceptionally high waves, long white foam patches cover sea	11.5 (16)
12	Hurricane	64+	117 & over	Air filled with foam and spray; sea completely white	14 (-)

*Speed = mean speed at a standard height of 10 metres.
**Wave height is only intended as a guide to what may be expected in the open sea.
Bracketed figures indicate the probable maximum wave height.

Wave Heights / State of Sea

The wave height is the vertical distance between the crest and the preceding or following trough. The table below gives a description of the wave system associated with a range of significant wave heights. The Significant wave height is defined as the average height of the highest one-third of the waves. (It is very close to the value of wave height given when making visual observations of wave height.)



Sea State (Descriptive)	Significant Wave height in meters
Calm	0 – 0.1
Smooth (Wavelets)	0.1 – 0.5
Slight	0.5 – 1.25
Moderate	1.25 – 2.5
Rough	2.5 – 4
Very rough	4 – 6
High	6 – 9
Very high	9 – 14
Phenomenal	Over 14

Individual waves in the wave train will have heights in excess of the significant height. The highest wave of all will have a height about twice the significant height

Visibility Descriptions of visibility mean the following:

Visibility (Descriptive)	Visibility in nautical miles (kilometres)
Good	More than 5 nm (> 9 km)
Moderate	2 – 5 nm (4 – 9 km)
Poor	0.5 – 2 nm (1 – 4 km)
Fog	Less than 0.5 nm (< 1 km)

Appendix 7.1 Met Éireann weather report.



APPENDIX 7.2

Appendix 7.2 Photographs.



Photograph No. 1 - Transom of boat showing open drain hole.



Photograph No. 2 - The river flowing over the spit of land following removal of the boat the day following the incident.

Appendix 7.2 Photographs.



Photograph No. 3 - The boat pinned to the trees later that day.

NATURAL JUSTICE - CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED

Section 36 of the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000 requires that:

- “36 (1) Before publishing a report, the Board shall send a draft of the report or sections of the draft report to any person who, in its opinion, is likely to be adversely affected by the publishing of the report or sections or, if that person be deceased, then such person as appears to the Board best to represent that person’s interest.
- (2) A person to whom the Board sends a draft in accordance with subsection (1) may, within a period of 28 days commencing on the date on which the draft is sent to the person, or such further period not exceeding 28 days, as the Board in its absolute discretion thinks fit, submit to the Board in writing his or her observations on the draft.
- (3) A person to whom a draft has been sent in accordance with subsection (1) may apply to the Board for an extension, in accordance with subsection (2), of the period in which to submit his or her observations on the draft.
- (4) Observations submitted to the Board in accordance with subsection (2) shall be included in an appendix to the published report, unless the person submitting the observations requests in writing that the observations be not published.
- (5) Where observations are submitted to the Board in accordance with subsection (2), the Board may, at its discretion -
- (a) alter the draft before publication or decide not to do so, or
 - (b) include in the published report such comments on the observations as it thinks fit.”

The Board reviews and considers all observations received whether published or not published in the final report. When the Board considers an observation requires amendments to the report that is stated beside the relevant observation. When the Board is satisfied that the report has adequately addressed the issue in the observation, then the observation is ‘Noted’ without comment or amendment. The Board may make further amendments or observations in light of the responses from the Natural Justice process.

‘Noted’ does not mean that the Board either agrees or disagrees with the observation.

8. NATURAL JUSTICE - CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED

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Note: The names and contact details of the individual respondents have been obscured for privacy reasons.

Correspondence 8.1 Limerick Fire and Rescue Service.



16th August 2016

Seirbhis Dóiteáin,
Comhairle Cathrach agus Contae Luimnigh,
Tuar an Daill,
Luimneach

Fire Service,
Limerick City and County Council,
Dooradoyle,
Limerick

t: +353 (0) 61 496 270
f: +353 (0) 61 496 007
e: fireservice@limerick.ie

Secretariat,
Marine Casualty Investigation Board,
Leeson Lane,
Dublin 2.

Your Ref: MCIB/12/253

Draft Report of the Investigation into the Fatal Incident on the River Shannon at Castleconnell, Co. Limerick on 4th February 2016

Dear [REDACTED]

Further to your correspondence dated 5th July 2016 regarding the above, I would comment as follows:-

1.0 Summary

This paragraph states that two of the four casualties were able to make their own way to safety. This statement is incorrect as all four had to be rescued by the Coast Guard Unit and Fire personnel.

Prior to the arrival of the Coast Guard Unit, two separate attempts were made by Fire Service Swift Water Rescue Technicians to reach the trapped casualties; both attempts were not successful due to the force of the water and the position of the trees and the boat.

Each of the four trapped casualties were rescued one at a time from the incident site by Killaloe Coast Guard Unit and the Fire Service Swift Water Rescue Technicians as they could not get ashore.

3.13 Narrative

Prior to the arrival of the Coast Guard Unit, the Fire Service carried out two rescue attempts to reach the four casualties using an inflatable rescue sled. Given the extremely hazardous conditions on site and the risk to the safety health and welfare of rescue personnel, it was decided not to commit fire service rescuers to the risk area water until a powered rescue boat arrived.

MCIB RESPONSE:
The MCIB notes this observation and has amended the report.

MCIB RESPONSE:
The MCIB notes the contents of this observation.

Correspondence 8.1 Limerick Fire and Rescue Service.

3.14

The first person rescued from the scene was taken on to the Killaloe Coast Guard boat by Coast Guard members in conjunction with Fire Service Swift Water Technicians. This was achieved by the Coast Guard boat dropping an anchor line upstream and veering down on the incident site. One member of the Fire Service Swift Water Technician team stepped on to the area where the casualties were trapped and helped the first of the four men trapped in to the rib. This casualty was handed over to the CRBI rib and they took him to shore to an awaiting ambulance.

The second casualty was rescued from downstream of the incident site. It was easier to get the casualties from this position. The Fire Service Swift Water Technicians stepped on to the incident area and helped place the second casualty in to the CRBI rib and the casualty was taken ashore to an awaiting ambulance.

The other two casualties were trapped, one by a leg entangled in branches behind the boat and the other was nearly fully submerged behind the body of the boat. When the Coast Guard rib returned to site, two Fire Service Swift Water Technicians tried to pull the casualties free. However this proved impossible because of the force of the water.

It was then decided to fix one end of a line to the seat of the boat and the other end of the line on to the front of a fire appliance ashore. The force of the water was so great that the fire appliance barely moved the boat. However this slight movement was enough to free the casualty with the leg trapped. This casualty was then placed in to the Coast Guard rib and was taken ashore to the awaiting ambulance.

3.15

The fourth casualty remained trapped. However with great difficulty Fire Service Swift Water Technicians freed the casualty and placed him on to the Coast Guard rib. This casualty was unresponsive and not breathing when freed. CPR was administered on the rib for the short journey to the shore.

3.16

The Shannon based Rescue helicopter was requested by the Fire Service. On arrival, the helicopter crew was informed by the Fire Service that they could not get to the casualties because of overhanging trees. The helicopter was requested to take up a position downstream in case rescuers or casualties got swept downstream. After some time, the helicopter informed the Fire Service that the weather had closed in again and as they could not assist further in the rescue, they were returning to Shannon airport.

5.6 Conclusion

It is considered that the level of skill and courage shown by members of the Killaloe Coast Guard crew was outstanding and warrant mention in the report. This rescue could not have been carried out without the joint efforts of all involved. It is also noteworthy that the report mentions the two very brave fire fighters.

Thank you for this opportunity to comment on this draft report.

Yours sincerely,



MCIB RESPONSE:
The MCIB notes the contents of this observation

MCIB RESPONSE:
The MCIB notes the contents of this observation.

MCIB RESPONSE:
The MCIB notes the contents of this observation.

MCIB RESPONSE:
The MCIB notes the contents of this observation.

Correspondence 8.1 Limerick Fire and Rescue Service.



Seirbhís Dóiteáin,
Comhairle Cathrach agus Contae Luimnigh,
Tuar an Dail,
Luimneach

Fire Service,
Limerick City and County Council,
Dooradoyle,
Limerick

t: +353 (0) 61 496 270
f: +353 (0) 61 496 007
e: fireservice@limerick.ie

19 July 2016

Marine Casualty Investigation Board
Leeson Lane
Dublin 2

Your Reference: MCIB/12/253

Dear [REDACTED]

I refer to your draft report into the fatal incident on the River Shannon at Castleconnell, Co. Limerick on 04/Feb/2016.

Please be advised that there are 12 Lifebelts in the Castleconnell area on the Limerick bank of the River Shannon. There are located as per the Loc 8 codes identified in the table hereunder.

	Lifebelt Location	Water Body	Loc 8 Code
1	Castleconnell, Car Park Upper Shannon	Upper Shannon	QDR-29-8CN
2	Castleconnell, Footbridge Upper Shannon	Upper Shannon	QDR-98-CB9
3	Castleconnell, Between Carpark and Footbridge 1-ESB	Upper Shannon	QDR-68-9CN
4	Castleconnell, Between Carpark and Footbridge 2-ESB	Upper Shannon	QDR-08-9CN
5	Castleconnell, Between Carpark and Footbridge 3-ESB	Upper Shannon	QDR-13-BC9
6	Castleconnell, Lacka - Worldsend Boat Club 1	Upper Shannon	QDR-84-7QN
7	Castleconnell, Lacka - Worldsend Road 1-ESB	Upper Shannon	QDR-49-8SN
8	Castleconnell, Lacka - Worldsend Road 2-ESB	Upper Shannon	QDR-76-9WN
9	Castleconnell, Lacka - Worldsend Road 3-ESB	Upper Shannon	QDR-38-8XN
10	Castleconnell, Lacka - Worldsend 5-N of Boatclub	Shannon	QDR-77-8YN
11	Castleconnell, Lacka - Worldsend 6-N of Boatclub	Shannon	QDS-43-70G
12	Castleconnell, Lacka - Worldsend 7-N of Boatclub	Shannon	QDS-71-71G

If you have any further queries please do not hesitate to contact this office on 064 496859.

Yours sincerely

[REDACTED SIGNATURE]

Limerick

Ceanncheathrú Chorporáideach, Cé na gCeannaithe, Luimneach
Corporate Headquarters, Merchants Quay, Limerick

customer services@limerick.ie
www.limerick.ie
@LimerickCouncil

Correspondence 8.2 Limerick Marine Search and Rescue Service and MCIB response.

**LIMERICK MARINE SEARCH
& RESCUE SERVICE**

Atlas Avenue, Dock Road, Limerick, V94C622.
Phone: 061-316300 Email: limerickrescue@gmail.com



Ref; MCIB/12/253

13th August 2016

Secretariat,

Marine Casualty Investigation Board,

Leeson Lane,

Dublin 2

Draft Report of Investigation

Fatal Incident

Castleconnell, Co. Limerick

4th February 2016

Dear [REDACTED]

I am writing to you on behalf of Limerick Marine Search & Rescue (Limerick CRBI) with reference to the Draft Report of Investigation into a Fatal Incident on the River Shannon at Castleconnell, Co. Limerick on the 4th February 2016.

With reference to the above I wish to inform you of a time line error in paragraph 3.14. It should be noted that one casualty was transferred to the Limerick CRBI RIB from the Killaloe Coast Guard Unit RIB prior to the Killaloe CGU RIB taking up position downstream. At all times during the operation the Limerick CRBI RIB remained upstream of the incident.

Limerick Marine Search & Rescue would also respectfully request that a full debrief for all parties involved become protocol following serious and/or fatal water based incidents. These debriefs may also be called by one or more interested parties following occurrences in all water based as to where it may be felt that lessons could be learned.

Yours Sincerely,


[REDACTED]
Committee

Charitable Status Number CHY 16083

MCIB RESPONSE:
The MCIB notes the contents of this observation and has amended the report.

CORRESPONDENCE 8.3

Correspondence 8.3 Survivor and MCIB response.



MCIB RESPONSE:
The MCIB notes the contents of this observation.

Correspondence 8.4 An Garda Síochána and MCIB response.

An Garda Síochána

An Leas-Choimisinéara
(Oibríochtaí)
An Garda Síochána
Ceanncheathrú na nGardaí
Páire an Fhionn-Uisce
Baile Atha Cliath 8
DO8 HN3X

Teileafón/Tel: (01) 666 2057/8/9
Facs/Fax: (01) 666 2060

Luaigh an uimhir thagartha seo a leanas, le do thoil : / Please quote the following Ref. No. :

Bl linn/Join us  



Deputy Commissioner
(Operations)
An Garda Síochána
Garda Headquarters
Phoenix Park
Dublin 8
DO8 HN3X

Láithreán Gréasain/Web Site:
www.garda.ie
Ríomh-phoist/Email:
Commissioner_OPS@garda.ie

CONFIDENTIAL

OPS_29-59434/16
Your Ref: MCIB/12/253

Marine Casualty Investigation Board
Lesson Lane
Dublin 2

Re: Draft Report from the Marine Casualty Investigation Board of the investigation into the fatal incident on the River Shannon at Castleconnell, Co. Limerick.

Dear [REDACTED]

I am directed by Deputy Commissioner, Operations to refer to your correspondence in the above matter, most recently, dated 28th July, 2016, to the Garda Commissioner and to advise you that the draft report in relation to this incident has been reviewed by local Garda Management for the area concerned.

An Garda Síochána is satisfied that the facts, as presented, accurately represent the events surrounding the above incident and would appreciate a copy of the Final Report in this matter, in course.

Yours sincerely,
[REDACTED]

8th August 2016

Ráiteas Misín / Mission Statement:
Ag obair leis an Pobail chun an Pobal a chosaint agus chun freastal orthu / Working with Communities to Protect and Serve



MCIB RESPONSE: The MCIB notes the contents of this observation.

CORRESPONDENCE 8.5

Correspondence 8.5 National Ambulance Service and MCIB response

Strictly Private & Confidential



Feidhmeannacht na Seirbhíse Sláinte
Health Service Executive



Ref: MD/SD/ACK/0716

13th July 2016

██████████
Secretariat
Marine Casualty Investigation Board
Leeson Lane
Dublin 2.

Strictly Private & Confidential

Re: Draft report of the investigation into the fatal incident on the River Shannon at Castlecomber Co. Limerick, 4th February 2016.

Dear ██████████

I'd like to acknowledge receipt of your correspondence received above and below are some points of note.

In relation to paragraph 3.11, I would like to confirm that the National Ambulance Service received an Emergency Ambulance call from Limerick Fire Service at 04:24hrs via the 999/112 system in the first instance, and a separate was received at the NACC Desk at 04:36hrs from the Valentia Coast Guard.

We can confirm that the National Ambulance Service dispatched rescuers to the scene from the original call received at 04:24hrs.

I hope the above is of assistance.

Yours Sincerely

██████████
██████████



Strictly Private & Confidential

MCIB RESPONSE:
The MCIB notes the contents of this observation.



Leeson Lane, Dublin 2.
Telephone: 01-678 3485/86.
Fax: 01-678 3493.
email: info@mcib.ie
www.mcib.ie

