



Leeson Lane, Dublin 2.
Telephone: 01-678 3485/86.
Fax: 01-678 3493.
email: info@mcib.ie
www.mcib.ie

**REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION
INTO
A FATAL INCIDENT INVOLVING
“MFV OUR JENNA”
HORN HEAD,
CO. DONEGAL
ON
16th JUNE 2015**

The Marine Casualty Investigation Board was established on the 25th March, 2003 under the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000.

The copyright in the enclosed report remains with the Marine Casualty Investigation Board by virtue of section 35(5) of the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000. No person may produce, reproduce or transmit in any form or by any means this report or any part thereof without the express permission of the Marine Casualty Investigation Board. This report may be freely used for educational purposes.

**REPORT NO. MCIB/245
(No.1 OF 2016)**



Report MCIB/245 published by The Marine Casualty Investigation Board.
Printed 11th February 2016.



	PAGE
1. SUMMARY	4
2. FACTUAL INFORMATION	5
3. NARRATIVE	8
4. ANALYSIS	11
5. CONCLUSIONS	13
6. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS	14
7. APPENDICES	15
8. CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED	31

1. SUMMARY

On the 16th June 2015, the “*MFV Our Jenna*” departed from Portnablagh, Co. Donegal at approximately 06.00 hrs. The vessel had two persons on-board. At approximately 13.30 hrs one man fell overboard. The Skipper managed to grab hold of the other crewmember and secure him, in the water, with a line around his waist. The Skipper contacted the Coast Guard Radio Station at approximately 13.54 hrs. The rescue services were alerted and units, including a SAR helicopter, the Irish Coast Guard and the RNLI, were tasked. The first vessel to arrive at the scene was a charter vessel but the Skipper was unable to transfer people across to the “*MFV Our Jenna*” due to sea conditions. The Irish Coast Guard was the first of the emergency services to arrive at the scene. The casualty was transferred to the SAR helicopter and brought to Letterkenny General Hospital, Co. Donegal where he was pronounced dead. The vessel returned to Portnablagh later that afternoon.

(Note: All times are in UTC and local time is UTC +1)

2. FACTUAL INFORMATION

General description of vessel

2.1 Vessel Particulars

Name:	<i>“MFV Our Jenna”</i>
Flag:	Irish
Port of Registry:	Sligo
Official Number:	IRL001113088
Fishing Number:	SO4P
Type:	Fully decked Malahide Workboat
Year Built:	1988, Malahide
Gross Tonnage:	6.21
Registered Length:	9.14 metres (m)
Beam:	3.20 m
Depth:	1.40 m
Engine:	Ford inboard Diesel
Horse power:	59.68 kW

2.2 The vessel is an inshore fishing craft engaged in the crabbing sector. The vessel is constructed of Glassfibre Reinforced Plastic materials (GRP) and is described as a fully decked vessel, with raised fore deck. The wheelhouse is towards the forward part of the working deck and offset to port. It is noted that the perspex type rear wheelhouse windows are crazed which would restrict visibility towards aft (see Appendix 7.1 Photograph No. 1). There is a pot hauler fitted to the starboard side of the deck area, to starboard of the wheelhouse (see Appendix 7.1 Photograph No. 1). Steel safety rails are set on the side bulwarks, with a gap towards the middle of the starboard side, for handling pots (see Appendix 7.1 Photograph No. 1). The main deck is covered with four strips of rubber matting, which was newly laid, and from conveyor belt rubber. There is a large opening aft, where the bulwark section of the transom had been removed (see Appendix 7.1 Photograph Nos. 2 & 3). The opening was spanned by a steel platform with rails. The vessel carried the required safety equipment on-board, including a boarding ladder.

2.3 Survey

The vessel was issued with a Document of Compliance in September 2013, which was due to expire in August 2017 (see Appendix 7.2 Document of Compliance).

2.4 Voyage Details

- 2.4.1 The vessel departed from Portnablagh at approximately 06.00 hrs on the 16th June 2015 with two crewmembers on-board. The two crewmembers were equal shareholders in the vessel but one acted as Skipper and the other as crew. The weather was south westerly Beaufort Force 4 with a 1.25 m to 2.5 m sea and 0 to 2 m swell. This was considered fair and the vessel was rolling in the sea when underway.
- 2.4.2 The vessel had just finished hauling a string of pots and was moving into a new position to shoot a string. The crew had baited the pots and laid them out on deck ready for shooting.
- 2.4.3 The Skipper went into the wheelhouse to set the position on the GPS and to move the vessel towards the location. The casualty was standing on the deck ready to shoot the pots, immediately aft of the engine room access hatch.
- 2.4.4 The Skipper put his head outside the wheelhouse door to check if his crewmember was ready and did not see him. He then saw the casualty in the water off the starboard quarter.

2.5 Marine Incident Information

- Type: This was a serious marine casualty leading to loss of life. One person died.
- Time: The incident is reported as occurring at approximately 13.30 hrs on the 16th June 2015.
- Position: The vessel was in position 55°15.70N 008°01.80W or approximately 1.7 nautical miles NW of Horn Head, Co. Donegal.
- Weather: Wind Force 4 south westerly with 1 / 2.5 m and 0 / 2 m swell (see Appendix 7.3 Met Éireann Weather Report). Video footage of the scene was good and a lack of white waves indicated low wind speed.
- Consequence: The crewmember was working on the deck of the vessel at the time.

2.6 Emergency Response and Timeline

- 2.6.1 The Skipper called Malin Head Coast Radio Station (MRSC Malin) by VHF radio at 13.54 hrs advising there was a person in the water and that he had a rope around his waist but was unable to lift him on-board.
- 2.6.2 MRSC Malin tasked the Aranmore RNLI, R118 Sligo Helicopter, Lough Swilly RNLI and the Mulroy Coast Guard Unit. A vessel, the “*MV Rosguill*” (charter vessel), was also approximately six nautical miles from the scene and volunteered to assist.
- 2.6.3 At 14.02 hrs the “*MV Rosguill*” was one nautical mile from the scene.
- 2.6.4 At 14.22 hrs the “*MV Rosguill*” reported they were unable to board “*MFV Our Jenna*”.
- 2.6.5 At 14.33 hrs the Mulroy CGU was on scene and proceeding to assist.
- 2.6.6 At 14.40 hrs the Mulroy CGU had taken the casualty from the water and was taking instructions from R118.
- 2.6.7 At 14.57 hrs the casualty was on-board R118 and was being taken to Letterkenny General Hospital.
- 2.6.8 At 15.09 hrs Mulroy CGU advised they were escorting “*MFV Our Jenna*” into Portnablagh.
- 2.6.9 At 15.37 hrs all SAR units were stood down.
- 2.6.10 The response time from first notification to arrival on scene was 46 minutes.

3. NARRATIVE

- 3.1 The vessel was built in Malahide in 1988. It was fitted out as a fully decked inshore fishing vessel. The vessel was purchased in Northern Ireland by the current owners in 1992. It was jointly owned by two persons, one of whom was the casualty. Over the years the original engine was replaced with a Ford diesel from the Ford Transit van series.
- 3.2 Both owners had undergone various training courses at the Sea Fisheries College in Greencastle, Co. Donegal, including a sea survival course in 2014.
- 3.3 In 2013, the vessel was inspected by a surveyor under the Code of Practice for Fishing Vessels of less than 15 m in length and a Document of Compliance was issued on the 3rd September 2013. It is noted that the Document of Compliance described the vessel as an open boat when in fact it was fully decked (see Appendix 7.2 Document of Compliance).
- 3.4 In early 2015, a modification to the transom bulwark was carried out at a local boatyard. This involved cutting away the section of bulwark that stretched across the transom. There was an unprotected opening left of 2,337 mm x 609 mm across the aft end of the working deck (see Appendix 7.1 Photograph No. 3).
- 3.5 At the time of the incident none of the crew were wearing Personal Flotation Devices (PFD).
- 3.6 The Skipper described the process involved in shooting their pots**
- 3.6.1 As the string of pots was recovered the pots were placed in a cradle at the starboard side rails (see Appendix 7.1 Photograph Nos. 4 & 5). The pots were emptied and then baited. They were then set out on deck. The string contained 40 pots and was of 10 mm Powerflex rope (approximately six full coils of rope were used to make the string). The riser element at each end was fitted with a buoy bearing the vessel's fishing number and was approximately 60 fathoms in length. At the 60 fathom end, a small section of anchor chain was attached, with a weight of 25 kg. The pots were attached to the line using toggles set through loops in the line and spaced at 15 fathoms (see Appendix 7.1 Photograph No. 6). The line was flaked on deck on the starboard side.
- 3.6.2 The arrangement was viewed on the deck of the vessel on the 4th August 2015. It was noted that with the main rope element flaked out on deck the only clear deck space was between the stern and the aftermost row of pots and there was a small area immediately aft of the engine access hatch (see Appendix 7.1 Photograph No. 7).
- 3.6.3 When the pots were ready the Skipper went into the wheelhouse to pick out the next stored position on the chart plotter from where the pots would be shot. The vessel proceeded ahead for the run to the new position.

3.6.4 As the vessel approached the position, the Skipper brought the “Morse” type lever to the neutral position. He also ensured the power to the pot hauler was disengaged. The throttle lever was on the starboard side of the wheelhouse. On the port side of the wheelhouse there was a lever for engaging or disengaging the hydraulic pump for the pot hauler. The hauler was controlled by a lever on the unit. A joystick control was fitted on the starboard side (inside) of the wheelhouse to enable the Skipper to control rudder movements whilst operating the pot hauler (see Appendix 7.1 Photograph No. 8).

3.6.5 When stopped, the Skipper put his head out of the wheelhouse door, set on the starboard side of the structure, to check if the Crewmember was ready to shoot the pots. He stated that he never instigated shooting the pots until the Crewmember acknowledged he was ready.

3.7 Events before the incident

3.7.1 When the pots were baited and set out on deck, ready for deployment, the Skipper went to the wheelhouse and entered the waypoint code for their next shoot.

3.7.2 As he approached the location, the Skipper looked back on this occasion and could not see the Crewmember due to the crazed perspex windows.

3.7.3 When the Skipper looked from the wheelhouse door he could see the Crewmember in the water off his starboard quarter.

3.8 Events after the incident

3.8.1 The Skipper immediately turned the vessel round and headed towards the Crewmember in the water. The Crewmember was still conscious and moving his arms at the time. It is understood the Crewmember was unable to swim. The Skipper threw a lifebuoy to the Crewmember but he was unable to reach it. He then threw the second lifebuoy, fitted with heaving line, but again, the Crewmember was unable to grasp it. The vessel carried an emergency boarding ladder, but it was not deployed.

3.8.2 The Skipper brought the vessel right up to the Crewmember and grabbed the back of his jacket. The Skipper managed to hold on long enough to grab a line and pass it around the Crewmember’s waist and make it fast.

3.8.3 The Skipper returned to the wheelhouse to raise Malin Head Radio on Channel 16. The casualty was reported and the emergency response initiated, as outlined in Section 2.6 above. The Skipper continued to try to keep the Crewmember’s head above water and spoke continuously to him, while he awaited for assistance.

- 3.8.4 All Situation Reports indicate that the Crewmember became unconscious before the alarm was raised. When he was recovered the emergency services attempted to revive the Crewmember using CPR techniques but to no avail. The Crewmember was declared dead at Letterkenny General Hospital.
- 3.8.5 A witness aboard the “*MV Rosguill*” states that they approached the “*MFV Our Jenna*” and could see the Crewmember held fast by rope to the port side of the vessel, his head was towards the bow. A line ran down from a side cleat, around the Crewmember and back diagonally across the deck towards the starboard side.
- 3.8.6 The Coroner’s Report, issued on the 22nd July 2015, indicated that the cause of death was drowning.

4. ANALYSIS

- 4.1 No one saw the incident take place. The Skipper was in the wheelhouse at the time, concentrating on getting to the next deployment location. The Crewmember was on his own on deck. The Crewmember was not wearing a PFD.
- 4.2 The vessel had steel guardrails fitted to the bulwarks of the vessel to a height of 1 m above the deck level (rail and bulwark height included) and conforming to the requirements of the Code of Practice for Small Fishing Vessels of less than 15 m in length. There was a low point on the starboard side in way of the bait cradle. Although there was a platform with rails aft, there was a large opening in the transom bulwark. This opening had only been created in early 2015, by removing the transom bulwark structure. The opening was 2,337 mm (wide) x 609 mm (high). This opening did not conform to the Code of Practice and represents an alteration of the vessel's structure, post issuance of its Document of Compliance.
- 4.3 The Document of Compliance issued in 2013 was incorrect in describing the vessel as an open boat.
- 4.4 The rubber laid on the deck was designed for a conveyor belt. This material does not have the same anti-slip properties as dedicated marine grade matting. Conveyor belt rubber is noted to become slippery when wet and therefore would not conform to Section 6.1.4 of the Code of Practice.
- 4.5 The video footage of the scene shows that the weather conditions were good and a lack of white waves indicated low wind speeds. However, the sea was choppy and this prevented the safe transfer of persons to the vessel to assist in the recovery of the crewmember.
- 4.6 Below are the relevant extracts of the 2005 edition of the Code of Practice for the Design, Equipment and Construction of small fishing vessels of less than 15 metres in length:

6.1.2 Bulwarks, Guard Rails and Handrails

6.1.2.1 The perimeter of an exposed deck should be fitted with bulwarks, guard rails or guard wires of sufficient strength and height for the safety of persons on deck; the height of tubular railings and guard wires being not less than 1000 mm above the deck (915 mm where already fitted), the lower course of rails or wires having a clearance of not more than 230 mm and the remaining courses being evenly spaced. Where there would be unreasonable interference with the efficient operation of the vessel the height may be reduced.

6.1.2.2 Sections of rails or wires may be portable where necessary for the vessel's fishing operations.

6.1.2.3 *Access stairways, ladder ways and passageways must be provided with handrails and grab rails for the safety of the crew.*

6.1.2.4 *A pound barrier should be fitted to separate the creel ropes from the crew.*

6.1.3 Safety Harnesses

6.1.3.1 *Safety harnesses provide excellent protection against falling from exposed decks or into the sea and they should be carried and worn, particularly by single-handed operators.*

6.1.3.2 *Efficient means for securing lifelines for the safety harnesses should be provided to enable crewmembers to traverse safely the length of the weather deck in bad weather.*

6.1.4 Surface of Working Decks

6.1.4.1 *Decks to which the crew are expected to have access must be provided with an adequate non-slip surface or efficient non-slip covering.*

6.1.4.2 *Particular attention must be paid to the provision of a non-slip surface to any hatch cover fitted on a working deck.*

6.1.4.3 *The exposed bottom boards of open boats must have a non-slip surface.*

4.6.1 The arrangements, as outlined in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 above, did not conform to the requirements of Section 6.1.2 of the Code of Practice.

4.6.2 There is no mandatory requirement for the use of safety harnesses, but in this incident the provision and use of such could well have prevented the incident from occurring.

4.7 Post incident the vessel was surveyed by a member of the panel of surveyors authorised by the Marine Survey Office, Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport and certain actions have been carried out:

1. The Document of Compliance was withdrawn as it incorrectly described the type of vessel.
2. Two lengths of chain have been attached to the side rails and span the opening aft.
3. A new portable section of side guard rail has been fabricated and inserted in way of the pot landing point on the starboard side.
4. A new Code of Practice inspection has been carried out and a new Document of Compliance issued for the vessel.

5. CONCLUSIONS

- 5.1 There was no evidence to suggest the Crewmember was tangled by a rope, although the autopsy report notes there were two distinct rope abrasions on the Crewmember's torso. It is considered this could have occurred when the Skipper attempted to recover the casualty and secured him to the side of the vessel.
- 5.2 There was no direct witness to the incident. There are two possible areas where the Crewmember could have fallen overboard either:
- The opening in the starboard side rails where the pots were recovered (see Appendix 7.1 Photograph No. 1), or,
 - The opening across the stern area (see Appendix 7.1 Photograph No. 3).
- 5.3 In altering the construction of the vessel and removing the transom bulwark, the owners created a large opening at the aft end of the working deck, through which a person could easily fall. Bulwarks are put in place for safety reasons and the implications of their removal should be carefully considered. It is considered that the modification did not conform to Section 6 of the Code of Practice, under which the vessel operated and perhaps rendered the Document of Compliance for the vessel invalid.
- 5.4 The rubber used on the deck did not conform to the Code of Practice and conveyor belt rubber is known to become slippery when wet. The deck would therefore not have the anti - slip properties required for safety. It is considered the rubber laid on deck did not conform to Section 6 of the Code of Practice.
- 5.5 The Crewmember, who was unable to swim, was not wearing a PFD, which is mandated by the Code of Practice nor was he wearing a safety harness as recommended by the Code of Practice.

6. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

- 6.1 All Owners and Skippers should ensure that their crew are wearing PFD's, as per the Code of Practice, Statutory Instrument S.I. 586 2001 and Marine Notice 48 of 2015.
- 6.2 The Minister for Transport, Tourism and Sport should issue a Marine Notice advising that fishing vessels are fitted with the appropriate non-slip decking as required by the Code of Practice.
- 6.3 Any planned alterations in the construction of the vessel must be carefully considered before they are carried out. The Code of Practice surveyors involved with particular vessels should ensure that any planned amendments comply with requirements of the Code of Practice. Owners should be reminded of their obligations under 1.5.4.4 of the Code of Practice.
- 6.4 The Minister for Transport, Tourism and Sport should consider strengthening the requirements of the Code of Practice to ensure that each vessel is required to carry safety harnesses for each person on-board, this supports Action No. 9 in the Maritime Safety Strategy published by the Irish Maritime Administration of the Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport in April 2015 in this regard.

7. APPENDICES

	PAGE
7.1 Photographs	16
7.2 Document of Compliance	21
7.3 Met Éireann Weather Report	26

APPENDIX 7.1

Appendix 7.1 Photographs.



Photograph No. 1 - View from aft shows offset wheelhouse and pot hauler davit. Engine and fish hold hatch is immediately aft of the wheelhouse. Both aft windows are crazed from u/v light



Photograph No. 2 - View of opening of transom and the conveyor belt rubber used on deck

Appendix 7.1 Photographs.



Photograph No. 3 - Stern area from deck level showing removed bulwark



Photograph No. 4 - Vessel with pots set up for shooting string

Appendix 7.1 Photographs.



Photograph No. 5 - View along starboard side, fish box in cradle for catch and new top section of rail in place at opening for landing pots

Appendix 7.1 Photographs.



Photograph No. 6 - Toggle on pot set through loop in string



Photograph No. 7 - Space between front of pots and engine hatch where casualty was last seen

Appendix 7.1 Photographs.



Photograph No. 8 - Inside wheelhouse. Engine throttle lever on right and hydraulic pump control on left beside chair

Appendix 7.2 Document of Compliance.



**Design, Construction and Equipment of
Small Fishing Vessels of less than 15 m Length overall**

**Code of Practice
Declaration of Compliance**

To be completed by an Authorised Person

Declarations on page v to be signed by the Authorised Person and Owner

Name of Vessel	Fishing Letters & Number	Official Number	Port of Registry
OUR Jenna	SD 4 P	IRL00113088	SLIGO
Overall Length (less than 15 metres)	Breadth	Depth	Date keel laid
9.14	3.2	1.4	1989
Engine Make & Model			Engine Power (kW)
FORD			59-68

Name & Address of Owner

Description of vessel

GRP open boat with inboard engine and fixed wheel house.

Description of operational area

Port Na Blagh and Surrounds.

- 1 -

Revision 1 14/02/2005

Appendix 7.2 Document of Compliance.

Chapter 2 Construction, Structural Strength and Weathertight Integrity

*2.1	Is hull suitable for the intended fishing method and sea areas?			Yes / No	
*2.2	Construction Materials	Hull	GRP	Superstructure	WOOD/GRP
*2.3	Is structure sound, watertight & free from significant damage & corrosion?			Yes / No	
*2.4	Do decks comply?			Yes / No	
2.5	Number of bulkheads	Non-watertight	2	Watertight	
*2.6	Do bulkhead doors comply with Annex 7 (2.3.4)?			NA Yes/No	
*2.7	Doors	Coaming height	NA		
		Are doors of sound construction and weathertight?	NA Yes/No		
2.8	Hatchway coaming height			NA	
*2.9	Can hatches be secured weathertight?			NA Yes/No	
*2.10	Do flush hatches comply?			NA Yes/No	
*2.11	Do skylights comply?			NA Yes/No	
*2.12	Do side scuttles & portlights comply?			NA Yes/No	
*2.13	Do windows comply?			1 Yes/No	
*2.14	Do ventilators comply?			NA Yes/No	
2.15	Is exhaust system acceptable			Yes/No	
*2.16	Do air pipes comply?			Yes/No	
*2.17.2	Do sea inlets and discharges comply?			Yes/No	
*2.18.3	Do valves, piping & hoses comply?			Yes/No	
*2.19	Do freeing ports comply?			NA Yes/No	

Chapter 3 Stability

*3.1	Is stability information supplied?			Yes/No
	Are requirements of Annex 7 applied?			Yes/No
	Stability standard applied			CCP
*Annex 7 (para.4)	Freeboard	0.60	Roll coefficient	0.8
Annex 2	Are guidance notes on board?			Yes/No

Chapter 4 Machinery and Electrical Installations

4.1	Machinery			
*4.1.1.1	General Requirements - comply?			Yes/No
*4.1.2	Propulsion Machinery and Stern Gear - comply?			Yes/No
*4.1.4	Controls and Instruments - comply?			Yes/No
*4.1.5	Steering System - comply?			Yes/No
4.2	Electrical Installations			
*4.2.1	General - comply?			Yes/No
*4.2.2	D.C. Systems Up To 24 volts - comply?			Yes/No
*4.2.3	A.C. Systems - comply?			NA Yes/No
4.3	Pumping & Piping			
*4.3.1	Fuel Oil Installations - comply?			Yes/No
*4.3.2	Cooling Water Systems - comply?			Yes/No
*4.3.3	Bilge Pumping Systems - comply?			Yes/No
*4.3.4	Bilge Pumps - comply?			Yes/No
4.4	Anchors & Cables			
*4.4.1	General - comply?			Yes/No
*4.4.4	Towline - comply?			Yes/No
4.5	Fishing & Handling Equipment			
*4.5.1	Winches, tackles and lifting gear - comply?			Yes/No
*4.5.2	Running gear - comply?			Yes/No

Appendix 7.2 Document of Compliance.

Chapter 5 Fire Protection, Detection & Extinction

5.1	Fire Safety				
#5.1.1	Machinery space capable of being closed down?				NA Yes/No
*5.1.2	Fire Prevention - comply?				Yes / No
*5.1.3	Cleanliness and Pollution Prevention - comply?				Yes / No
*5.1.4	Open-Flame Gas Appliances - comply?				NA Yes / No
*5.1.5	Gas Detection - comply?				NA Yes / No
5.2	Fire Fighting Appliances				
#5.2.1	Are extinguishers of an approved type				Yes / No
#5.2.2	Portable Extinguishers	Engine room	Type <i>Foam</i>	Rating <i>130lbs</i>	Serviced Date <i>Aug 12</i> Nº <i>2</i>
		Other spaces	Type <i>AB powder</i>	Rating <i>ABC</i>	Nº <i>2</i>
#5.2.5			Fire buckets		Nº <i>1</i>
#5.2.6	Remote controls for fuel tank valves	Yes / No	Number	Location	<i>at keelhouse</i>
#5.2.6	Are means of closing skylights, doorways etc to machinery and cargo spaces adequate?				Yes / No

Chapter 6 Protection of Crew

6.1	Protection of Personnel				
*6.1.2	Bulwarks, Guard Rails and Handrails - comply?				Yes / No
*6.1.4	Surface of Working Decks - comply?				Yes / No
#6.1.5	Personal Protective Equipment - comply?				Yes / No
#6.2	Medical Stores - comply?				Yes / No
*6.3	Securing of Heavy Items or Equipment and Fishing Gear etc - comply?				Yes / No

Chapter 7 Life-Saving Appliances

#7.1	Are all items of LSA of an approved type				Yes / No
#7.2	Have relevant items of LSA been serviced				Yes / No
#7.3	1 Lifejacket for every person on board	Yes / No	Nº <i>3</i>		
#7.4	Liferafts sufficient for 100% persons	Yes / No	Nº <i>1</i>	Last Serviced	<i>Jan 13</i>
	Hydrostatic Release Unit (HRU)	Yes / No	Nº <i>1</i>	Last Serviced	<i>Jan 12</i>
#7.5	Lifebuoys	Total Nº of Lifebuoys			<i>2</i>
		Nº with 18m line			<i>1</i>
		Nº with combined light & smoke signal			<i>1</i>
#7.6	1 Personal Floation Devices (PFD) for every person on board	Yes / No	Nº <i>3</i>		
#7.8	Distress signals	6 red star	Yes / No	12 parachute rockets	NA Yes / No
#7.9	Means for Recovering Persons from the Water				Yes / No

Chapter 8 Manning, Training & Certification

#8.2	Manning - comply?				Yes / No
*8.3	Standards of Competence - comply?				Yes / No
*8.5	Operation and Maintenance of Propulsion Machinery - comply?				Yes / No
#8.6	Operation of Radio Equipment - comply?				Yes / No
#8.7	Safety Training - comply?				Yes / No
	Is there a copy of the Code of Practice on board?				Yes / No

Appendix 7.2 Document of Compliance.

Chapter 9 Radio Equipment		
	Sea Area (A1 or A1 & A2)	NA
#9.3	Functional requirements - comply?	Yes / No
#9.4	Installation, location and control of radio equipment - comply?	Yes / No
#9.5	Radio equipment to be provided for all sea areas - comply?	Yes / No
#9.6	Additional radio equipment to be provided for sea areas A1 and A2 - comply?	NA Yes / No
#9.7	Radio Watches - comply?	NA Yes / No
#9.8	Sources of energy - comply?	Yes / No
#9.9	Performance standards - comply?	Yes / No
#9.10	Serviceability and maintenance requirements - comply?	Yes / No
#9.11	Radio personnel - comply?	Yes / No
#9.12	Radio records - comply?	NA Yes / No
Chapter 10 Navigation Equipment Lights, Shapes & Sound Signals		
*10.1	Navigation Equipment - comply?	Yes / No
*10.2	Are navigation lights fitted?	Yes / No
#10.3	Steaming Lights - comply?	Yes / No
#10.4	Fishing Lights - comply?	NA Yes / No
#10.5	Additional Fishing Light - comply?	NA Yes / No
#10.6	Anchor Light - comply?	Yes / No
#10.7	Positions or Lights - comply?	Yes / No
	Are any all-round lights obscured by mast, etc. by more than 6°?	Yes / No
#10.8	Day Signals	2 Black Cones with apexes together or a basket
	Signals	1 black ball
#10.9	Sound Signals - comply?	Yes / No
*10.10	Charts and Nautical Publications - comply?	Yes / No
Chapter 11 Accommodation & Working Spaces		
*11.6	Toilet Facilities - comply?	NA Yes / No
*11.7	Access and Escape Arrangements - comply?	Yes / No
*11.8	Ventilation - comply?	Yes / No
*11.10	Lighting - comply?	Yes / No
Annex 7 New Vessel Construction		
1.1	Construction Rules used	
*1.6	Are relevant chapters of Code complied with?	Yes / No
*2	Construction and Structural Strength - comply?	Yes / No
*3	Weathertight Integrity - comply?	Yes / No
*4	Stability - comply?	Yes / No
*5	Machinery - comply?	Yes / No
*6	Piping Systems - comply?	Yes / No
*7	Shafting and Stern Gear - comply?	Yes / No
*8	Bilge Pumping Systems - comply?	Yes / No
*9	Steering Gear - comply?	Yes / No
*10	Electrical Systems - comply?	Yes / No
*11	Fire Safety - comply?	Yes / No
*12	Accommodation and Working Spaces - comply?	Yes / No

Appendix 7.2 Document of Compliance.

Notes:

1. # indicates Statutory requirements
2. * indicates mandatory requirement for Code compliance
3. ‡ indicates statutory requirement for vessels $\geq 12m L_{oa}$ and mandatory requirement for Code compliance for vessels $< 12m L_{oa}$
4. Only Statutory and mandatory Code requirements are to be addressed when completing the Declaration.
5. If 'No' is answered to any question, please supply, in a separate statement, the reasons why the particular item is not complied with.
6. If a particular item is not applicable, please state the reason why.

Declaration by Authorised Person

Name of Vessel	Fishing Letters & Number	Official Number	Port of Registry
OUR Jenna	504P	IRL00113088	SLIGO

I hereby declare that on 29/8/13 at Port Na Blad I completed the inspection of the Fishing Vessel OUR JENNA and that:

1. the particulars given on this form are true and correct;
2. in my judgement the vessel complies with the Code of Practice and is fit for its intended fishing method and for the sea areas in which it is intended to operate.

Dated at Galway
this 3 day of Sept 2013

Signed 

This Declaration is valid until
28 day of August 2017

Company Stamp.



Declaration by Owner

I/We  Owner(s) of the above-described vessel declare that the particulars given on this form are correct and that we have no reason to believe that vessel is not fit for its intended fishing method or for the sea areas in which it is intended to operate.

Signature(s) 

If company, state position held:

Date

Appendix 7.3 Met Éireann Weather Report.



Appendix 7.3 Met Éireann Weather Report.



MET ÉIREANN
The Irish Meteorological Service

Glasnevin Hill, Cnoc Ghlas Naíon Tel: +353-1-806 4200
Dublin 9, Ireland. Baile Átha Cliath 9, Éire. Fax: +353-1-806 4247
www.met.ie E-mail: met.eireann@met.ie

22/6/2015

Our Ref: WS 3018/2_15914
Your Ref: MCIB/12/245

**Estimate of weather conditions in the sea area NW of Horn Head,
Co Donegal at 55° 15.7'N and 8° 1.8'W**

General Situation
A deep Low pressure centre south-west of Iceland (984hPa) gave a strong south-westerly airflow near the NW coast of Ireland. Associated frontal troughs moved eastwards over the area

Details

6 hours – 12 hours
Winds: from a south-south-west direction Force 4 to 5 and gusty
Weather: mostly cloudy and mostly dry
Visibility: mostly good, but poor in occasional drizzle
Seastate: Slight, mainly due to Swell, of 1 metre significant wave height, from a westerly direction.

12 hours to 18 hours
Winds: from a south-westerly direction Force 4 to Force 6
Weather: rather cloudy with some spells of rain or drizzle
Visibility: good occasionally poor in drizzle
Seastate: Slight, composed of Swell of 1 metre sig. wave height from a westerly direction and a lower Sea from a south-westerly direction.




Appendix 7.3 Met Éireann Weather Report.



MET ÉIREANN
The Irish Meteorological Service

Glasnevin Hill, Cnoc Ghlas Naíon Tel: +353-1-806 4200
Dublin 9, Ireland. Baile Átha Cliath 9, Éire. Fax: +353-1-806 4247
www.met.ie E-mail: met.eireann@met.ie

Beaufort Scale of Wind					
Force	Description	Speed*		Specification -sea	Wave height** (metres)
		knots	km/hr		
0	Calm	<1	<1	Sea like mirror	
1	Light air	1-3	1-5	Ripples	0.1 (0.1)
2	Light breeze	4-6	6-11	Small wavelets	0.2 (0.3)
3	Gentle breeze	7-10	12-19	Large wavelets, crests begin to break	0.6 (1)
4	Moderate breeze	11-16	20-28	Small waves becoming longer, frequent white horses	1 (1.5)
5	Fresh breeze	17-21	29-38	Moderate waves, many white horses, chance of spray	2 (2.5)
6	Strong breeze	22-27	39-49	Large waves, white foam crests, probably some spray	3 (4)
7	Near gale	28-33	50-61	Sea heaps up, streaks of white foam	4 (5.5)
8	Gale	34-40	62-74	Moderately high waves of greater length	5.5 (7.5)
9	Strong gale	41-47	75-88	High waves, dense streaks of foam, spray may reduce visibility	7 (10)
10	Storm	48-55	89-102	Very high waves, long overhanging crests, visibility affected	9 (12.5)
11	Violent storm	56-63	103-117	Exceptionally high waves, long white foam patches cover sea	11.5 (16)
12	Hurricane	64+	117 & over	Air filled with foam and spray, sea completely white	14 (-)

*Speed = mean speed at a standard height of 10 metres.
**Wave height is only intended as a guide to what may be expected in the open sea.
Bracketed figures indicate the probable maximum wave height.

Wave Heights / State of Sea

The wave height is the vertical distance between the crest and the preceding or following trough. The table below gives a description of the wave system associated with a range of significant wave heights. The Significant wave height is defined as the average height of the highest one-third of the waves. (It is very close to the value of wave height given when making visual observations of wave height.)

Sea State (Descriptive)	Significant Wave height in meters
Calm	0 – 0.1
Smooth (Wavelets)	0.1 – 0.5
Slight	0.5 – 1.25
Moderate	1.25 – 2.5
Rough	2.5 – 4
Very rough	4 – 6
High	6 – 9
Very high	9 – 14
Phenomenal	Over 14

Individual waves in the wave train will have heights in excess of the significant height. The highest wave of all will have a height about twice the significant height

Visibility Descriptions of visibility mean the following:

Visibility (Descriptive)	Visibility in nautical miles (kilometres)
Good	More than 5 nm (> 9 km)
Moderate	2 – 5 nm (4 – 9 km)
Poor	0.5 – 2 nm (1 – 4 km)
Fog	Less than 0.5 nm (< 1km)

Appendix 7.3 Met Éireann Weather Report.



MET ÉIREANN
The Irish Meteorological Service

Glasnevin Hill, Dublin 9, Ireland.	Cnoc Ghlas Naíon Baile Átha Cliath 9, Éire. www.met.ie	Tel: +353-1-806 4200 Fax: +353-1-806 4247 E-mail: met.eireann@met.ie
---------------------------------------	--	--



Appendix 7.3 Met Éireann Weather Report.



MET ÉIREANN
The Irish Meteorological Service

Glasnevin Hill, Dublin 9, Ireland. Cnoc Ghlas Naíon Baile Átha Cliath 9, Éire. www.met.ie
Tel: +353-1-806 4200 Fax: +353-1-806 4247 E-mail: met.eireann@met.ie

M4 Buoy

Latitude 55°N

Longitude 9.8°W

time	Air temperature (°C)	Sea temperature (°C)	wind direction (true 0-360)	wind gust (knots)	wind speed (knots)
16/06/2015 06:00	12	11.7	209.5	24.5	18.7
16/06/2015 07:00	12.1	11.7	201.1	26.5	19.8
16/06/2015 08:00	12.1	11.7	200.7	26.3	20.1
16/06/2015 09:00	12.1	11.7	199	25.2	20.1
16/06/2015 10:00	12.2	11.7	204.6	24.9	20.2
16/06/2015 11:00	12.3	11.7	206.4	25.9	20.4
16/06/2015 12:00	12.4	11.7	210.9	25.8	20.2
16/06/2015 13:00	12.4	11.7	209.9	26.6	20.1
16/06/2015 14:00	12.5	11.6	209.9	28.3	20.8
16/06/2015 15:00	12.5	11.5	214.8	27.2	20.8
16/06/2015 16:00	12.4	11.5	219	24.6	20.1
16/06/2015 17:00	12.3	11.5	222.9	23.9	18.7
16/06/2015 18:00	12.4	11.6	222.2	23.5	18.8

Malin Head

date	wind direction (true 0-36)	wind speed (knots)	air temperature (°C)
16/06/2015 06:00	20	8	12.4
16/06/2015 07:00	20	10	12.8
16/06/2015 08:00	19	11	14
16/06/2015 09:00	21	12	14.7
16/06/2015 10:00	20	12	15.6
16/06/2015 11:00	20	14	17.1
16/06/2015 12:00	20	15	17
16/06/2015 13:00	20	16	17.5
16/06/2015 14:00	20	16	17.7
16/06/2015 15:00	20	15	17.8
16/06/2015 16:00	21	16	17.5
16/06/2015 17:00	23	12	16.7
16/06/2015 18:00	23	13	15.6

8. CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED

	PAGE
8.1 Correspondence from Skipper and MCIB response	32
8.2 Correspondence from Casualty's next of kin and MCIB response	33

Note: The names and contact details of the individual respondents have been obscured for privacy reasons.

CORRESPONDENCE 8.1

Correspondence 8.1 Skipper and MCIB response

██████████
Secretary,
Marine Casualty Investigation Board,
Leeson Lane,
DUBLIN 2.
MCIB/12/245

██████████
Co. Donegal.
17/11/15


RE:- Draft Report of the Investigation into the
fatal incident involving "MFV OUK JENNA" at Horn Head,
Co. Donegal on the 16th June 2015.

Dear ██████████

Thank you for your sincere sympathy to us
on the loss of my work partner and friend. We are
distracted by this tragedy.


As requested, I wish to confirm in writing that I
have no comments or observations to offer, regarding
this Draft Report.

Yours sincerely
██████████
██████████



MCIB RESPONSE:
The MCIB notes the
contents of this
correspondence

Correspondence 8.2 Casualty's next of kin and MCIB response



MCIB RESPONSE:
The MCIB notes the contents of this correspondence

