

NOTES

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**REPORT OF THE
INVESTIGATION INTO
THE COLLISION BETWEEN
THE FRENCH FISHING
VESSEL "ROHELLAN"
AND THE IRISH FISHING
VESSEL "OILEANN CLEIRE"
ON SATURDAY 15 MAY 1999.**

The Marine Casualty Investigation Board was established on the 5th, June 2002 under The Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act 2000

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1. SYNOPSIS.

- 1.1 At approximately 1915 hours on Saturday 15th May, 1999 a collision occurred between a French fishing trawler "Rohellan" and an Irish fishing trawler "Oileann Cleire". The collision resulted in the Irish trawler foundering within 10 to 15 minutes following the abandonment by its crew of five persons to an inflatable liferaft.
- 1.2 There was no fatality and none of the "Oileann Cleire" crew suffered any apparent physical injury.

Note: All times are given throughout in Local Summer Time (Ireland & UK) which is Greenwich Mean Time (UT1) + 1 Hour

2. FACTUAL INFORMATION DESCRIPTION OF THE VESSELS

2.1 "Rohellan"

2.1.1	Name:	"Rohellan"
	Official Number:	BA 112492
	Port of Registry:	Bayonne, France.
	Type:	Deep-sea stern trawler
	Flag:	French (on a bareboat type charter to a Spanish Company)
	Built:	1966 at Chantier Naval SICC Na St. Malo, France.
	Engine:	570 Kw - Caterpillar 3512
	Hull:	Steel
	L.O.A.:	33.23 metres
	Breadth:	7.75 m
	Depth:	3.68 m
	Gross Tonnage:	278.18
	Decks:	Two
	Fish on board:	Approximately 6.5 tonnes
	Owners:	S.A. Alouette Residence Fontarrabs II 17, bd Marciel de Clerc 64700 Hendaye Plage France
	Operators:	S.A. Alouette Eqidazu Kaia, Bayo 48700 ONDARROA (Bizkaia) Spain

2.1.2 Stores on board.

Fresh Water:	17 tonnes
Fuel Oil (Diesel):	42 tonnes
Hydraulic Oil:	50 litres
Lubricating Oil:	1500 litres
Empty Fish boxes:	about 1,000 on deck

2.2 NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

- 2.2.1 Furuno 8-tone Daylight display Marine Radar Model No. 1932, defective and not operating.
- 2.2.2 Ratheon R40 Raster Scan Radar was operating though with a distorted screen display. The deficiency of the equipment would make it difficult to properly identify target, range and bearing.

CONTD.

- 2.2.3 Marine Autopilot Type 528 NEC with Control Unit, Rudder Feed Back Unit and Compass (magnetic) Sender Unit. The correct manufacturer manual of operating instructions was not on board. Crew alleged that when the vessel was on automatic pilot setting at sea that there had been a tendency for the ships' head to momentarily and periodically slew or deviate off course and settle back again. "Rohellan"s French skipper did not regard this as an operational problem. It had been alleged that the new autopilot had been recently installed as the previous one had been giving trouble.
- 2.2.4 Durmast Limited Marine Electronics of Cork, Ireland checked the above three navigational items on 20 May 1999. Without proceeding to sea with the ship the technician said that he was unable to establish the alleged fault to the autopilot while the vessel was alongside. This alleged defect was not resolved before the vessel departed Ireland. (See Appendix 8.7).
- 2.2.5 There were other items of navigational equipment, such as: - Arkas Rudder indicator, DGPS NR 51, Radio Navigateur GPS CM015, Decca Navigator 21, Kodex Chromoscope, BEN ECO 3C Speed Log and Speed indicator (inoperable), Electronic Charts System, GMDSS DSC MF SSB transceiver and VHF Channel watch receiver Radios.
- 2.3 WHEELHOUSE VISIBILITY**
 - 2.3.1 "Rohellan" was inspected shortly after berthing at Cobh, Co. Cork on 17 May 1999. The general layout of the wheelhouse was reasonably spacious.
 - 2.3.2 There was a pilot chair fitted close to the aft door. The wheelhouse window that was in front of the pilot chair had stain marks. A computer repeater screen sited in front of the line of vision further obstructed the line of visibility from the pilot chair. There is a mechanical clear view screen fitted to the window in line with the pilot chair.
- 2.4 VESSEL'S CERTIFICATION AND GENERAL CONDITION**
 - 2.4.1 "Rohellan" was maintained in a good condition including the machinery space and accommodation.
 - 2.4.2 A Permit for Navigation (Safety Equipment Certificate) was issued by the French Administration for 11 persons on 28/12/98. Liferafts and other lifesaving appliances were in date and found in good condition.
 - 2.4.3 The Fire Equipment was inspected in Bilbao and a certificate issued on 26 September 1998.
 - 2.4.4 Magnetic Compass was adjusted and deviation card completed 11/10/96.
 - 2.4.5 Load Line Certificate was issued 20/5/98 and expires 4/2/2001. It was endorsed 24/2/99.
 - 2.4.6 BV Class Certificate issued 22/1/97 and occasional survey afloat after damage repairs completed to stem and forward shell 12/3/99.

CREW ON BOARD THE VESSELS

2.5 "ROHELLAN" - 11 PERSONS IN TOTAL:

- 1) Jose Enerique Lerchundi Urresti, Pesca du Patron (technical fishing skipper) age 55 years who was the charterer's (operators) commercial representative on board. He was the duty bridge watchkeeper at the time of the collision. He held a Diploma as a Navigation Skipper for deep-sea fishing. He held a valid Medical Certificate for one year issued 25 June 1998.
- 2) Faye Diene, the skipper and a French national. He was the owner's representative on board and the off duty bridge watchkeeper. He alleges that the Spanish Pesca du Patron is effectively in command on board and that he, the French skipper, is on board solely for his formal national qualification which entitles him to command a French registered fishing vessel.
- 3) Jose Aristondo Argoita age 50 years, Chief Engineer and on duty in the Engineroom at the time of collision.
- 4) Joel Pendelienre is a French national who was said to have no executive position on board. It is understood that he was understudying the French skipper.
- 5) Adriano da Silva Saraiva was the Bosun (Deck Foreman) and was working aft on the fish catch at the time of the collision.
- 6) Jose Barreiro Lourido was the Bosun's Mate (Assistant Deck Foreman) and was working aft on the fish catch at the time of the collision.
- 7) Miguel Villarreal was an oiler (engine room rating) working aft on the fish catch at the time of the collision.
- 8) Joaguin Campos Amaro was a deckhand working aft on the fish catch at the time of the collision.
- 9) Tomas Lourido Cernadas was a deckhand working aft on the fish catch at the time of the collision.
- 10) Francisco Javier Iglesias Lopez was the cook/deckhand and was working aft on the fish catch at the time of the collision.
- 11) Blas Corta Jimenez was the off duty oiler and in his cabin at the time of the collision.

2.6 "OILEANN CLEIRE"

Name	"Oileann Cleire"
Previous name:	"Maureen Rose"
Official Number:	110804
Fishing Number:	D 610
Port of Registry:	Dublin, Ireland
Type:	Seining and Trawling
Flag:	Irish
Built:	1978 Baltimore Boatyard, Ireland.
Engine:	Grenaa - Type 6F24TK 650 hp/485Kw Driving a 3 bladed variable pitch propeller.
Hull:	Wood, Iroko on sawn oak futtock frames and floors.
L.O.A.:	24.38 m (80 feet)
Register Length:	22.86 m (75 feet)
Breadth:	7.01 m (23 feet)
Depth:	3.23 m (10 feet 07 inches)
Gross Tonnage:	117.48
Decks:	One
Owner and Operator:	Sean and Agnes O'Driscoll, Ardmanagh Drive, Schull, Co. Cork, Ireland.

2.6.1 A survey had been carried out on "Oileann Cleire" 20 February 1997 when the vessel changed ownership. A marine surveyor and consulting engineer instructed by the owner and for insurance underwriting purposes had carried out the survey. The vessel was found to be structurally sound and in an overall good condition.

2.6.2 The Department of the Marine and Natural Resources carried out a safety equipment inspection, on 11 November 1997. The vessel complied with Irish statutory requirements.

2.6.3 In addition to the above it has been established that at the time of the incident there was on board adequate life-saving appliances for the size of vessel and number of crew (5 persons) on board, including:

1 x 10 person RFD SOLAS Liferaft -	service due 11.11.99
1 x 8 person ZODIAC SOLAS -	service due 23.02.00
(See Appendix 8.6)	

The liferafts were stowed on the galley top and fitted with Hydrostatic Release Units.

"Oileann Cleire" had been regularly maintained and earlier in 1999 it had the deck fully caulked and 75% of the hull caulked. (See Appendix 8.5)

2.7 "OILEANN CLEIRE" - 5 PERSONS IN TOTAL:

- 1) Patrick O'Sullivan; who was the relief skipper;
- 2) Derek Gallagher; the engineer.
- 3) Dennis O'Driscoll; a deckhand,
- 4) Boris Hamon; a French national and deckhand,
- 5) Shane Kennedy; the cook/deckhand.

3. EVENTS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT

3.1 "ROHELLAN" LEADING UP TO THE COLLISION

- 3.1.1 The French trawler "Rohellan" was on regular voyages to and from the port of Castletownbere, which is situated on the Southwest coast of Ireland. "Rohellan" usually landed between 6 and 9 tonnes of fish and returned to the fishing grounds off the West coast of Ireland. The vessel had departed Castletownbere at 0730 on Tuesday 11 May 1999. "Rohellan" had been fishing since it arrived at the fishing grounds. On the day of the collision "Rohellan" had commenced shooting nets at 0600 and completed 4 tows that day.
- 3.1.2 Due to ground damage caused to the fishing nets "Rohellan" intended to steam westwards towards deeper water and a smoother fishing seabed in an attempt to avoid further net damage.
- 3.1.3 At approximately 1900 on Saturday 15 May 1999, "Rohellan" had already hauled nets and was proceeding at full speed, about 11 knots, on a westerly heading and steering by automatic pilot.
- 3.1.4 The duty crews of "Rohellan" were working on the catch of fish landed on board and were also engaged in repairing damaged nets on the after deck in preparation for the next shoot.
- 3.1.5 The Pesca du Patron (fishing skipper) was in the wheelhouse with the responsibility of maintaining the navigation watch.
- 3.1.6 He alleges that the sun was shining and causing a glare to be reflected off the calm sea up to the conning position thus adversely affecting his vision.
- 3.1.7 He maintains that from time to time leading up to the collision he looked ahead (forward) and did not see anything unusual ahead.
- 3.1.8 He states that one of the radars was not operational and the other daylight radar had a distorted screen image.
- 3.1.9 His attention was diverted towards his crew who were engaged in work on the aft deck.
- 3.1.10 He also maintains that lately he had noticed the vessel had been intermittently yawing 10 to 15 degrees when steering on automatic pilot.

3.2 "OILEANN CLEIRE" LEADING UP TO THE COLLISION

- 3.2.1 The Irish trawler had sailed from Castletownbere on Friday 14 May for the fishing grounds in approximate position 52 degrees North and 011 degrees West.
- 3.2.2 "Oileann Cleire" was engaged in twin trawling and had just completed a third tow and was hauling nets with the intention to reshoot.
- 3.2.3 "Oileann Cleire" was for some twenty minutes before and at the time of impact stopped in the water and heading in a westerly direction. They had been hauling nets for about twenty minutes. Three of the five crew were working on or near the mid deck and one was working aft. The skipper was close to the wheelhouse and operating the winch controls.
- 3.2.4 The crew of "Oileann Cleire" first sighted "Rohellan" when it was some 2 miles away and appeared then to be heading towards "Oileann Cleire".
- 3.2.5 As "Rohellan" continued to approach some of the crew of "Oileann Cleire" formed an impression that "Rohellan" was going to pass very close in order to see how much catch that "Oileann Cleire" had. The cod end of one trawl was over the port quarter and "Oileann Cleire" crew were preparing to lift it on board.
- 3.2.6 The French trawler continued to bear down on the Irish trawler. When it was at a distance of some 450 yards away (one crewmember stated 200 to 250 yards) it was observed to veer off to starboard some 10 to 15 degrees and then return back on course heading straight for "Oileann Cleire".
- 3.2.7 As "Rohellan" came much closer the skipper of "Oileann Cleire" realised that there was going to be a collision and rushed into the wheelhouse to alert the approaching trawler on the radio.

4. THE INCIDENT

- 4.1 The incident occurred at position 52.40.N and 011.46.W on Saturday, 15th May 1999 (See Appendices 8.2 and 8.3).
- 4.2 The bow of "Rohellan" struck the port stern of "Oileann Cleire" at full speed of 11 knots.
- 4.3 The stern of "Oileann Cleire" was pushed around and there was a second impact as the port side of "Rohellan" scraped down the "Oileann Cleire". "Oileann Cleire" began to list over to port.
- 4.4 The "Rohellan" had her propeller entangled in the nets of "Oileann Cleire" that were lying off to the port side of "Oileann Cleire" which resulted in "Rohellan" stopping in the water a short distance from "Oileann Cleire".
- 4.5 Immediately following the collision the skipper of "Oileann Cleire" called Valentia Radio (Coast Radio Station) on medium frequency 2182 k/Cs and informed the radio station that they had been "rammed" by another fishing vessel and that they were taking water and sinking and requested immediate assistance. Irish Marine Emergency Service (IMES) logged the communication at 1915 and a Mayday Relay broadcast was immediately made.
- 4.6 The mate/deckhand first looked into the machinery space of "Oileann Cleire" and at that time observed it dry. He then went down into the sleeping accommodation to inspect the damage there. The stern area was well open to the sea and "Oileann Cleire" was taking water rapidly into the accommodation.
- 4.7 The skipper of "Oileann Cleire" looked again into the machinery space and saw that the water was then rising up above the bottom plates. It was when the machinery space gearbox alarm sounded that he made the decision to abandon ship following his assessment that the vessel was foundering.
- 4.8 The French skipper of "Rohellan" was not on navigational watch at the time of impact. He was in his cabin resting. Immediately following impact the skipper went to the wheelhouse.
- 4.9 The weather at the time of the incident was fine, visibility good and wind slight. (See Appendix 8.3).

5. EVENTS AFTER THE INCIDENT

- 5.1 Within a short time following the collision the crew of “Oileann Cleire” had taken their lifejackets from their storage position under the settee in the messroom area and put them on. The position of storage of the lifejackets was well marked and they were readily accessible.
- 5.2 It took three of the crew on board “Oileann Cleire” to transfer the eight-person liferaft from the top of the galley to the starboard side.
- 5.3 The liferaft was placed over the side, inflated and the five crewmembers got on board. They used the paddles to clear “Oileann Cleire” and then boarded “Rohellan” by the ladder that had been rigged over the stern of the French trawler. The time was approximately 1930.
- 5.4 The IMES Rescue Helicopter lifted the five rescued crew off the French trawler at 2050 on Saturday 15 May 1999 and landed them at Shannon Airport at 2145. They were then taken to a hotel in Bunratty Co. Clare.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS

- 6.1 It is apparent that "Rohellan" as a 'power- driven vessel' under the Collision Regulations and not a 'vessel engaged in fishing' was proceeding at a full speed of 11 knots on a westerly heading and steering by automatic pilot. The International Regulations For Preventing Collisions At Sea 1972 deem this vessel as the responsible vessel under Rule 18 (a) and Rule 16. As a power-driven vessel underway it must keep out of the way of a vessel engaged in fishing, Rule 18 (a) (iii). Refer to Appendix 12 requires it to do so.
- 6.2 It is apparent that "Rohellan" was not maintaining a proper lookout in accordance with Rule 5 of Collision Regulations, appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions.
- 6.3 Being mindful of the good weather conditions the crew of "Oileann Cleire" perceived from observation that "Rohellan" was on a heading to pass very close by in order that "Rohellan" could observe what the "Oileann Cleire" crew were working at on deck. As "Rohellan" approached it was observed by two of the crew on "Oileann Cleire" to have altered course some 10 to 15 degrees and then resume back on to the course eventually leading to the collision. This deviation from the course would appear consistent with the alleged problem of the autopilot yawing. When it was realised by "Oileann Cleire" that a collision was imminent it was too late to take any appropriate avoiding action. The nets were still lying out in the sea and over the port stern.
- 6.4 The Pesca du Patron on board "Rohellan" who was the sole watch-keeper had been on board for two weeks and was engaged in working at least 12-hours bridge watch-keeping in each 24-hour period.
- 6.5 The Irish trawler did not carry an EPIRB (Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon) and is not required to do so under existing legislation at the time of the casualty for Class X Fishing vessels. During this incident an EPIRB was not required to be brought into use as part of the rescue operation.
- 6.6 It took three able bodied crew on board "Oileann Cleire" to transfer an 8 person SOLAS liferaft from the galley top to the deck and then over the ship side bulwark for launching and inflation. This made launching more difficult. (see Appendix 8.6).
- 6.7 Shortly following the "Oileann Cleire" submerging below the water the Hydrostatic Release Unit (HRU) to the second liferaft, which had remained secured on the wheelhouse top, operated. The container packed liferaft floated to the surface as designed and automatically inflated though in an inverted position. This occurred while the crew of "Oileann Cleire" were in the launched liferaft and paddling their way towards "Rohellan".

7 RECOMMENDATIONS

- 7.1 In the light of experience gained through the investigation of this casualty Marine Notice No. 24 of 1999 concerning the difficulties in Launching of Liferafts Stowed on the Top of Wheelhouse and Galley Tops of Fishing Vessels was published and circulated within two months following the casualty. (See Appendix 8.6).
- 7.2 A safe Navigational Watch should be maintained at all times in accordance with the International Regulations and Marine Notice No. 9 of 2002 (see Appendix 8.7)

8. APPENDICES


- 8.1. Photos of "Rohellan".
- 8.2. Larger scale copy taken from Admiralty Chart No. 1125
- 8.3 Met Eireann Weather Report for area on 15 May 1999.
- 8.4 Report from Atlantic Marine Supplies Ltd. of Killybegs advising of valid certification and service confirmation of SOLAS liferafts on "Oileann Cleire".
- 8.5 Photos of "Rohellan" showing damage on bow and views from wheelhouse.
- 8.6 Copy of Marine Notice No. 24 of 1999 issued 16 July 1999 following the casualty.
- 8.7 Marine Notice No. 9 of 2002 "Keeping a Safe Navigational Watch on Board Fishing Vessels" (First issued 1982).

8.1. Photos of "Rohellan".




APPENDIX 8.2

8.2. Larger scale copy taken from Admiralty Chart No. 1125



8.3 Met Éireann Weather Report for area on 15 May 1999.



MET ÉIREANN
The Irish Meteorological Service

Tel: +353-1-806 4200
Fax: +353-1-806 4247

Glasnevin Hill,
Dublin 9, Ireland.

Cnoc Ghlas Naíon,
Baile Átha Cliath 9, Éire.

Weather Report for the sea area around 67miles west of Loop Head
on the 15th May 1999
18 to 20 hours

General Situation


A large Anti-cyclone in the Atlantic extended north-eastwards over the sea area west of Ireland.

Details

Winds: North to north-east Force 1 to 4.

Weather: Fine.

Visibility: Good.




APPENDIX 8.4

- 8.4 Report from Atlantic Marine Supplies Ltd. of Killybegs advising of valid certification and service confirmation of SOLAS liferafts on "Oileann Cleire".

17/06/99	12:06	31699 ATLANTIC MARINE SUPPLIES LTD - DEPT MARINE SURV	NO. 853
tel 073-31440/31332		Fax: 073-31699	VAT No IE 4586166/B

ATLANTIC MARINE SUPPLIES LTD.
DONEGAL ROAD, KILLYBEGS, Co. DONEGAL



SHIP CHANDLERS LIFERAFT SERVICING

SUPPLIERS OF LIFESAVING & FIREFIGHTING EQUIPMENT

Date: 17-06-99

To: Department of The Marine

For the attention of: MR DONAL LENIHAN

Fax Number: 01 - 8724491

Number of pages: 1

From: Graeme

Message: DONAL

DETAILS ON LIFERAFTS WHICH WERE ON BOARD
M.F.V. "Oileann Cleire" are as follows

1 ONLY 10 PERSON RFD - Serial Number D10SU0214

Date of Service : 11-11-98,

Date of manufacture : 05-86

1 ONLY 8 PERSON Zodiac - Serial Number TBS188696

Date of Service : 23-02-99

Date of manufacture : 02/96

Hope the above is to your satisfaction, IF
you require any further details please give
the office a call.

Many thanks.
G -

8.5 Photos of "Rohellan" showing damage on bow and views from wheelhouse.



APPENDIX 8.5

CONTD.





- 8.6 Copy of Marine Notice No. 24 of 1999 issued 16 July 1999 following the casualty.



MARINE NOTICE


No. 24 of 1999

NOTICE TO ALL DESIGNERS, BUILDERS, REPAIRERS, OWNERS AND SKIPPERS OF FISHING VESSELS

THE LAUNCHING OF LIFERAFTS STOWED ON THE WHEELHOUSE AND GALLEY TOP OF FISHING VESSELS

1. The Department of the Marine and Natural Resources wishes to draw attention to the difficulties encountered in launching liferafts which are stowed on the wheelhouse and galley tops of many fishing vessels. On these fishing vessels the liferafts are often lashed down with rope and without a *hydrostatic release unit* (HRU) and weak link properly fitted.
2. In a recent incident, in order to launch a liferaft, it was first necessary to transfer one of the two liferafts which were positioned on the galley top to the deck and then over the ship side bulwark. The danger and difficulty to crew members involved in this particular operation was considerably increased by a heavy list on the vessel. Fortunately the weather conditions at the time were excellent with flat seas and good daylight visibility. Nevertheless, it took three able bodied hands to manhandle the liferaft to the launching position.
3. Liferafts should always be stowed in such a way as to be readily available in case of emergency, and they should be capable of being launched quickly to the sea on either side of the vessel.
4. To facilitate the safe launching of liferafts stowed on the wheelhouse or galley top, and to eliminate the necessity of manhandling the liferaft across cluttered working decks, the Department strongly recommends the fitting of portable rails together with a hinged launching ramp or other equivalent arrangement to bridge the area between the wheelhouse or galley top and the bulwark.
5. Approval of any such launching arrangements may be sought from the Department's Marine Survey Office, 26/27 Eden Quay, Dublin 1.

- 8.7 Marine Notice No. 9 of 2002 "Keeping a Safe Navigational Watch on Board Fishing Vessels" (First issued 1982).



Department of the Marine
and Natural Resources

Roinn na Mara agus Acmhainní Nádurtha

MARINE NOTICE No. 9 Of 2002

**NOTICE TO ALL OWNERS, OPERATORS, SKIPPERS, SECOND HANDS
AND CREWS OF FISHING VESSELS, AND TO NAUTICAL SCHOOLS**

**Keeping A Safe Navigational Watch On Board Fishing
Vessels**

The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has adopted Resolution A.484 (XII) "Basic Principles to be Observed in Keeping a Navigational Watch on board Fishing Vessels" relating to the principles to be observed in order to ensure that a safe navigational watch is maintained.

These principles were in effect reviewed and updated by the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Fishing Vessel Personnel 1995.

The basic principles are reproduced in the Annex to this Notice and should be observed by all concerned.

Candidates for all fishing certificates of competency will be expected to have a thorough knowledge of the content and application of the basic principles.

Marine Notice 39 of 1999 is hereby withdrawn as this Notice supersedes it.

Secretary-General
Department of the Marine and
Natural Resources
Dublin 2

12th May 2002

Any enquiries concerning Marine Notices should be addressed to:
Maritime Safety Division
Tel: 01-6199358 Fax: 01-6620774 email: marine.notices@marine.gov.ie

BASIC PRINCIPLES TO BE OBSERVED IN KEEPING A NAVIGATIONAL WATCH ON BOARD FISHING VESSELS

- 1** These basic principles are to be observed by skippers and watchkeeping personnel to ensure that a safe navigational watch is maintained at all times.
- 2** The skipper of every fishing vessel is bound to ensure that watchkeeping arrangements are adequate for maintaining a safe navigational watch. Under the skipper's general direction, the officers of the watch are responsible for navigating the vessel safely during their periods of duty when they will be particularly concerned with avoiding collision and stranding.
- 3** The basic principles, including but not limited to the following, should be taken into account on all fishing vessels. However, very small fishing vessels may be excluded from fully observing the basic principles. References to the wheelhouse should, in such vessels, be construed as meaning the position from which the navigation of the ship is controlled.
- 4** En route to or from fishing grounds

4.1 Arrangements of the navigational watch

4.1.1 The composition of the watch should at all times be adequate and appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions and should take into account the need for maintaining a proper look-out.

4.1.2 When deciding the composition of the watch the following factors, *inter alia*, should be taken into account:

- (i) at no time should the wheelhouse be left unattended;
- (ii) weather conditions, visibility and whether there is daylight or darkness;
- (iii) proximity of navigational hazards which may make it necessary for the officer in charge of the watch to carry out additional navigational duties;
- (iv) use and operational condition of navigational aids such as radar or electronic position-indicating devices and any other equipment affecting the safe navigation of the vessel;
- (v) whether the vessel is fitted with automatic steering;
- (vi) any unusual demands on the navigational watch that may arise as a result of special operational circumstances.

4.2 Fitness for duty

4.2.1 The watch system should be such that the efficiency of watchkeeping personnel is not impaired by fatigue. Duties should be so organised that the first watch at the commencement of a voyage and the subsequent relieving watches are sufficiently rested and otherwise fit for duty.

4.3 Navigation

4.3.1 The intended voyage should, as far as practicable, be planned in advance taking into consideration all pertinent information and any course laid down should be checked before the voyage commences.

4.3.2 During the watch the course steered, position and speed should be checked at sufficiently frequent intervals, using any available navigational aids necessary, to ensure that the vessel follows the planned course.

4.3.3 The officer in charge of the watch should have full knowledge of the location and operation of all safety and navigational equipment on board the vessel and should be aware and take account of the operating limitations of such equipment.

4.3.4 The officer in charge of a navigational watch should not be assigned or undertake any duties which would interfere with the safe navigation of the vessel.

4.4 Navigational equipment

4.4.1 The officer in charge of the watch should make the most effective use of all navigational equipment at his disposal.

4.4.2 When using radar the officer in charge of the watch should bear in mind the necessity to comply at all times with the provisions on the use of radar contained in the applicable regulations for preventing collisions at sea.

4.4.3 In cases of need the officer of the watch should not hesitate to use the helm, engines and sound signalling apparatus.

4.5 Navigational duties and responsibilities

4.5.1 The officer in charge of the watch should:

- (i) keep his watch in the wheelhouse;
- (ii) which he should in no circumstances leave until properly

relieved;

- (iii) continue to be responsible for the safe navigation of the vessel
- (iv) despite the presence of the skipper in the wheelhouse until the skipper informs him specifically that he has assumed that responsibility and this is mutually understood;
- (iv) notify the skipper when in any doubt as to what action to take in the interest of safety;
- (v) not hand over the watch to a relieving officer if he has reason to believe that the latter is obviously not capable of carrying out his duties effectively, in which case he should notify the skipper accordingly.

4.5.2 On taking over the watch the relieving officer should satisfy himself as to the vessel's estimated or true position and confirm its intended track, course and speed and should note any dangers to navigation expected to be encountered during his watch.

4.5.3 Whenever practicable a proper record should be kept of the movements and activities during the watch relating to the navigation of the vessel.

4.6 Look-out

4.6.1 A proper look-out shall be maintained in compliance with Rule 5 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972. It shall serve the purpose of:

- (i) maintaining a continuous state of vigilance by sight and hearing as well as by all other available means, with regard to any significant changes in the operating environment;
- (ii) fully appraising the situation and the risk of collision, stranding and other dangers to navigation, and;
- (iii) detecting ships or aircraft in distress, shipwrecked persons, wrecks and debris;

The look-out must be able to give full attention to the keeping of a proper look-out and no other duties shall be undertaken or assigned which could interfere with that task.

4.6.2 In determining that the composition of the navigational watch is adequate to ensure that a proper look-out can continuously be maintained, the skipper shall take into account all relevant factors, including those described under paragraph 4.1, as well as the following factors:

- (i) visibility, state of weather and sea;
- (ii) traffic density and other activities occurring in the area in which the vessel is operating;
- (iii) the attention necessary when navigating in or near traffic separation schemes and other routing measures;
- (iv) the additional workload caused by the nature of the vessel's functions, immediate operating requirements and anticipated manoeuvres;
- (v) rudder and propeller control and vessel manoeuvring characteristics;
- (vi) the fitness for duty of any crewmembers on call who may be assigned as members of the watch;
- (vii) knowledge of and confidence in the professional competence of the vessel's officers and crew;
- (viii) the experience of the officer of the navigational watch and the familiarity of that officer with the vessel's equipment, procedures and manoeuvring capability;
- (ix) activities taking place on board the vessel at any particular time and the availability of assistance to be summoned immediately to the wheelhouse when necessary;
- (x) the operational status of instrumentation in the wheelhouse and controls, including alarm systems;
- (xi) the size of the vessel and the field of vision available from the conning position;
- (xii) the configuration of the wheelhouse, to the extent such configuration might inhibit a member of the watch from detecting by sight or hearing any external developments.

4.7 Protection of the marine environment

4.7.1 The skipper and the officer in charge of the watch should be aware of the serious effects of operational or accidental pollution of the marine environment and should take all possible precautions to prevent such pollution particularly within the framework of relevant international and port regulations.

4.8 Weather conditions

4.8.1 The officer in charge of the watch should take relevant measures and notify the skipper when adverse changes in weather could affect the

4.8.2 Safety of the vessel, including conditions leading to ice accretion.

5.1 Navigation with pilot embarked

5.1.1 The presence of a Pilot on board does not relieve the skipper or officer in charge of the watch from their duties and obligations for the safety of the vessel. The skipper and the pilot should exchange information regarding navigation procedures, local conditions and the vessel's characteristics. The skipper and the officer of the watch should co-operate closely with the pilot and maintain an accurate check of the vessel's position and movement.

6.1 Vessels engaged in fishing or searching for fish

6.1.1 In addition to the principles enumerated in paragraph 4, the following factors should be considered and properly acted upon by the officer in charge of the watch:

- (i) other vessels engaged in fishing and their gear, own vessel's manoeuvring characteristics, particularly in stopping distance and the diameter of turning circle at sailing speed and with the fishing gear overboard;
- (ii) safety of the crew on deck;
- (iii) adverse effects on the safety of the vessel and its crew through reduction of stability and freeboard caused by exceptional forces resulting from fishing operations, catch handling and stowage, and unusual sea and weather conditions;
- (iv) the proximity of offshore structures, with special regard to the safety zones; and
- (v) wrecks and other underwater obstacles which could be hazardous for fishing gear.

6.2 When stowing the catch, attention should be given to the essential requirements for adequate freeboard and adequate stability and watertight integrity at all times during the voyage to the landing port taking into consideration consumption of fuel and stores, risk of adverse weather conditions and, especially in winter, risk of ice accretion on or above exposed decks in areas where ice accretion is likely to occur.

7.1 Anchor watch

7.1.1 The skipper should ensure, with a view to the safety of the vessel and crew, that a proper watch is maintained at all times from the wheelhouse or deck on fishing vessels at anchor.

8.1 Radio watchkeeping

- 8.1.1** The skipper should ensure that an adequate radio watch is maintained while the vessel is at sea, on appropriate frequencies, taking into account the requirements of the Radio Regulations.